



"SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REPUTATION
OF HOLDING EXTREME VIEWS":

CHAPTER FOURTEEN OF CANDRAKĪRTI'S
BODHISATTVA YOGĀCĀRACATUḤŚATAKATĪKĀ

EDITED FROM THE SANSKRIT FRAGMENTS AND THE TIBETAN TEXTS

TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED

by

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I INTRODUCTION

A. ĀRYADEVA AND HIS WORKS

The views of the celebrated Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250 A.D.), have been the subject of much discussion and debate, not only among his contemporaries, but even among present day scholars and philosophers who have compared them to those of Kant and Whitehead.¹ Nāgārjuna's works, in particular, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, provided the basis for the philosophical tenets of the Madhyamaka school upon which later Mādhyamikas, Āryadeva (ca. 170-270 A.D.), Buddhapālita (ca. 470-540 A.D.), Bhāvaviveka (ca. 490-570 A.D.), and Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650 A.D.), constructed their own treatises. The eminent position which Nāgārjuna occupies whenever Madhyamaka philosophy comes under discussion, although well deserved, at the same time, however, has overshadowed the contributions of his disciple, Āryadeva.

Āryadeva can be indentified without hesitation as the principal student of Nāgārjuna and as his successor in the Madhyamaka lineage. The Catuhśataka is Āryadeva's major treatise in which he utilizes the tenets of the Madhyamaka school to argue against the positions of his opponents who come from the Brahmanical schools and from other Buddhist schools as well. Some fragments of the Catuhśataka along with portions from a commentary, the Bodhisattvayogācārakatuhśatakatīkā, which was written by Candrakīrti, were discovered in 1911 by Haraprasad Shastri among some old palm leaf manuscripts that had come into his possession.² Three years later Shastri published these Sanskrit

fragments in the Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.³ Unfortunately less than a third of the original four hundred verses of Catuhṣataka was found among these fragments. The remainder of the verses have been preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations.⁴ P.L. Vaidya and Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya both utilizing the surviving Sanskrit fragments of the Catuhṣataka in conjunction with the Tibetan translation have translated, respectively, chapters eight through sixteen into French⁵ and chapter seven into English.⁶ In addition, Giuseppe Tucci has translated chapters nine through sixteen of the Chinese translation into Italian.⁷ No portion of Candrakīrti's commentary has been translated as yet into any western language. The present work translates the fourteenth chapter of Āryadeva's Catuhṣataka along with Candrakīrti's commentary on it, the Bodhisattvayogācārakatuhṣatakatīkā, into English. This chapter was chosen for translation because all but four of the original twenty five verses and much of the commentary are preserved in Sanskrit. The Tibetan translation has been consulted wherever the Sanskrit is lacking or seems corrupt.

The earliest and briefest of the biographical materials on Āryadeva is found in the first chapter of Candrakīrti's commentary. This account of Āryadeva's life was utilized by the Tibetan historians who enlarged upon it. Candrakīrti says:

The teacher Āryadeva was born on the island of Siṃhala as the son of the Siṃhala king. Finally, having forsaken / his position as / crown prince (rgyal tshab, yuvarāja), he

entered the religious life (rab tu byung, pravrajita). Then, having come south, he became the disciple (nye gnas, antevāsin) of the teacher Nāgārjuna. Because he [Āryadeva] was a follower of his doctrine, the truth of the Catuhśataka treatise is not different in character from the truth that is expounded in the Madhyamaka treatise. 8

Even this account, which was written some four or five hundred years after the death of Āryadeva, contains some information that seems suspect. The portrait of the young Āryadeva as a king's son, who renounces his position as heir apparent to the throne in order to take up the life of a wandering ascetic, is strikingly similar to the accounts we have of the Buddha's early life. Candrakīrti's brief narrative, however, clearly identifies him as a disciple of Nāgārjuna and as a follower of the Madhyamaka doctrine. There is said to be no essential difference between the views set forth in Āryadeva's Catuhśataka and those expressed earlier by his teacher, Nāgārjuna, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

The Tibetan historians, Bu ston (1290-1364 A.D.) and Tāranātha (1575-), both make use of Candrakīrti's account in addition to reporting the oral traditions passed on by their Indian and Tibetan contemporaries. Both histories, Bu ston's Chos 'byung, which was written in the fourteenth century A.D., and Tāranātha's rGya gar chos 'byung, which was written in 1608 A.D., follow much the same outline of events, but Tāranātha's version of Āryadeva's biography is much richer in detail and differs in some respects from Bu ston's version. "The teacher Āryadeva," Bu ston reports, "the [spiritual] son of Nāgārjuna, was miraculously born inside a lotus on the

island of Siṃhala and was taken by that island's king as [his] son."⁹ Tāranātha writes that although the story that Āryadeva was miraculously born inside a lotus in the garden of the Siṃhala king has circulated widely in Tibet and is believed by the Tibetan people, nonetheless, such a story is not reported in Candrakīrti's commentary to the Catuhśataka or in other original sources from India which state simply that he was the son of the Siṃhala king.¹⁰ Tāranātha gives the name of Āryadeva's father as Pañcaśrīga.¹¹

After Āryadeva had grown up, Bu ston says:

...having come to Nāgārjuna, he became [his] student. He became proficient in all the sciences and in all the non-Buddhist and Buddhist philosophical systems (grub mtha', siddhanta).¹²

Tāranātha's account of the same period of time in Āryadeva's life is much more extensive. After Āryadeva had reached maturity, he was placed in the position of heir apparent to the throne, but he strongly desired to gain admission (rab tu byung ba, pravrajyā) to the Buddhist monastic community. He received admission to the order, and subsequently, ordination (bsnyen par rdzogs, upasampadā) from Hemadeva.¹³ Then Tāranātha says:

When he had perfected [his study of] the entire corpus of Buddhist scripture (sde snod gsum, tripitaka), he arrived in India for the purpose of seeing the temples and stupas (mchod rten) of the various regions. He met Nāgārjuna when he [Nāgārjuna] was just about to leave the region of King Udayana for Śrīparvata. At Śrīparvata, honoring the feet of [his] teacher, he [Āryadeva] obtained many magical powers (dnogs grub, siddhi), the prolonging of life (bcud len, rasāyana), etc., and finally, was entrusted with the essential teachings.¹⁴

Āryadeva, according to both Bu ston and Tāranātha, was renowned for his ability to defend Buddhist doctrine against attacks from those who advocated heterodox views (*tīrthika, mu stegs pa*). Both accounts credit him with defeating Mātrceta in debate and converting him to Buddhism. Bu ston tells the following story about the events that led up to Mātrceta's conversion:

At that time a teacher of heterodox views, named Mātrceta, having propitiated the god Maheśvara, had received the excellent boon that he could not be overcome in debate by anyone born from a womb. Attacking the Buddha's teaching and converting the majority of the people to heterodoxy, he arrived at Nālandā. The Nālandā monks sent for Nāgārjuna, who was dwelling at Śrīparvata. Āryadeva promised Nāgārjuna and the monks that he would subdue the heretic. While traveling to Nālandā he gave one of his eyes as a gift to a tree goddess who had begged him for the eye. Then, after he had defeated the heretic, when they asked, "Who is this one-eyed man?", he said, "although Śiva has three eyes, he does not see the truth; although Indra has a thousand eyes, he does not see the truth. Āryadeva who has one eye sees the truth of all three states of existence (*srid pa gsum, tribhava*)."

While Mātrceta completely overcame by the Dharma was converted to the Buddhist teaching and became a great *paṇḍita*. 15

Tāranātha's version of the story of Mātrceta's conversion differs.¹⁶ In Bu ston's account Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva both were dwelling at Śrīparvata, but according to Tāranātha, Nāgārjuna had died and the invitation to debate with Mātrceta was sent to Āryadeva, not as Bu ston reports, to Nāgārjuna. Tāranātha explains that a female heretic had requested the eye of Āryadeva because the eye of a learned monk was necessary to complete the materials she required for the realization of magical pow-

er, while Bu ston had attributed the request to a tree goddess and had left unexplained her motive for making such a demand. In Bu ston's version of the story of Mātrceta's conversion it is implied that Āryadeva was able to defeat Mātrceta in debate because he had been lotus-born and the boon which Maheśvara had granted to Mātrceta rendered him invincible only insofar as his opponents were born from a womb. Tāranātha, however, rejected as apocryphal the story that Āryadeva had been born inside a lotus, and consequently, has a different explanation for the defeat of Mātrceta. He explains that by the use of magical incantations (sngags, mantra) and by encircling the debating area with rags, Maheśvara was prevented from entering into Mātrceta's stream of consciousness (rgyud, saṃtāna), and thus, he was able to be vanquished by Āryadeva.¹⁷

Bu ston provides no more details of Āryadeva's life after his defeat of Mātrceta, although he mentions the tradition that holds that Āryadeva obtained the eighth stage on the Bodhisattva path.¹⁸ Tāranātha says:

After that, the teacher Āryadeva remained at Nālandā for a long time, but at last, he again went south and worked extensively for the benefit of sentient beings. At the place called Raṅganātha near Kāñcī he, having entrusted the essential teachings to Rāhulabhadra, died.¹⁹

Before passing judgement on the historical merits of Bu ston's and Tāranātha's works, it may be useful to consider the Chinese accounts of Āryadeva's life.

The Chinese sources contain biographical material on Āryadeva that is not found in the Tibetan histories. The earliest

of these Chinese sources is a biography of Āryadeva, the T'i p'o p'u sa ch'uan which was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Kumārajīva some time between the years 402 and 412 A.D.²⁰ In the Chinese accounts Āryadeva is referred to as Deva or as Kānadeva. The biography which was translated by Kumārajīva tells the following story to explain the reason for the epithet "one-eyed" (kāna) being applied to Deva:

Bodhisattva Kānadeva, a son of a Brahman in Southern India, was the greatest disciple of Nāgārjuna. He was matchlessly eloquent. In his time there was a large golden image of Maheśvara whose statue was about 22 to 36 feet high. People believed that if they made vows to this image, they could obtain any desire.... But Deva fearlessly said: "If this be God, it must exercise the influence of divine power upon human beings and must overpower all beings with its divine knowledge and virtue. Here indeed is trickery devised for the purpose of deluding with the gorgeousness of gold and the glitter of glass. 21

With the aid of a ladder Āryadeva climbed onto the immense statue of Maheśvara and plucked the left eye from it. When he returned the following morning to the shrine of Maheśvara with alms, the deity who still lacked the left eye became incarnate and addressed Āryadeva:

"What I want is the left eye. Art thou able to give me thy left eye?" Deva replied: "Certainly, sir." He bored it out and offered it of his own will. Maheśvara said: "Well done. This is the true and best of alms." 22

This biography also attests to Āryadeva's great skill in debate. He had been granted permission by a South Indian king whom he had converted to gather together all the teachers of heterodox views and to debate the Buddha's teachings with them.

None of them was able to refute his arguments. Consequently, they were all forced to shave their heads and become Āryadeva's disciples. This great victory, however, was the cause of Āryadeva's death. After the debate, he had retired along with his many disciples to a secluded forest. There the Catuhśataka and the Śataśāstra were composed. An embittered disciple of one of the defeated heterodox teachers one day surprised Āryadeva while he was walking through the forest and murdered him to avenge his former teacher.²³

The record that the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan tsang made of his journey to India during the latter part of the seventh century A.D., namely, the Ta T'ang Hsi yu chi, contains several anecdotes about Āryadeva. Hsüan tsang reports that when Āryadeva sought to meet Nāgārjuna, Nāgārjuna, who had been informed that Āryadeva had arrived, filled a bowl with water and had one of his disciples take the bowl to Āryadeva. Āryadeva silently dropped a needle into the bowl. After the bewildered disciple returned with the bowl, Nāgārjuna explained to him that the bowl of water symbolized his own knowledge and that Āryadeva's action signified that he had penetrated that knowledge. Nāgārjuna thereupon welcomed Āryadeva and praised him as an excellent scholar. He considered him to be the proper person to whom he could entrust the continuous lamp of the true teachings.²⁴

Hsuan tsang reports that the following discourse took place between Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. Āryadeva had heard that the monks at Vaiśālī had been unable to defeat the heterodox teachers in debate for twelve years and as a consequence were prohibited from sounding the gong (ghaṇṭā). He said to Nāgārjuna:

I am bold enough to think that by the instruction I have received I can silence all the heretics. But let my master assume the side of the heretics, and I will refute you....Nāgārjuna took the side of the heretics, and Deva set himself to overthrow his arguments. After seven days Nāgārjuna lost his superiority (was defeated), and said with a sigh, "False positions are easily lost; erroneous doctrines are defended with difficulty. You yourself can go; you will overthrow those men."²⁵

The fame of Āryadeva had preceeded him to Vaiśālī, and the heretics had persuaded the king to forbid entrance to the city to any foreign monk (śramaṇa), but nevertheless, Āryadeva entered the city in disguise and struck the gong. The king summoned all the heretics to a debate with Āryadeva. They were all defeated by Āryadeva. The king had a stūpa built to honor Āryadeva's victory.²⁶

Another encounter between Āryadeva and a heretical opponent has been reported in Hsüan tsang's account of his travels in India. There was a brahmin who was renowned for his ability to silence his challengers through the use of different applications of the same word. He said to Āryadeva:

"Pray, what is your name?" Deva said, "They call me Deva." The heretic rejoined, "Who is Deva?" He answered, "I am." The heretic said, "And who is 'I'?" Deva answered, "A dog." The heretic said, "And who is a dog?" Deva said, "You." The heretic answered, "And 'you' what is that?" Deva said, "Deva." The heretic said, "And who is Deva?" He said, "I." The heretic said, "And who is 'I'?" Deva said, "A dog." Again the heretic asked, "And who is a dog?" Deva said, "you." The heretic said, "And who is 'you'?" Deva answered, "Deva." And so they went on till the heretic understood; from that time he greatly revered the brilliant reputation of Deva.²⁷

Āryadeva, according to Hsüan tsang, was honored as one of the four suns that illuminate the world.²⁸

Unfortunately much of the material on Āryadeva's life, which is to be found in Candrakīrti's commentary to the Catuh'sataka, the religious histories of Bu ston and Tāranātha, the biography which was translated by Kumārajīva, and Hsüan tsang's account of his travels in India, is unreliable as it is based largely upon legends and anecdotes which are difficult to substantiate and are probably apocryphal. All that can be determined with certainty is that Āryadeva was a student of Nāgārjuna, a Mādhyamika, and a skilled debator who was well acquainted with the philosophical systems of both his Buddhist and Brahmanical opponents.

The year and place of his birth are uncertain. Candrakīrti, Bu ston, Tāranātha, and Hsüan tsang all place the birth of Āryadeva on the island of Siṃhala. The Singhalese chronicles, the Mahāvamsa and the Dīpavamsa, both mention a monk Thera Deva who preached to the third century A.D. kings of Ceylon, Vohara Tissa, Abhaya Tissa, and Saṅgha Tissa.²⁹ Both Yamakami and Lamotte suggest that this monk Thera Deva left Ceylon for southern India where he was known as Āryadeva.³⁰ However the biography translated by Kumārajīva puts Āryadeva's birthplace in southern India. P.S. Sastri argues that the Andhra district is the site of Āryadeva's birth.³¹ Regardless of the issue of his birthplace it seems likely that both Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna lived for some time in the Andhra region. On the basis of Nāgārjuna's association with one of the Andhra Śātavahāna kings who is identified by Lamotte as Yajñāśri,³² for whom one of Nāgārjuna's works, the Suhrllekha was

written, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva are considered to have flourished during the second and third centuries A.D.³³

With the exception of the fragmentary remains of the Catuhśataka, and the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa none of the many works attributed to Āryadeva in the Tibetan and Chinese Tripiṭakas survive in Sanskrit. The Catuhśataka is without doubt the work of the first Āryadeva, but the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa a tantric text, is the work of a second Āryadeva who had adopted the name of the earlier Mādhyamika writer.³⁴ The Tōhoku catalogue of the Tibetan bstan 'gyur does not distinguish between these two Āryadevas. All of the tantric works attributed to Āryadeva in the Tōhoku catalogue may be considered the works of this second Āryadeva. In addition to the tantric works, the Tōhoku catalogue attributes the following treatises to Āryadeva.

1. Hastavālaprakaraṇa (3844) translated by Śraddhākara-varma and Rin chen bzang po; Hastavālaprakaraṇakārikā (3848) translated by dPal brtsegs raksita.

2. Hastavālaprakaraṇavṛtti (3845), translated by Śraddhākara-varma and Rin chen bzang po; Hastavālavṛtti (3849), translated by Dānaśīla, dPal 'byor snying po, and dPal brtsegs raksita.

3. Catuhśatakaśāstrakārikānāma (3846), translated by Sūksmajāna and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.

4. Skhalitapramardanayuktihetusiddhināma (3847), translated by dPal brtsegs raksita.

5. Madhyamakabhramaghātanāma (3850), translated by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Tshul khrims rgyal ba.

6. Jñānasārasamuccayanāma (3851) translated by Kṛṣṇa-pa and Chos kyi shes rab.

Of these treatises, the Hastavālaprakaraṇa and its vṛtti are wrongly attributed to Āryadeva. The Chinese Tripitaka correctly ascribes them to Dignāga.³⁵ The Catuhśataka is certainly the work of Āryadeva, but the three small works, The Skhalitapramardanayuktihetusiddhi, the Madhyamakabhramaghāta, and the Jñānasārasamuccaya, may not be his works.

Nanjio's catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka attributes the following treatises to Āryadeva.

1. Śataśāstra (1188), translated by Kumārajīva; Śataśāstravaipulya (1189), translated by Hsüan tsang, and Śataśāstravaipulya (1198) also translated by Hsüan tsang. The first two works contain a commentary by Vasu, while the latter work, which is believed to be the last eight chapters of the Catuhśataka, contains a commentary by Dharmapāla.

2. Aksaraśataka (1254), translated by Bodhiruci.

3. Mahāpurusaśāstra (1242), translated by Tao thai

4. Śāstra on the refutation of the four theses of the Tīrthikas and the Hīnayānists in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (1259), translated by Bodhiruci.

5. Śāstra on the explanation of the Nirvāṇa of the Tīrthikas and the Hīnayānists in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (1260). translated by Bodhiruci.

In addition a commentary on the Madhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna translated by Kumārajīva (1174), and by Prabhākaramitra (1185) is also ascribed to Āryadeva by those who take Nīlacakṣus and Piṅgalanetra as his aliases.³⁶ Of the above works, the first

two, the Śataśāstra and the Aksaraśataka, are certainly the work of Āryadeva despite the fact that the Tibetan Tripitaka attributes the Aksaraśataka to Nāgārjuna.³⁷ The other works are ascribed to Āryadeva with less justification. The three works most commonly ascribed to Āryadeva are the Catuhśataka, the Śataśāstra, and the Aksaraśataka. V. Gokhale points out, "one might easily be tempted to suggest a chronological sequence among the works: Catuhśataka, Śataka (Śata Śāstra) and Aksara Śataka, where beginning from the Catuhśataka the logical arguments become more and more systematic and pointed."³⁸

B. CANDRAKĪRTI AND HIS WORKS

Several hundred years after the deaths of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva the Madhyamaka school split into two separate factions: the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. These two factions were headed, respectively, by Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita. In the rgya gar chos 'byung Tāranātha reports that according to the stories that were widespread among the Tibetan people Buddhapālita was reborn as Candrakīrti. However, Tāranātha rejects this story as groundless and irrational.³⁹ Bu ston's Chos 'byung provides the following information about the life of Candrakīrti:

Candrakīrti was born at Samana in the southern region of the country. By studying the sūtras and tantras, and relying upon the discourses of Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son,⁴⁰ Āryadeva, he became a great pandita.

Bu ston briefly mentions two anecdotes which are related in detail below:

One day while circumambulating the main temple at Nālandā, Candrakīrti hit his head on a pillar. A scholar who was with him asked, "You are the believer in the self-naturelessness of both persons and phenomena. Why, then, does anything happen when your head hits this column?"

The Bodhisattva replied, "Column? What column?" and put his hand through the column as though it were not there.

Another time there was an extremely heavy rainy season, and all the cows sought shelter deep in the jungle. The monks wanted milk and said to Candrakīrti, "If everything is really without an intrinsic nature of its own, why don't you get us some milk from that picture of a cow?" Candrakīrti milked the cow in the picture and presented the milk to the Saṅgha. In such a way he led many followers of the other Mahāyāna schools to the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.⁴¹

Tāranātha says that Candrakīrti received instruction in the works of Nāgārjuna from various students of Bhāvaviveka and also from a certain Kamalabuddhi who was a student of Bhāvaviveka's rival, Buddhapālita. Eventually, Candrakīrti became head of the great Buddhist monastic university of Nālandā.⁴² Tāranātha recounts that during the period of time that Candrakīrti spent at Nālandā he engaged the scholar Candragomin in debate for a period of seven years. Candragomin upheld the doctrines of the Yogācāra school. Candrakīrti, on the other hand, defended the Madhyamaka doctrine of the absence of own-nature (niḥsvabhāva). The lengthy debate came to an end only after Candragomin sought the assistance of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara. Upon learning this, Candrakīrti accused the Bodhisattva of taking sides in the debate, and thereafter, no more answers were supplied to Candragomin.⁴³ After some time, Candrakīrti returned south where he continued to promulgate the Dharma. Tāranātha attributes to him the conversion of many brahmins and the establishment of many centers for the spread of the Dharma.⁴⁴

It is evident from the works of Candrakīrti that he was familiar not only with the root texts of Madhyamaka philosophy which were composed by Nāgārjuna, but also that he knew well the divergent interpretations propounded by Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita. This suggests that Candrakīrti had studied with disciples of both men. Moreover, the study of his works indicates that he supported the opinions of Buddhapālita and criticized those of Bhāvaviveka. The anecdotes quoted above are certainly apocryphal, but they demonstrate Candrakīrti's

belief in the doctrine of the absence of own-nature for all things.

It is possible as Tāranātha has said that Candrakīrti at one time became the abbot of Nālandā, but it is very unlikely as Tāranātha reports that Dharmapāla was his successor. Elsewhere in the *rGya gar chos 'byung* Tāranātha has written that Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Catuhśataka* is earlier than the one Candrakīrti wrote on the same text,⁴⁵ and this is certainly the case. Hsuan tsang who travels in India extended over the years 629-641 A.D. was familiar with Dharmapāla as one of the past abbots of Nālandā, but Candrakīrti is nowhere mentioned in the record of his travels.⁴⁶ Hsuan tsang also reveals that Bhāvaviveka had gone north to engage Dharmapāla in a debate, but that the latter had already retired to Bodhgayā to take up the pursuit of meditation.⁴⁷ Ui has put the date of Dharmapāla's retirement from Nālandā at 599 A.D.⁴⁸ The debate between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka was carried out only in their written works.⁴⁹

The date of Candrakīrti is uncertain, but the opinion of Winternitz that "One of Dharmapāla's pupils is Candrakīrti, who must accordingly have lived in the 6th century and not, as is usually taken for granted, in the 7th," is not very likely. Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti shared a common interest in refuting the opinions of Bhāvaviveka and it is certain that Candrakīrti was familiar with Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Catuhśataka*.⁵¹ If the Candrakīrti that the Chinese pilgrim I tsing met in eastern India in the seventh century is Candragomin⁵² and further if

the Tibetan tradition is correct in maintaining that Candragomin and Candrakīrti were contemporaries, then, a seventh century date is appropriate. Moreover, as the dates of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka have been fixed as well within the latter half of the sixth century, and if it is true as the rGya gar chos 'byung reports that Candrakīrti studied with students of these two men, then a date set in the early part of the seventh century or even later seems more probable than one set in the sixth century.

The Tibetan bsTan 'gyur does not distinguish between one Candrakīrti, the composer of Mādhyamika treatises, and the other Candrakīrti, the composer of a number of Tantric works.⁵³ Apart from those works attributed to this second Candrakīrti the Tōhoku catalogue of the Tibetan Tripitaka ascribes the following works which are contained in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan 'gyur to Candrakīrti:

1. Mūlamadhyamakakārikāvṛttiprasannapadānāma (3860), translated by Mahāsumati and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags; revised by Kanakavarma and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.
2. Madhyamakāvatāranāma (3861), translated by Tilakakalaśa and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags; revised by Kanakavarma and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.
3. Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyanāma (3862), translated by Tilakakalaśa and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags; revised by Kanakavarma and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.
4. Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra (3863), translated by Zla ba grags pa and 'Gos Lhas btsas.
5. Yuktisastikavṛtti (3864), translated by Jinamitra,

Dānaśīla, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye shes sde.

6. Bodhisattvayogācārakatuhśatakatikā (3865), translated by Sūksmajāna and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.
7. Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa (3866), translated by Dīpaṃkara-śrījñāna and Tshul khrims rgyal ba.
8. Śūnyatāsapatativṛtti (3867), translated by Abhayākara and Dar ma grags.

Bu ston attributes to Candrakīrti a commentary on the Guhya-samājatantra entitled the Pradīpoddyotana⁵⁴, but Candrakīrti's authorship of such a work is not mentioned by Tāranātha. The Pradīpoddyotana is probably the work of the second Candrakīrti.

C. THE SANSKRIT FRAGMENTS OF THE CATUHŚATAKA AND ITS
COMMENTARY, THE BODHISATTVA YOGĀCĀRACATUHŚATAKATĪKĀ

In 1911 in an article entitled, "Notes on the newly found manuscript of the Chatuḥśatika by Āryadeva," which appeared in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Haraprasad Shastri reported that he had received a batch of old palm leaves which contained fragments of four different works.⁵⁵ Twenty three of these leaves were found to contain a then unknown commentary on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. Although Shastri's task was made difficult by the previous owner of the palm leaves who had replaced the old leaf marks with new marks of his own which completely changed the original sequence of the leaves, he was able to find the colophons to seven of the chapters in Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka and put the twenty three leaves back into their proper order. He discovered that the entire work had been divided into sixteen chapters of which he says, "the first eight chapters are dogmatical and religious, and the last eight chapters are philosophical and controversial."⁵⁶

Three years later Shastri published these fragmentary remains of the Catuḥśataka in the Memoirs of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.⁵⁷ Shastri wrote that he had edited the text from the twenty three palm leafs which were inscribed in the Newārī characters of the eleventh century and had been assisted by Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣana in comparing the Sanskrit fragments with the Tibetan translation. He says:

From a comparison with the Tibetan translation the commentary appears to have been written by Candrakīrti. The commentary is written in beautiful prose, enlivened in the first 8 chapters with pretty

stories and anecdotes taken from both life and literature; and in the last 8 chapters, with philosophical speculations both Buddhist and Brahmanical. 58

Shastri says that the Catuhśataka originally contained three hundred seventy five verses which were divided among the sixteen chapters. The majority of these sixteen chapters had twenty five verses each.⁵⁹ However P.L. Vaidya found that when he consulted the Tibetan translation of the Catuhśataka all four hundred verses were present in both the Peking and sNarthang editions.⁶⁰ Vaidya in Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuhśataka reconstructed the missing one hundred and seventeen verses of chapters eight through sixteen.

In a paper delivered at the Fourth Oriental Conference held at Allahabad in 1926 Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya criticized Vaidya's reconstructions as "marred by many inaccuracies."⁶¹ In addition he presented in this paper his own reconstruction from the Tibetan of the verses in chapter seven of the Catuhśataka. Bhattacharya's extensive criticism of Vaidya's work developed in a book, The Catuhśataka of Āryadeva in which he reconstructed once again the verses of chapters eight through sixteen and compared his versions with those published earlier by Vaidya.⁶²

Bhattacharya's book was an improvement over Vaidya's work because Bhattacharya had been able to consult both the sNarthang and Peking editions of the Catuhśataka and of its commentary, the Bodhisattvayogācārācatuhśatakatīkā while Vaidya had used only the Tibetan translation of the Catuhśataka itself. Bhattacharya's book has not only the original and reconstructed por-

tions of the Catuhśataka, but much of the original and reconstructed portions of the commentary as well.

Unfortunately, Bhattacharya's reconstructions also are marred on occasion by inaccuracy. This inaccuracy is due in part to the fact that the xylographs of the Peking and Snarthag editions with which he had to work were illegible in some places.⁶³ Also, both the Peking and Snarthag editions contain readings which in the light of comparison with the Cone and Derge editions should be disregarded. Any new retranslation of the Catuhśataka from Tibetan into Sanskrit must take into account the readings in all four editions of the Tibetan Tripitaka both of the text itself and its commentary. Both Vaidya's and Bhattacharya's reconstructions have proved helpful on occasion and although I disagree in some places with the reconstructions of both writers, nevertheless, I have not made an effort to draw attention to every instance of disagreement. An extensive critique of either Vaidya's or Bhattacharya's reconstructions is beyond the scope of the present work.

D. THE TIBETAN TRANSLATION OF THE CATUHŚATAKA AND ITS
COMMENTARY, THE BODHISATTVA YOGĀCĀRACATUHŚATAKATĪKĀ

The first of many Tibetan translators (lo tsā ba) who were to travel to Kashmir for the purpose of studying Sanskrit and Buddhist doctrine with the Indian scholars (paṇḍita) of that region were sent by 'Khore-re, the tenth century king of the western area of Tibet. When the two surviving members of the original group of twenty one, Rin chen bzang po and Legs pa'i shes rab, returned to Tibet after completing their studies in India, they brought back with them many Indian scholars.⁶⁴ The collaboration of these Tibetan translators and Indian scholars resulted in the translation of many Buddhist works that had not been translated previously.

Some of these Tibetan translators remained in Kashmir studying with Indian teachers for long periods of time. "Pa tshab Nyi ma grags," Bu ston reports in the Chos 'byung, "studied in Kashmir for twenty three years, invited the scholar Kanakavarma [to come to Tibet], and explained the turning of the wheels of Madhyamaka [to Tibetans]."⁶⁵ The Deb ther sngon po of 'Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481) credits Nyi ma grags with introducing the works of Candrakīrti to Tibetan scholars. He was born in 1055 A.D. in the upper region of the sPa tshab district in 'Phan Yul. Nyi ma grags had arrived in Kashmir when he was a youth and remained there for twenty three years while studying the Sanskrit language and Buddhist works with the two sons of Sañjana and with other learned scholars.⁶⁶ He studied in

the monastery of Ratnaguptavihāra which was located in the town Anupamamahāpura, the present Śrīnagar according to Nau-dou.⁶⁷ Two Indian scholars, Kanakavarma and Tilakakalaśa, accompanied Nyi ma grags on his return to Tibet.⁶⁸

'Gos lo tsā ba says:

When he returned to 'Phan Yul, [his] students were few. A good friend (dge ba'i shes gnyen, kalyānamitra), Shar ba pa, sent many of his own students to him to study Madhyamaka. Then after establishing well the Madhyamaka teaching, he supported many monks and translated well the commentaries composed by Candra[kīrti] to the three [major works, viz.,] the Mūlamadhyamakārikā, the Madhyamakāvatāra, and the Ca-tuhśataka, [and also] the Yukisastika. Later at Ramoche together with the scholar Kanakavarma he checked [his translations] with the manuscripts of Magadha. The great commentary composed by Candra[kīrti] to the Sūnyatāsapatati was [previously] translated by Abhaya and sNur Dharma grags. sPa tshab and the scholar Mudita together revised more than two sections (bam po) in the first part of this commentary.⁶⁹

In Lhasa at the temple Ramoche Tilakakalaśa worked together with Nyi ma grags on the translation of many hymns of praise (stotra, bstod pa) as well as on the translation of the Madhyamakāvatāra.⁷⁰ Kanakavarma also had gone with Nyi ma grags to Ramoche where together they compared Nyi ma grags's and Mahāsumati's translation of the Prasannapadā with the original Sanskrit manuscripts.⁷¹ As 'Go lo tsā ba has said above other translations also were checked against the original Sanskrit versions. Jacques May in speaking about Nyi ma grags's translation of the Prasannapadā has said that it is "extrêmement remarquable pour la précision et l'exactitude qu'elle met à rendre les nuances et la terminologie de l'original sanscrit."⁷²

Both the Catuhśataka and its commentary, the Bodhisattvayogācāracatuhśatakatīkā, were translated into Tibetan by Nyi ma grags and the Indian scholar, Sūkṣmajana. The colophon to the Bodhisattvayogācāracatuhśatakatīkā describes Sūkṣmajana as "having been born into the lineage of a family of scholars for countless generations, the son of the great brahmin, Sañjana, and the greatgrandson of the great brahmin, Ratnavajra."⁷³ Ratnavajra was one of the Indian scholars who had collaborated with Rin chen bzang po.⁷⁴ In the Deb ther sngon po Nyi ma grags is reported to have said that although Rin chen bzang po was renowned as a good translator and had boasted of his translation of the Pradīpodyotana commentary to the Guhyasamājatantra, nevertheless, he found that it had not been properly done and retranslated it.⁷⁵ The Deb ther sngon po's mention of Nyi ma grags's revision of previously translated works supports Arnold Kunst who says:

We very seldom come across translations of Sanskrit works either in the Kanjur or in the Tanjur which were prepared by more than one translator. The usual partnership was the Indian Pandit, the Tibetan Lotsava and a reviser. But no more than one party is attached to one work and strangely enough it always has been taken for granted that no other translators existed. The view should be revised perhaps to the effect that no other "official" translator existed.⁷⁶

The process of revision continued throughout the preparation of new editions of canonical works.

E. THE CONTENT OF THE FOURTEENTH CHAPTER

That all exists, Kaccāna, this is one extreme. That all does not exist, this is the second extreme.⁷⁷

The earliest reference to the extreme views occurs in the Pali canon. In the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta in which, according to tradition, the newly-enlightened Tathāgata sets in motion the wheel of his doctrine, the two extremes are explained as sensual indulgence (kāmasukhallika) and self-torture (attakilamatha). The practice of sensual indulgence is vulgar and the practice of self-torture is painful; both are unprofitable and ought, therefore, to be avoided.⁷⁸ Here the two extremes refer to conduct, but in other canonical passages, such as the one quoted above, the two extremes have a philosophical connotation. These latter two extremes are known as the eternalist view (bhavadiṭṭhi) and the annihilist view (vibhavadiṭṭhi). In the Cūlasīhanāda Sutta the Buddha warns his disciples that whoever clings to either of these two extremes, ignorant of their pitfalls, will succumb to the influence of desire (rāga), aversion (dosa), and delusion (moha) and will not find release (nissarana) from suffering.⁷⁹

Taking the self (atta) as a reified entity and as the object of unprofitable speculative opinions (diṭṭhi), the ignorant remain bound to the cycle of existence (saṃsāra). Speculative opinions concerning the eternality of the self and the world (loka) are catalogued in detail in the Brahmajāla Sutta,⁸⁰ one of the earliest and most extensive accounts of the views

held by the Buddhists' rivals. The response of the Buddha to these speculative views is that speculation about the eternality of the self or the world and so on does not lead to an absence of desire (virāga), cessation (nirodha), calm (upasama), super-knowledge (abhiñña), complete awakening (sambodhi), or Nibbāna.⁸¹ The Buddha proclaims that he is free of all speculative views and that as he has understood the arising (samudaya) and ceasing (atthaṅgama) of the aggregates (khandā) he has, therefore, attained liberation (vimutta).⁸² Interdependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) governs the arising and ceasing of all things, but this 'chain of causation' as it is sometimes referred to can be severed through destroying either ignorance (avijjā), the first of its twelve members, or desire (tanhā), the eighth member. Ignorance and desire are the root causes for attachment to the cycle of existence and only through their eradication can liberation be attained.

In short, all erroneous speculative views, which can be reduced in number to the two principal ones, namely, the view of eternalism (bhavadiṭṭhi, sassatadiṭṭhi) and the view of annihilationism (vibhavadiṭṭhi, ucchedadiṭṭhi), are rejected in the early canonical literature inasmuch as they are contrary to fact and totally ineffective in breaking the bonds of saṃsāra. Only the correct views (sammādiṭṭhi), namely, the understanding of interdependent origination, and the understanding of the four noble truths, will bring about such liberation.

* * * * *

Early Buddhist philosophy was based upon experience, not upon speculation. The criterion for knowledge was observation.

The world and all the things within it were seen to be unsatisfactory and attachment to these things was given as the source of suffering. Through the pervasive force of ignorance the mind fails to perceive these things as they really are (yathābhūtam) and consequently, seizes upon the erroneous notion that these things actually exist as the objects of the self's attachment. The goal of the Abhidharma treatises is to demonstrate the fact that there is no real substantial self apart from the continually changing aggregates (skandha), nor is there any real objective thing apart from the continually changing aggregation of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī). The Abhidharma is an ordered and concise rendition of the topics which were discussed by the Buddha throughout the Sūtras. In the Sūtras the Buddha's doctrine was adapted to nature of his audience, but in the Abhidharma texts the doctrine is presented invariably in succinct technical terminology.

The fifth of the seven books which comprise the Pali Abhidhamma, the Kathāvatthu, is an encyclopedic account of the various speculative views likely to be raised in scholastic debates and of the various arguments useful in refuting those who maintained such views. In the section of the Kathāvatthu which is concerned with the topic of the self it is said that, according to the Buddha, there are three types of teachers: those who maintain that there is a self which exists in this world (ditthe dharme) and will exist in the world to come, those who maintain that there is a self which exists in this world, but who do not maintain that there is a self in the world to come, and those who maintain that there is neither a self in this world nor in the world to come. The first are eternalists (sassatavādin), the

second are annihilationists (ucchedavādin), and the third are completely enlightened (sammāsambuddha).⁸³

The Vibhāṣā, a commentary, originally written in Sanskrit but now preserved only in Chinese, on the first of the seven books of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the Jñānaprasthāna, states that all wrong speculative views (kudṛsti) are encompassed by just two, bhavadrsti, which is equivalent to śāśvatadrsti, the view of eternity, and vibhavadrsti, which is equivalent to ucchedadrsti, the view of annihilation.⁸⁴ Moreover, the Vibhāṣā says that the brahmanas and the heterodox mendicants (parivrajaka-tīrthika) in accepting the view of eternity or the view of annihilation have repudiated the middle path (madhyamā pratipad). The Vibhāṣā, quoting the Buddha, asserts:

Those who maintain annihilation or eternity are not true brahmanas. The true brahmana understands that everything which is subject to production is subject to destruction. As there is production, therefore, there is no annihilation; as there is destruction, therefore, there is no eternity. Neither annihilation, nor eternity--that is the middle path.⁸⁵

Those who agreed with the statements of the Vibhāṣā became known as the Vaibhāṣikas. A later compendium of Abhidharma philosophy, the Abhidharmakośa, describing the Vaibhāṣika point of view, was written by Vasubandhu (ca. 5th century A.D.). According to the Abhidharmakośa, seizing the extremes (antagrāha) was one of five major erroneous views. Vasubandhu says:

The view of seizing the extremes is [defined as maintaining] the view of eternity (dhruva) or the view of annihilation for that very thing which was admitted to be the self (ātman) because it seizes the extremes of eternity or annihilation.⁸⁶

The affirmation of either eternity or annihilation with respect

to anything was rejected by the Abhidharma treatises. The perfectly enlightened (samyaksambuddha) teacher does not speak of anything that remains unaffected by birth (jāti) and decay (jarā)

* * * * *

The Buddha proclaimed his teaching as the middle path, the path which avoids the extremes and thus, leads to awakening (bodhi) and nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna, relying upon the Buddha's words as his inspiration, calls his philosophical system the Madhyamaka. His views on the middle path and the extremes are set out in his major work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In the seventh verse of chapter fifteen Nāgārjuna refers to the discussion between the Buddha and Kātyāyana (Pali: Kaccāna):

In the instructions to Kātyāyana both 'It is' (asti) and 'It is not' (nāsti) are denied by the Bhagavan who comprehends existence and non-existence. 87

Candrakīrti quotes the Buddha in his commentary to this verse:

'It is' is one extreme, Kāśyapa, 'It is not' is the [other] extreme. That which is the middle between the two extremes is formless (arūpya), indefinable (anidarśana), limitless (apratistha), without appearance (anābhāsa), signless (aniketa), free from knowledge (avijñaptika), Kāśyapa, this is what is called the middle path, the true knowledge of things. 88

Nāgārjuna in verse ten of this chapter identifies the assertion 'It is' with seizing the eternal (śāśvatagrāha) and the assertion 'It is not' with the view of annihilation (uccheda-darśana). In the Ratnāvalī he defines the two extremes as follows:

In brief, the nihilist view (nāstitadrsti) is that action (karman) has no fruit (phalām). This is regarded as without merit (apunya), leading

to a bad fate (apāyiki), as a false view (mithyādrsti).⁸⁹

In brief, view of existence (astitādrsti) is that action has fruit. This is regarded as having merit (punya), leading to a good rebirth (sugati), as a correct view (samyagdrsti).⁹⁰

While the nihilist view leads those who adhere to its principles into a bad destiny (durgati), the eternalist view, on the other hand, may motivate those who adhere to its principles to accumulate meritorious actions and consequently, reap the fruit of a good destiny. Neither view, however, will lead to liberation (moksa) from samsāra. Nāgārjuna says:

From the cessation of adherence to existence and non-existence through knowledge (jñāna) there is the transcendence of evil (pāpa) and merit. Therefore, the wise say there is liberation (moksa) from bad and good destiny.⁹¹

Liberation is the result of knowledge and bondage is the result of ignorance.

Through ignorance people fail to perceive things as they really are (yathābhūtam) and thus, erroneously construct and superimpose adventitious properties upon the true nature of things. As Nāgārjuna points out in the Ratnāvalī: "The real nature of the world is born of discursive development (prapañca)."⁹² If this fact is understood neither the nihilist view nor the view of existence is tenable, for if the world and all the things within it are like a mirage (marīcipratima) it is due to the influence of delusion (moha) that one attributes either existence or non-existence to it.⁹³ The multiplicity of things which the ordinary person conceives as being subject to the law of cause and effect and which he observes from time to time as coming into existence and passing out of existence are mere illusions without

any claim to a real substantial nature of their own (svabhāva). Common experience demonstrates that different people under different circumstances will perceive the same thing in different ways. The pleasurable thing which produces desire (rāga) is empty of any real substantial nature of its own, and similarly, the desire which has arisen in dependence upon that thing also is lacking a nature of its own.

"Without conceptual construction (kalpanā)," Āryadeva says in the third verse of chapter eight of the Catuh'sataka, "desire, etc. has no existence."⁹⁴ None of the three defilements, desire, aversion (dveṣa), and delusion, can be considered to exist independently of their source, conceptual construction. All defilement (kleśa) is the result of dichotomizing conceptual constructions (vikalpa) which falsely superimpose the notion of duality upon things which are ultimately non-dual. These false constructions, bound up as they are with the proclivity of discursive thought (vitarka) to develop and expand its reach, come to an end only when this discursive development itself is made to cease. Discursive development, which operates on the premise that duality is real, namely, that the distinction that is ordinarily drawn between the subject and the objects of the perception is a valid one, is destroyed through emptiness (śūnyatā).⁹⁵

"The Victorious Ones," Nāgārjuna says, "have proclaimed that emptiness is that which gets rid of (nihsarana) all views."⁹⁶ Emptiness is not considered to be an additional view which somehow mediates between the extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism, but rather as a potent antidote to the ill effects of

all speculative views. Emptiness is the means by which all speculative views are canceled out and the bondage of conceptual construction is broken. At this point emptiness becomes, as Āryadeva says, indistinguishable from nirvāṇa (śūnyatāṃ eva nirvāṇam).⁹⁸

* * * * *

The fourteenth chapter of Āryadeva's Catuhśataka is concerned with the refutation of the doctrines of those who adhere to extreme views. Āryadeva takes the philosophical positions of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas on one hand and the Sautrāntikas and the Vaiśeṣikas on the other hand to be representative of the two diametrically opposed extreme views which are both rendered void (śūnya) through the onslaught of the Madhyamaka critique. Logic and the dialectical method of argumentation as used by Nāgārjuna and his disciple, Āryadeva, cut through and expose the limitations of language that ensnare their opponents. Their rejection of their opponents' arguments does not imply the acceptance of the opposite point of view. The Mādhyamikas' critique of the views of other philosophical systems seems intended merely to demonstrate the inability of language to express anything that is unequivocally valid, not to supplant one view by another. Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva considered themselves to be irrefutable, for as Āryadeva explains, "No refutation can be addressed for a long time to one for whom the positions 'existing, non-existing, existing and non-existing' are not admissible."⁹⁹

In the first verse of the fourteenth chapter the Catuhśataka sets out one of the basic tenets of the Madhyamaka school, namely, that no thing exists independently of something else:

Were a thing (bhāva) not dependent upon another, its existence (astita) certainly would be established. / But / this / thing / does not exist anywhere at all. 100

An opponent has objected that if, because it has originated in interdependence (pratītyasamutpanna), existence (bhava) has no nature of its own and is like the circle made by a whirling fire-brand, then what has a nature of its own? Candrakīrti replies in his commentary to this verse that it is impossible to imagine the existence of something that has not originated in dependence upon a variety of causes and conditions and consequently, there is nothing that exists solely by virtue of its own nature. Candrakīrti's response is based upon the common experience of ordinary people: nothing is observed to exist without some cause which has brought it into being. According to the Tibetan commentators on the Catuhśataka, Red mda' ba and rGyal tshab, this is the brief explanation (mdor bstan) of the doctrine that conditioned things have no nature of their own.

Both Tibetan commentators divide their treatment of the extensive explanation (rgyas bshad) of the doctrine into four parts: (1) the refutation of the four extreme positions (mtha' bzhi), (2) the refutation of the true establishment (bden grub) of the aggregate, (3) the refutation of the parts of the aggregate as substantially existent (dravya-sat, rdzas yod), and (4) the refutation of establishing the aggregate as either one or multiple in nature.

(1) the refutation of the four extreme positions

These four extreme positions are detailed in the second verse:

That there is identity / consisting in / the color (rūpa) being the pot is not so, nor is the pot possessing

the color (rūpavān) different \angle from the color. 7. The color does not exist in the pot and the pot does not exist in the color. 101

First, the possibility of identity between the pot and its color is examined. All the commentators assert that if it were admitted that the relationship of identity exists between the color and the pot, then everywhere the one exists the other also must exist. Furthermore, they argue that if the one is destroyed, then, the other will be destroyed also. To admit identity would result in the absurd consequence (prasaṅga) that when the red color of the unbaked pot disappears in the process of baking, the pot also would disappear.

But if the opponent should suppose that the pot which possesses the color is something different from that color, then that alternative also leads to an absurd consequence. The commentators say that if the pot were different from its color, then it would be perceived independently of its color and that is contrary to experience. Finally, since the pot and its color cannot be established as separate things, the relation of locus-located (ādharādheya, rten dang brten pa) does not apply, for if two things are not clearly differentiated from one another, it is impossible to say that one is located in the other or vice versa. The four extreme positions can be reduced to the dichotomy of identity and difference and each half is rejected as being contrary to experience and as leading to absurd consequences.

(2) the refutation of the true establishment of the aggregate

The two Tibetan commentators divide this section into two

parts: the refutation of the non-Buddhists, viz., the Vaiśeṣikas, and the refutation of the Buddhists, viz., the Vaibhāṣikas. The position of the Vaiśeṣikas is considered first. Verse three says:

After having perceived a difference in characteristic (vailaksanya) between the two, if [you say] the pot is different from existence, then, [we reply] no, why, then, would not existence also be different from the pot? 102

The commentators explain that if the opponent considers the pot to be something different from existence because of the fact that one is particular (viśeṣa) and the other is a universal (sāmānya), then, equally, it would be the case that existence would be something different from the pot and consequently, the pot would be non-existent.

The pot is existent, the Vaiśeṣikas maintain, because it is a locus for qualities (guṇa). Because the substance (dravya) pot and the quality one are dissimilar things the commentators say that there can be no connection (yoga) between them. All the commentaries deny that there is any real connection between the characterized thing (lakṣya) exemplified by the pot and its characteristics (lakṣaṇa) exemplified by the qualities, color, number, and so forth. Red mda' ba says that if the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that existence has the characteristic of recurring (anupravṛttilakṣaṇa, rjes su 'jug pa'i mtshan nyid) in substances and the pot has the characteristic of differentiation (vyāvṛttilakṣaṇa, ldog pa'i mtshan nyid), then if the pot is differentiated from its qualities, it is not possible to establish that its nature is similar to those qualities.¹⁰³ Consequently, even by means of its characteristics the pot is not established as existent.

Now the position of the Vaibhāṣikās is examined. The Vaibhāṣikās establish the pot as being one in nature with color, etc. Unlike the Vaiśeṣikās, who held that the whole itself is different from the parts which comprise it, the Vaibhāṣikās hold that the whole is one with its parts. The Vaibhāṣika opponent first argues that the pot is one with color, etc. because of mutual connection (parasparasamīyoga), but in verse eight Āryadeva replies:

There is no connection between a non-tangible (asparsavat) thing and a tangible thing. Therefore the connection [of the pot] with color, etc. is not logically possible in all respects.¹⁰⁴

The opponent suggests an alternative: the pot is the whole and color, etc. are its parts. Āryadeva responds in verse nine:

The color is a part (avayava) of the pot and therefore, it is not the pot. Since the whole (avayavin) does not exist, therefore the part also does not exist.¹⁰⁵

If it is further objected that 'because color, etc. are parts, then shouldn't a whole exist?', then the commentators answer that because there is no independent establishment of the pot as something other than its constituent parts and because it cannot be perceived independently of them, it is empty of any substantial nature of its own. Moreover, the parts also cannot be perceived independently of their locus and are similarly empty of any substantial nature of their own. Things which cannot exist independently of one another are non-existent in the ultimate sense (paramāṛthataḥ).

(3) the refutation of the parts of the aggregate as substantially existent

In verse fifteen Āryadeva says:

Just as the pot does not exist apart from color, etc., similarly, the color does not exist apart from

air (vāyu), etc..¹⁰⁶

The commentators say that just as the pot is not independent of its color, smell, etc., similarly, the color, etc. are not independent of the four great elements (mahābhūta): earth, air, fire and water. Color, which the Buddhists classify as derived from the elements (bhautika), would have no cause if these elements were not present. Even these great elements cannot be established independently of one another and consequently, they also do not exist by virtue of their own-nature.

(4) the refutation of establishing the aggregate as either one or multiple in nature

The commentators argue that since the elements of which the atoms are composed do not have a unitary nature, the things which are aggregates of the atoms will not be one in nature either. Furthermore, it is argued that if there is nothing that is one in nature, then since what is multiple in nature is dependent upon the gathering together of unitary things, that also will not exist.

In verse twenty Āryadeva refers to the views of the Sāṃkhyas:

If [your] opinion is that the three things are not different and in this respect a thing that is one in nature exists, [then, we reply]: since threeness exists in each case, therefore, oneness does not exist. ¹⁰⁷

Candrakīrti in his commentary to this verse points out that since according to the Sāṃkhya everything has the nature of the three qualities (guṇa), therefore there is nothing that is one in nature. According to the two Tibetan commentators verses one to twenty one make up the first section of the fourteenth chapter of the Catuhśataka which is concerned with showing that conditioned

things are empty of any nature of their own. This lengthy section ends by proclaiming the catuskoti as the proper investigative method that ought to be applied to all the philosophers' theories:

Existing (sat), non-existing (asat), [both] existing and non-existing (sadasat), and neither existing nor non-existing (sadasan na)--this is the method that intelligent people should utilize constantly with regard to [the theories of] identity, etc..108

The second section according to the two Tibetan commentators is concerned with showing the reason for the mistaken notion that things are real and permanent. This brief section involves just one verse of the Catuhśataka, namely, the twenty-second:

Just as one might say that some permanent thing exists if the continuum (saṃtāna) is wrongly perceived, similarly, one might say that a thing exists if an aggregation (sāmagrī) is wrongly perceived. 109

The two Tibetan commentators assert that ordinary people and the sages of the non-Buddhist schools err in attributing permanence to the world and themselves because of the fact that they are unable to grasp the true momentariness of all things. The self (ātman), which non-Buddhists conceive as permanent, according to Candrakīrti, is just an aggregation of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī), an unbroken series or continuum (saṃtāna) of the five aggregates which undergo change each moment (ksana). Similarly, people erroneously perceive the pot and other things as real and permanent, but they are in fact aggregates of constantly changing properties.

According to the Tibetan commentators, the third section is concerned with utilizing the proper method to show that things are

not truly established. Āryadeva in verse twenty four says:

That [thing] for which there is interdependent origination is not independent (svatantra). All this is without independent reality; therefore, self[-nature] does not exist. 110

The opponent argues that if the Mādhyamikas do not admit that things exist, then, they will be guilty of contradicting ordinary experience. The Mādhyamikas, according to the commentators, reply that they do not intend to deny that things exist, for they are not nihilists since they accept the doctrine of interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). The Mādhyamikas assert that as all things in the world have originated in interdependence, there is nothing that can be considered as being independent of causes and conditions, and consequently there is nothing that has a real substantial nature of its own. Since these things lack a nature of their own (niḥsvabhāva) they cannot, therefore, be truly established and so, resemble illusions (māyā), mirages (marīci), and reflections (pratibimba). To say that something has originated in interdependence, Candrakīrti explains, is equivalent to saying that it lacks a nature of its own and is empty.

The fourth and final section into which the Tibetan commentators have divided the fourteenth chapter of the Catuhśataka is concerned with showing the necessity of understanding that things are not real. This section involves only the last verse of this chapter in which Āryadeva says:

The seed of existence (bhava) is consciousness; sense objects (visaya) are the sphere (gocara) of its activity. When non-substantiality (nairātmya) is perceived in the sense objects, the seed of existence will cease. 111

The commentators explain that if it is thought that things are real, then consciousness (viññāna) through the force of defiled ignorance (kliṣṭāviññāna) becomes attached to those things. In this way the seeds for continued existence in saṃsāra are produced. The disciples (śrāvaka), Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas who have cultivated an aversion towards saṃsāra produce the thought of awakening (bodhicitta), the seed from which the Tathāgata's knowledge arises.

Nāgārjuna says in the tenth verse of the eighteenth chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:

Whatever exists in dependence (pratītya) is neither identical with that [upon which it depends] nor different; therefore, it is neither annihilated (ucchina) nor eternal (śāśvata). 112

In the fourteenth chapter of the Catuhśataka Āryadeva enlarges upon this notion that a thing which exists in dependence upon something else is neither identical to that upon which it depends nor different from it. He considers the pot and its color and fire and fuel and concludes in both cases that the one cannot be said to exist without the other. Their relation is one of interdependence. Āryadeva in this chapter upholds the Madhyamaka interpretation of interdependent origination of things as the means by which the pitfalls of eternalism and annihilationism are avoided.

II NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

¹ For a comparison with Kant see Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Airvāna, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Leningrad, 1927, p. 107 note 1, and T.R.V.Nurti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1955, pp. 293-301. Compare Jacques May, "Kant et le Mādhyamika," *IJ* 3 (1959), pp. 102-111. For a comparison with Whitehead see Frederick J. Streng, "Metaphysics, negative dialectic, and the expression of the inexpressible," *PEW* 25 (1975) pp. 429-447, and Robert F. Olson, "Whitehead, Mādhyamika, and the Prajñāpāramitā," *PEW* 25 (1975), pp. 449-464. Ives Waldo in an article, "Nāgārjuna and analytic philosophy," *PEW* 25 (1975), pp. 282-290 has found parallels between Nāgārjuna and such analytic philosophers as Wittgenstein.

² Haraprasad Shastri, "Notes on the newly found manuscript of the Catuḥśatika by Āryadeva," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, n.s. 7 (1911), pp. 431-436.

³ Haraprasad Shastri, "Catuḥśatikā by Āryadeva," *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. III no. 8, pp. 449-514.

⁴ Kuang pai lun pen, Taisho 1570. Bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes tshig le'ur byas pa. Mdo XVIII, 1.

⁵ P.L.Vaidya, Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geunther, 1923, pp. 129-167; hereafter cited as Vaidya.

⁶ Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, "The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva," Proceedings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Conference, Allahabad, 1926, pp. 831-871.

⁷ Giuseppe Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva confrontata col testo sanscrito et la traduzione tibetana," Rivista degli Studi Orientali 10 (1923), pp. 521-567.

⁸ 'di ltar slob dpon 'phags pa lha ni singala'i gling du
'khrungs pa singala'i rgyal po'i sras zhig ste mthar rgyal
tshab bor nas de nyid du rab du byung shing / de nas lho
phyogs kyi rgyud ltar 'ongs te slob dpon klu sgrub pa kyi
nye gnas nyid du gyur cing / de'i lugs kyi rjes su 'jug par
gyur pa de nyid kyi phyir na bstan bcos bzhi brgya 'di'i de
kho nyid gang yin pa de ni dbu ma'i bstan bcos las bshad pa'i
de kho nyid las mtshan nyid tha dad pa can ma yin no // Candrakīrti, Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakāṭikā, f. 34b (PTT vol. 98).

⁹ ... slob dpon āryadeva ni / singala'i gling du padma'i
sbums su rdzus te skyes pa la de'i rgyal pos bur bzung ste...
 Bu ston, bDe bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi
'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod (hereafter abbreviated as Chos 'byung) in The Collected Works of Bu ston 24 (ya), ed. Lokesh Candra, International Academy of Indian Culture, New Delhi, 1971, f. 834. Cf. History of Buddhism by Bu ston. Part II: The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, trans. by E. Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1932, p. 130.

¹⁰ Tāranātha, dPal gyi byung gnas dam pa'i chos rin po che 'phags pa'i yul du ji ltar dar ba'i tshul gsal bar ston pa dgos 'dod kun 'byung (hereafter abbreviated as rGya gar chos 'byung), ed. Anton Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1868, p. 66. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, translated by Anton Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1869, pp. 83-84, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya and ed. by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1970, pp. 123-124.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² ...slob dpon klu sgrub du byon nas slob gnyer mdzad pas rig pa'i gnas thams cad dang phyi nang gi grub mtha' ma lus pa mkhas par gyur te / Chos 'byung, f. 834. Cf. History of Buddhism, p. 130.

¹³ rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 66. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, p. 84, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 124.

¹⁴ sde snod gsum po mtha' dag chub par byas pa na yul sna tshogs kyi lha khan dang mchod rten dag blta ba'i phyir 'dzam bu'i gling du byon / slob dpon klu sgrub rgyal po bde byed kyi sa nas dPal gyi rir gshegs pa dang nye ba'i tshe 'jal te dPal gyi rir slob dpon gyi zhabs pad bsten cing bcud len la sogs pa'i dngos grub mang po thob par mdzad nas mthar snying po'i don gyi bstan pa'ang gtad do // rGya gar chos 'byung, pp. 66-67. Cf. Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, p. 84, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in In-

dia, p. 124.

15 de'i tshe mu stegs gyi ston pa ma khol zhes bya ba lha
dbang phyug chen po grub ste mngal skyes gang qis mi thub
pa'i mchog sbyin ba zhig yod pa des sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa
la gnod pa byas te phal cher mu stegs la btsud de nālendrar
phyin no // nāendra pa rnams kyi dpal gyi ri la klu sgrub
bshugs pa la sbran nas / slob dpon āryadeva 'dul bar zhal
gyis bzhes te byon pa'i tshe / shing gi lha mo spyen slong
po la spyen gcig sbyin por btang ngo // de nas mu stegs pham
par byas pa na mig gcig pa 'di ci 'dra zhes smra ba la /
drag po mig gsum ldan yang de nyid mthong ba med // āryadeva
mig gcig po ni gang yin des // srid pa gsum po ma lus yi de
nyid mthong // zhes gsungs te chos kyi tshar bcad de bstan
pa la bcug ste paṇḍita chen por gyur to // Chos 'byung,
 f. 834. Cf. History of Buddhism, p. 130.

16 rGya gar chos 'byung, pp. 67-68. See Tāranātha's Geschi-
chte des Buddhismus in Indien, pp. 84-85, and Tāranātha's
History of Buddhism in India, pp. 124-126.

17 rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 67. See Tāranātha's Geschichte
des Buddhismus in Indien, p. 85, and Tāranātha's History of
Buddhism in India, p. 125.

18 Chos 'byung, f. 834. See History of Buddhism, p. 130.

19 de nas slob dpon āryadevas nāendra yang yun ring du
bzhugs shing / mthar yang lho phyogs kyi rgyud du gshegs
nas sems can gyi don rgya chen po mdzad de yul kañci dang
nye ba'i raṅganātha zhes bya bar sgra gcan 'dzin bzang po

la snying po'i don gyi bstan pa gtad nas sku 'das so //

rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 68. Cf. Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, pp. 85-86, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 126.

²⁰ Taisho 2048; Nanjio 1461.

²¹ T'i p'o p'u sa ch'uan, partially translated by Sogen Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1912. Summarized by Richard Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1967.

²² Yamakami, op. cit. pp. 191-192.

²³ Ibid. pp. 192-194.

²⁴ Ta T'ang Hsi yü Chi, translated by Samuel Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, Delhi, 1969, pp. 210-212. Cf. Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, Munshiram Manoharal Publishers, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 200-202.

²⁵ Beal op. cit. p. 98.

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 98-99. Cf. Watters, op. cit. pp. 100-102.

²⁷ Beal, op. cit. p. 231.

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 302-303.

²⁹ Mahānāma, Mahāvamsa 36:29, ed. Wilhelm Geiger, PTS, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1908 (reprinted 1958); translated by Wilhelm Geiger, The Mahāvamsa, PTS, Oxford University Press, London, 1912, p. 258. Dīpavamsa 22:41, 50, ed. and translated

by Bimala Churn Law, The Chronicle of the Island of Ceylon,
The Ceylon Historical Journal 7 (1957-1958), pp. 123 and 258.

³⁰ Yamakami, op. cit. pp. 190-191; Etienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse (hereafter abbreviated as Traité) tome III, Université de Louvain Institut Orientaliste, Louvain, 1970, p. 1373.

³¹ P.S. Sastri, "Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva," IHQ 31 (1955), pp. 195-202.

³² Traité tome I, pp. xi-xiv.

³³ See Robinson, op. cit. pp. 21-28.

³⁴ Prabhubhai Bhikabhai Patel, ed. Cittavisuddhiprakarana of Āryadeva, Visvabharati, 1949, p. xv. On this tantric Āryadeva see Alex Wayman, The Buddhist Tantras, Samuel Weiser, New York, 1973, pp. 14-16.

³⁵ Taisho 1620; Nanjio 1255. See F.W. Thomas and H. Ui, "The Hand Treatise," JRAS (1918), pp. 267-272.

³⁶ Nanjio, p. 370; Traité tome III, p. 1373.

³⁷ See Vasudev Gokhale, trans. "Aksara-Satakam," MKB 14 (1930), pp. 1-3.

³⁸ quoted by Murti, op. cit. p. 94.

³⁹ rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 107. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, pp. 137-138, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, pp. 187-188.

⁴⁰ zla ba grags pa ni / yul lho phyogs sa ma nar 'khungs te / mdo rgyud kyi don la sbyangs pas klu sgrub yad sras kyi

gsungs rab la brten nas mkhas pa chen por gyur cing ...

Chos 'byung, f. 837. Cf. History of Buddhism, p. 134.

⁴¹ Geshe Wangyal, The Door of Liberation, Maurice Girodias Associates, Inc., New York, 1973, pp. 51-52.

⁴² rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 114. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, p. 147, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 198.

⁴³ rGya gar chos 'byung, pp. 118-119. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, pp. 153-154, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, pp. 204-205.

⁴⁴ rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 115. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, p. 148, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism, p. 199.

⁴⁵ rGya gar chos 'byung, p. 124. See Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, p. 161, and Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 213.

⁴⁶ Beal, op. cit. p. 171.

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 223-224.

⁴⁸ See Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," WZKSO 5 (1961), p. 132ff.

See Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla," WZKSO 12-13 (1968-1969), p. 200ff.

⁵⁰ quoted by Murti, op. cit. p. 100 note 6.

⁵¹ See Bhattacharya, p. xxii.

⁵² I-tsing, A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised

in India and the Malay Archipelago, trans. J. Takakusu, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1966 reprint, pp. 164 and 183.

⁵³ See Wayman, op. cit. p. 16 on this tantric Candrakīrti.

⁵⁴ Chos 'byung, f. 837. See History of Buddhism, pp. 134-135.

⁵⁵ Haraprasad Shastri, "Notes on the newly found manuscript of the Chatuḥśatika by Aryadeva," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, n.s. 7 (1911), p. 431.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 432.

⁵⁷ HPS pp. 452-514.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 449.

⁵⁹ Ibid. pp. 450-451.

⁶⁰ Vaidya, p. 67.

⁶¹ Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, "The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva," Proceedings of the Fourth Oriental Conference, Allahabad, 1926, p. 832.

⁶² Bhattacharya, pp. 1-298.

⁶³ Ibid., p. xii.

⁶⁴ Chos 'byung, f. 905. See History of Buddhism, pp. 212-213.

⁶⁵ pa tshab nyi ma grags kyis kyang kha cher lo nyi shu rtsa gsum sbangs te pandita kanakavarma spyen drangs te dbu ma'i skor rnams bsgyur bshad pas...Chos 'byung, f. 908. Cf. History of Buddhism, p. 216.

⁶⁶ 'Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal, Deb ther sngon po, International Academy of Indian Culture, New Delhi, 1974, f. 304. See George Roerich, Blue Annals, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1949, pp. 341-342.

⁶⁷ Jean Naudou, Les Bouddhistes Kaśmiriens au Moyen Age, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1968, p. 170.

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 185.

⁶⁹ 'phan yul tu phebs dus gdul bya ha cang mi che ba la /
dge ba'i shes gnyen shar pa pas rang gi gra ba mang po khong
la dbu ma slob du btang bas / de nas dbu ma'i 'chad nyan
legs par tshugs te gra ba mang du bskyangs / rtsa 'jug bzhi
gsum / rigs pa drug bcu pa rnams kyi slob dpon zla bas
mdzad pa'i 'grel pa rnams legs par bsgyur zhing / phyis ra
mo cher pandita kanakavarma dang lhan cig tu yul dbus gyi pe
dang 'thun pa yang bcos / stong nyid bdun cu pa la slob
dpon zla bas mdzad pa'i 'grel chen po de / abhaya dang snur
dharma grags kyis bsgyur ba las // spa tshab kyis pandita
mudita dang lhan cig tu 'grel pa de'i stod nas bam po gnyis
lhag tsam gyi 'gyur bcos / Deb ther sngon po, f. 304. Cf.
Roerich, op. cit. p. 342.

⁷⁰ Naudou, op. cit. pp. 185-186.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 186.

⁷² Jacques May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, Adrien Maisonneuve, Paris, 1959, pp. 6-7.

⁷³ ...gdung rabs grangs med par pandita brgyud ma'i rigs su
sku 'krungs pa bram je chen po rin chen rdo rje'i dbon po
bram je chen po sañjana'i sras... CŚT f. 273b.

- ⁷⁴ Naudou, op. cit. p. 139ff.
- ⁷⁵ Deb ther sngon po, f. 305. See Roerich, op. cit. pp. 342-343.
- ⁷⁶ Arnold Kunst, "Kamalaśīla's Commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Anumānaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṅgraha," MCB 8 (1946-1947), p. 152.
- ⁷⁷ Sabbam atthīti kho Kaccāna ayam eko anto / Sabbam natthīti ayam dutiyo anto // Saṃyutta Nikāya III, ed. Leon Feer, PTS, London, 1890, p. 135; trans. C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward, The Book of Kindred Sayings II, PTS, London, 1922, p. 13.
- ⁷⁸ Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, ed. and trans. Soma Thera, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, 1960, p. 1.
- ⁷⁹ Cūlasīhanāda Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya I, ed. P.V. Bapat, Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series, Pāli Publication Board, 1958, p. 92; trans. I.B. Horner, The Middle Length Sayings I, PTS, London, 1954, pp. 87-88.
- ⁸⁰ Brahmajāla Sutta in Dīgha Nikāya I, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter, PTS, London, 1890; trans. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha I, PTS, London, 1899, pp. 1-55.
- ⁸¹ Aggivacchagotta Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya II, ed. Mahapandita Rahula Sankrityayana, Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series, Pāli Publication Board, 1958, p. 179; trans. I.B. Horner, The Middle Length Sayings II, PTS, London, 1957, p. 164.

82 Ibid.

83 Kathāvatthu, ed. J. Kashyap, Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series, Pāli Publication Board, 1961, pp. 69-70; trans. Shwe Zan Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, PTS, London, 1969 reprint.

84 quoted by Louis de La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, vol. V. MCB 16. Brussels, 1971, p. 265, note 1.

85 trans. by Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Les Deux Vérités," MCB 5 (1936-1937), p. 169.

86 Abhidharmakośa, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi, 1972, p. 772; cf. trans. by Louis de La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, vol. IV. MCB 16. Brussels, 1971, pp. 17-18.

87 kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam /
pratisiddham bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā //
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, BB 4, St. Petersburg, 1903-1913, p. 269.

88 astīti kāśyapa ayam eko 'nto nāstīti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntah /
yad enayor dvayor antayor madhyam tad arūpyam anidarśanam apra-
tistham anābhāsam aniketam avijñaptikam iyam ucyate kāśyapa
madhyamā pratipad dharmānām bhūtapratyavekseti / Ibid. p. 270.

89 samāsān nāstitādrstīh phalam nāstīti karmanah /
apunyaṇāpāyikī caisā mithyādrstir iti smṛtā // Ratnāvalī 1:43,
ed. and trans. Tucci, "The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna," JRAS 1934,
pp. 317, 318.

- 90 samāsād astitādr̥stih phalaṁ cāstīti karmanām /
punyaṁ sugatinisyaṇḍā samyagdr̥stir iti smṛtā // Ratnāvalī

1:44. Ibid.

- 91 jñāne nāstyastitāsānteh pāpapunyavyatikramah /
durgateh sugateś cāsmāt sa moksah sadbhir ucyate // Ratnāva-
lī 1:45. Ibid.

- 92 asya lokasya yāthābhūtyaṁ prapañcajam // Ratnāvalī 1:50b.
 Ibid. pp. 318, 319.

- 93 Ratnāvalī 1:56, Ibid. pp. 319, 320.

- 94 vinā kalpanayāstitvaṁ rāgādīnām na vidyate / ed. and trans.
 Vaidya, pp. 70, 129; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 3.

- 95 See MK 18:5b p. 350.

- 96 'sūnyatā sarvadr̥stīnām proktā nihsaranām jinaih / 13:8a,
 p. 247.

- 97 See Candrakīrti's commentary on this verse pp. 247-249;
 trans. Stantislav Schayer, Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasā-
napadā, Krakowie, 1931, pp. 38-39. Cf. Bimal Krishna Matilal,
 "A Critique of the Mādhyamika Position," in The Problem of
Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. M. Sprung, Dordrecht,
 1973, p. 62.

- 98 cś 12:23c, ed. and trans. Vaidya, pp. 101, 150; ed. Bhatta-
carya, p. 163.

- 99 sād asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate /
upālabhas' cirenāpi tasya vaktuṁ na śakyate // cś 16:25,
 ed. and trans. Vaidya, pp. 128, 167; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 296.

- 100 āyattaṁ yasya bhāvasya bhaven nānyasya kasyacit /

sidhyet tasyāstitā nāma kvacit sa ca na vidyate // ed. and
and trans. Vaidya, pp. 109, 155; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 199.

101 rūpaṁ eva ghaṭo naikyāṁ ghaṭo nānyo 'sti rūpavān /
na vidyate ghaṭe rūpaṁ na rūpe vidyate ghaṭaḥ // ed. and
trans. Vaidya, pp. 109, 155; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 200.

102 vailakṣanyaṁ dvayor dr̥ṣṭvā bhāvād anyo ghaṭo yadi /
ghaṭād anyo na bhāvo 'pi kim evaṁ na bhaviṣyati // ed. and
trans. Vaidya, p. 109, 156; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 201.

103 Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, Sarnath,
1974, p. 175.

104 na hy asparśavato nāma yogah sparsāvataḥ saha /
rūpādīnām ato yogah sarvathāpi na yujyate // ed. and
trans. Vaidya, pp. 110, 157 ; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 207.

105 ghaṭasyāvayavo rūpaṁ tena tāvan na tad ghaṭaḥ /
yasmād avayavī nāsti tena nāvayavo 'pi tat // ed. and trans.
Vaidya, pp. 111, 157; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 207.

106 rūpādivyatirekena yathā kumbho na vidyate /
vāyvādivyatirekena tathā rūpaṁ na vidyate // ed. and
trans. Vaidya, pp. 112, 158; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 211.

107 bhāvās trayo na santy tatraiko 'stīti cen matam /
tritvaṁ yenāsti sarvatra tenaikatvaṁ na vidyate // ed.
and trans. Vaidya, pp. 113, 159; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 215.

108 sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah /
esa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādisu nityaśah // ed. and
trans. Vaidya, pp. 114, 159; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 215.

- 109 ji ltar rgyun la lta nyes na // rtag pa yod ces byar
'gyur ba // de bzhin tshogs la lta nyes na // dngos

po ces bya bar 'gyur // ed. and trans. Vaidya, pp. 114, 159;
 ed. Bhattacharya, p. 224.

- 110 gang la brten nas 'byung yod pa // de ni rang dbang ma
'gyur ro // 'di kun rang dbang med pa ste // des na
bdag ni yod ma yin // ed. and trans. Vaidya, pp. 114,
 159; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 226.

- 111 srid pa'i sa bon rnams shes te / yul rnams de yi spyod
yul lo // yul la bdag med mthong ba ni // srid pa'i
sa bon 'gag par 'gyur // ed. and trans. Vaidya, pp. 115,
 160; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 230.

- 112 pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat /
na cānyad api tasmān nocchinnaṁ nāpi śāśvataṁ //

MK 18:10, p. 375.

III THE TRANSLATION

Here it is objected that if existence (bhava) because of the fact that it has originated in interdependence (pratītyasamutpanna)¹ is without a nature of its own (niḥsvabhāva) as in the case of a fire/brand's circle (alātacakra), etc.,² now, then what has a nature of its own (svabhāva)?³ [To this objection we reply that] it is impossible to imagine the own-nature of any thing (padārtha)⁴ because of the fact that things of such sort [namely, things which have a nature of their own]⁵ are not perceived anywhere at all. Thus,

1. Were a thing (bhāva) not dependent (āyatta) upon another, its existence (astitā)⁶ certainly would be established. But this [thing] does not exist anywhere [at all].⁷

For if there were not some dependence somewhere in the establishment (nispatti) of some thing, then it would be proper to imagine existence by virtue of own-nature (svabhāvato 'stitvam) because of the fact that an independent thing (svatantra), not dependent upon another, is established only by virtue of itself (svata eva). But it is not logically possible, [namely], that things which have originated in dependence upon causes and conditions (hetupratyaya)⁸ would not be dependent upon another.

Or [as an alternative if you suppose that] some thing might arise without a cause (aḥetuka)⁹, [then, we reply that] since in this way there is no nature of its own (svarūpa)¹⁰

for any thing [that has not originated in dependence upon causes and conditions or is not dependent upon something else]¹¹ because of the [undesired] consequence (prasaṅga) that it is without a cause, [and that thing which has come into existence without a cause is nowhere and at no time existent],¹² therefore there is not any thing that has a nature of its own, and because of the non-existence of own-nature it is determined that there is no establishment [of any thing] by virtue of its own-nature as in the case of the firebrand's circle.

If these things were not unreal (avastuka)¹³ because of the fact that they are in contradiction (visaṁvāda)¹³ [with reality] as in the case of the firebrand's circle, etc., then, certainly, when being examined by logical possibility (upapatti)¹⁴ their own-nature would be perceived more clearly as in the case of unrefined gold.¹⁵ Because of the fact that they are founded in error (viparyāsanibandhanatvāt)¹⁶ it is not the case that these [things], when heated by the fire of examination, do not prove to be lacking a nature of their own. Indeed,¹⁷ without logical possibility no thing (vastu) exists¹⁷ because of the fact that this [logically impossible thing] is completely in contradiction [with reality].¹⁸ Therefore for the purpose of abandoning [conceptual] attachment (abhiniveśa) to things henceforth the teacher [Āryadeva] says how it is appropriate that pots, etc. do not have a nature of their own [in the verse]:

2. That there is identity (aikyam) [consisting in] color (rūpa)¹⁹ being the pot is not so, nor is the pot possessing the color (rūpavān) different [from the color]. The color does not exist in the pot and the pot does not exist in the color.²⁰

In this connection, if some thing were called a 'pot', then because of the fact that it is apprehended through the visual sense faculty (darśanendriya) that thing is either supposed [by our opponent] to be different (bheda) from the color or identical (abheda) [with that color].²¹ First of all [we reply]:

That there is identity [consisting in] color being the pot is not so.

It is not the case that just what is the color is the pot, and hence that there is identity between the color and the pot. Indeed, if there were identity between the color and the pot, then wherever there is the color, there is the pot; and hence everywhere the color exists, the pot also would exist. When the color is destroyed in the arising of a quality (guṇa) produced by baking (pākaja),²² then the destruction of the pot would occur.²³ Because that does not happen, [our opponent's assertion] that just the color is the pot; and hence that there is identity [between the color and the pot] is not so.

But on account of a desire to avoid that error (doṣa) should it be supposed [as an alternative by our opponent] that the pot possessing the color is different from the col-

or [just as one might say]--for example, Devadatta is someone who possesses cows (gomān) by virtue of the cows which are different things [than him]--that [alternative] also is not logically possible because [we reply]:

nor is the pot possessing color different [from the color].

²⁴ If the pot were different from the color, then it would be perceived independently of that color.²⁴ It is not the case that Devadatta, who exists apart from [his] cows, is not perceived separately from [his] cows. Similarly, the pot also should be perceived independently of the color, but it is not so perceived; and hence the pot is not different from the color. When that [pot] does not exist [in reality], then how, being non-existent (asamvidyamāna), is it perceived as possessing that [color]? Indeed the son of a barren woman, being non-existent, is not mentioned as someone who possesses cows, and thus it is not logically possible to say that the pot possesses color.²⁵

Since there is no establishment of the color and the pot even through the supposition (kalpanā)²⁶ of the locus-located (ādhāra-ādheya)²⁷ [relationship] because of the impossibility of difference [between them we say]:

The color does not exist in the pot and
the pot does not exist in the color.

If there were a difference between the color and the pot, then it might be said that the color is in the pot as in the case of curds in a jar, or it might be said that the

pot is on the color as in the case of Devadatta on a straw mat. That [alternative] is not possible and hence the pot does not exist by virtue of its own-nature.²⁸ Whatever has no nature of its own and is perceived is empty of own-nature (svabhāvaśūnya) as in the case of the fire/brand's/circle, etc.

Moreover, just as the self (ātman) is not the aggregates (skandha) because of the consequence of identity between the agent (kartr), [namely,] the self, and the action (karman), [namely,] the appropriation (upādāna)²⁹ because of the consequence that it would experience arising (udaya) and passing away (vyaya) just like the aggregates³⁰, and³¹ because of the consequence that it would be multiple (bahu)³¹, similarly, the pot also is not the color because of the consequence of identity between the appropriation and the appropriator (upādātr), and because of the consequence that the pot would be multiple. Just as the self is not different from the aggregates because of the consequence that it would be perceived separately³², and because of the consequence that it would be without a cause³³, similarly, the pot also is not different from the color because of the consequence that it would be perceived separately, and because of the consequence that it would be without a cause.

Just as it is not mentioned that the self possesses the aggregates because of the absence of the supposition of [either] identity or difference in relation to the aggregates, similarly, it is not mentioned that the pot possesses color because of the absence of the supposition of [either] ident-

tity or difference between the color and the pot. Just as it is not logically possible to say in two ways that the aggregates are in the self or that the self is in the aggregates because of the absence of the supposition of [the self's] identity [with the aggregates] or difference from the aggregates,³⁴ similarly, the twofold supposition, namely, that the color does exist in the pot and the pot does exist in the color, also is irrational (nopapadyate).³⁵ Just as the fourfold supposition³⁶ is not possible with regard to the color [considered] in relation to the pot, similarly, the fourfold [supposition] with regard to all causes of designation (prajñapti)³⁷ is not possible; and hence the pot does not exist by virtue of its own-nature. Just as the pot does not exist by virtue of its own-nature, similarly, all things, when examined, also do not exist by virtue of their own-nature; and hence³⁸ existence is established as similar to the firebrand's circle, etc.³⁸

In this connection some [viz., Vaiśeṣikas]³⁹ object that even if there is no difference between the color and the pot, nevertheless there is a difference between existence (sattā) and the pot because in our [Vaiśeṣika] viewpoint⁴⁰ the pot is one thing and existence is another thing. Indeed, it is said that existence is the great universal (mahāsāmānya)⁴¹ and the pot is a particular (viśeṣa) substance (dravya). Because of [its] connection (yoga) with [the universal] existence it [viz., the pot] is pointed out as existent. We reply to them:

3. After having perceived a difference in characteristic (vailaksanya)⁴² between the two, if

['you say'] the pot is different from existence, then ['we reply'] no. Why then would not existence also be different from the pot? ⁴³

If ['you Vaiśeṣikas suppose that'] existence is a universal ['characteristic'] (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) because of the fact that it has the characteristic of recurring (anupravṛttilakṣaṇa)⁴⁴ in a substance, ['e.g.'] the pot, etc., and that the pot is a particular characteristic (viśeṣalakṣaṇa) because of the fact that it has the characteristic of differentiation (vyāvṛttilakṣaṇa);⁴⁵ and hence after perceiving a difference in characteristic between the two, the pot and existence, the pot is different from existence, then ['we reply'] just so, why would not existence be different from the pot because of a difference in characteristic.⁴⁶ Therefore you ['Vaiśeṣikas'] must not posit a ['universal'] difference, a separate thing which has the characteristic of recurring, as a ground for the application (pravṛttinimitta)⁴⁷ of the idea (buddhi) and the word (śabda) 'different' because the establishment of the application of the idea and the word 'different' is just a difference in characteristic.

But a ['universal'] difference is posited ['by you Vaiśeṣikas'] as a separate thing; and hence in this connection a difference which is ['just'] dependent upon the difference in characteristic between existence and the pot does not exist and therefore as for what was said:

After having perceived a difference in characteristic between the two, if ['you say'] the pot is different from existence.

Then we reply that is not so. Just as existence is different from the pot because of the fact that it has the characteristic of recurring, just so the universal difference also would be different from the pot because of the fact that it has the characteristic of recurring. There is no separate thing which is the ground for the application of the idea and the word 'different' to any given difference. If that were the case, then there would be an infinite regress (aparyavasthāna)⁴⁸ of differences.

But if as an alternative you Vaiśeṣikas suppose that there is the idea of 'different' in any given difference even without positing the universal difference, then we reply that in other instances also let that be considered; and hence there is no need for an imaginary universal difference that does not do anything.⁴⁹ If the universal difference does not exist, then it is established that there is no difference at all in reality between anything anywhere.

Moreover, you Vaiśeṣikas should consider this: what kind of existence is connected with the universal difference? Is it different in nature from that existence which is connected with the substance, etc.⁵⁰ or is it not different? If it is already different, then a connection with the universal difference is useless. But on the other hand, if it is not different, then in this case also no connection with the universal difference arises because a connection with something which is different is contradictory. It is not logically possible to say that existence is different from the pot because of the non-existence of any given difference in reality.⁵¹

Therefore taking an error (viparyāsa) as valid knowledge (pramāṇa)⁵², it is established in ordinary language (loke) that existence is the very nature of potness because of the fact that it is the ground for the application of the idea and the word 'existent'. It [viz., the pot] has no nature of its own when it is examined in four ways with regard to color; and hence from the point of view of knowledge of the ultimate truth (tattva)⁵³ it is established that the pot is empty of any nature of its own as in the case of the fire [and] circle, etc.

Here it is objected [by you Vaiśeṣikas] that the pot exists because of the fact that it is the substratum (āśraya) for qualities.⁵⁴ Indeed no non-existing thing is considered a substratum for qualities, [e.g.] one says "one pot, two pots." Oneness comes under the category quality and [you Vaiśeṣikas maintain that] the pot is a substance. It is proper for qualities to have substances as their substratum. Therefore the pot exists because of the fact that it is the substratum for qualities. To this [objection] we reply that in your opinion--

4ab. If the [number] one is not considered the pot, then [we reply] the pot also is not one [in number].⁵⁵

If you [Vaiśeṣikas] think that the [number] one is not the pot because of a difference in category⁵⁶, then in this case also [we reply that] the pot is not one [in number]. Just as oneness, namely, the number one, is not the pot, similarly the pot is not one [in number] because of the fact that it

is a separate thing from the number. The meaning is [the pot is not one in number because it has the property of being two (dvitva)].⁵⁷

Moreover, is the number one supposed [by you Vaiśeṣikas] for the pot which has a single nature (ekarūpa) or [for the pot which has] a multiple nature (anekarūpa)? If [you Vaiśeṣikas suppose that] it has a single nature [already], then [we reply that] the supposition that it has the property of being one is useless. But on the other hand if [you Vaiśeṣikas suppose that] it has a multiple nature, then [we reply that] that [supposition that the pot has the property of being one] is not logically possible because of the fact that it is contradictory. Therefore the supposition of oneness for the pot which has no other thing placed in proximity (asam-nihita)⁵⁸ should be understood [as established only] in ordinary language.

But if, after assuming that qualities have substances as their substratum, [you Vaiśeṣikas as an alternative suppose that] the pot is one because of a connection with oneness, then to this [alternative] we reply:

4cd. This is not a connection of two similar (sama) things and because of this, it [viz., the pot] also is not one.⁵⁹

What is called a connection exists only between two similar things not between two dissimilar things.⁶⁰ In this case because the [number] one is considered [by you Vaiśeṣikas] as a quality and the pot [is considered as] a substance; and

since there is no similarity between qualities and substances, therefore there is no connection between the two. Because of the non-existence of a connection in this case, if you [Vaiśeṣikas] maintain that on account of a connection with oneness the pot is one, [then we reply that] that is not so. But if a connection were experienced in this case, then there would be a connection between the pot and the [number] one and [there would be a connection] also between the [number] one and the pot. That is not so; and hence a connection between two different things is irrational. Because of the non-existence of a connection, the [number] one is not the pot and the pot is not one [in number]. Therefore in this case the first half of the verse states the refutation (dūṣana) with regard to admitting a connection [between the pot and the number one] and the latter half of the verse states the refutation with regard to the impossibility of a connection [between the pot and the number one]. And the word "also" is to be understood as having the sense of joining together (samuccaya)⁶¹ the causes for [each] refutation.

Moreover, this [opinion that there is a connection between the pot and the number one] is regarded as even more unsuitable with regard to [our] opponent's doctrine (samaya) since that [viz., the Vaiśeṣika doctrine] establishes that qualities have substances as their substratum⁶² not that particular qualities (viśeṣaguna)⁶³ have [other] qualities as their substratum. But [should you Vaiśeṣikas suppose that] it is possible for qualities to have [other] qualities as their substratum, then in this case [we reply that] whatever has that

same size (parimāṇa)⁶⁴ as the pot, even the color which has that pot as its substratum also must be as large [as the pot]. Therefore largeness occurs in the color in the same manner as [it occurs] in the substance.

5ab. When the color is as large as the substance, then is not the color large?⁶⁵

When the opponent admits that a substance is such [in extent], the shape (saṁniveśa) consisting of the extension in length of the substance being such [in extent], and [the color is such [in extent], the shape consisting of the extension in length of the color also is just such [in extent], then, certainly, when the substance is small or large, the color also must be small or large. Therefore in this case, surely, how are smallness and largeness not maintained [by you Vaiśeṣikas to inhere] in the color in the same manner as in the substance which is the material cause (kāraṇa)⁶⁶ [of the color].

But [the Vaiśeṣikas reply that if we Vaiśeṣikas] suppose that the color is a quality and that largeness and smallness also are qualities, our [Vaiśeṣika] doctrine states that a quality does not enter into [another] quality and therefore even if the color is also as large as the substance [in which it inheres], nevertheless from fear of contradicting [our] established doctrine (siddhānta)⁶⁷ we say that smallness and largeness are not [inhering] in the color. To this we reply:

5cd. A doctrine [becomes the object of a rebuttal] if the opponent [who holds it]

is not from another school (apara).⁶⁸

If the opponent were from your own school (svayūthya), then it would be proper to mention to him a contradiction with [your] established doctrine in order to refute him because that has the power (samāṛthya) to controvert him; but when the opponent is from another school, mentioning a contradiction with [your] established doctrine has no effect because he is engaged in refuting [your] established doctrine. Mentioning a contradiction with logic (yukti) and ordinary language⁶⁹ is proper⁶⁹ because of the fact that he can be refuted by that [method]. Therefore this reply which mentions a contradiction with [your] scriptural authority (āgama) is an inescapable error; and hence there is no [universal] difference [inhering] in existence and the pot. Therefore in this case, because of the refutation of the [universal] difference [as inhering] in existence, in other cases also the refutation of universal-particulars (sāmānya-viśeṣa)⁷⁰, potness (ghaṭatva), etc. should be considered. Universal-qualities (sāmānya-guṇa)⁷¹ are like number, and particular-qualities (viśeṣa-guṇa) are like largeness.

Here it is objected [by you Vaiśeṣikas] that the refutation of any difference between the pot and existence has been stated, but because there has been no refutation of the own-nature of the pot, there is an existence known as 'pot' by virtue of its own-nature. To this [objection] we reply:

6. Where there is no establishment of the characterized thing (lakṣya) even by means of the characteristic (lakṣaṇa), there is

no existence [of that characterized thing]
without number, etc. [its characteristics].⁷²

In this connection mentioning the characteristics of differentiation (vyāvṛtti) and recurrence (anuvṛtti) with regard to the pot and existence, the [Vaiśeṣika] opponent has established that the pot has the characteristic of differentiation. Therefore there is no establishment of the characterized thing [viz., the pot] even by means of [the characteristic of] differentiation, for merely by means of [the characteristic of] differentiation, which would establish that some thing has the property of being a characterized thing (lakṣyatā), it is impossible to ascertain the own-nature of a thing.⁷³

First of all, the [number] one is not the pot because of the fact that it is a quality. Color, etc. [as in the previously mentioned case of] small and large is not understood as the pot because of the fact that it is a quality. Also, existence is not the pot because it is a universal [which inheres] in substances, qualities, and actions. Therefore it cannot be established that this [viz., the pot], which is [maintained by you Vaiśeṣikas to be] different from [its characteristics] number, large, small, color, etc., has such an own-nature. Therefore in this way wherever there is no establishment in the opponent's thesis (pakṣa) of the own-nature of the pot, the characterized thing, even by means of the characteristic [of differentiation], there is in his thesis no existence understood as 'pot' which is established by virtue of its own-nature separately from [its characteristics] number, etc. Therefore it is established that the pot is empty of a nat-

nature of its own.

Alternatively, [if you Vaiśeṣikas suppose that] number, etc. is the characteristic of the pot, and that the pot is a characterized thing because of the fact that it is characterized by that [characteristic], then [we reply that] even by means of the characteristic it is not possible to establish the own-nature of that [viz. the pot] separately because its own-nature is not perceived separately from [its characteristics] number, etc. Indeed, if that characterized thing obtains a nature of its own, then, surely, it would be separate from [its characteristics] number, etc. by virtue of its own-nature, and also it would be perceived as separate from number, etc. which is precisely its characteristic. That is not so⁷⁴; and hence [we reply]:

Where there is no establishment of the characterized thing even by means of the characteristic, there is no existence [of that characterized thing] without number, etc. [its characteristics].

Therefore the pot does not exist by virtue of its own-nature.

First of all the refutation of any difference between the characterized thing and the characteristic has been stated. But to those [viz. the Vaibhāṣikas]⁷⁵ who maintain that there is oneness between the pot and the color, etc. this is replied [by us] to refute their established doctrine:

7. Oneness does not exist for the pot [and its characteristics] because of the fact that it is not separate (apṛthak)

from [its] characteristics. If the pot is not existent in each one, then the multiplicity [of pot] is not possible.⁷⁶

Color, etc. are said to be the distinct characteristics [of the pot]. To those [Vaibhāsikas] who maintain the non-separateness (apṛthattvam)⁷⁷ of the pot and [its] characteristics, color, etc., [we reply that]⁷⁸ because [you Vaibhāsikas admit that] the pot is non-separate from [its] characteristics,⁷⁸ [your opinion that] it [viz., the pot] is one is irrational because it [viz., the pot] is not different from [its] characteristics.⁷⁹ [if you Vaibhāsikas were to reply that] in this connection if it were supposed that oneness is not maintained, well, then multiplicity occurs;⁸⁰ [then] to this [objection] we reply that because with regard to color, etc., it is experience that the pot is not existent in each one [of its characteristics], therefore multiplicity [of the pot] also does not occur.⁸¹

Here it is objected [by you Vaibhāsikas that] if oneness does not exist between the pot and [its] characteristics, color, etc. because they are non-separate, then oneness will exist for the pot [and its characteristics] because of [their] mutual connection (parasparasaṃyoga). To this [objection] we reply:

8. There is no connection between a non-tangible (asparśavat) thing and a tangible (sparśavat) thing. Therefore the connection [of the pot] with color, etc. is not logically

possible in all respects.⁸²

In this connection contact (sparśa)⁸³ [is defined as] touching (spr̥sti)⁸⁴ [and as] the fact of being apprehended by the tactile sense faculty (kāyendriya). That [thing] which has contact is tangible (sparśavat). A tangible thing because of the fact that it is apprehended by the tactile sense faculty is touchable (sparśavya).⁸⁵ Connection (yoga), conjunction (saṁyoga) and contact (saṁsparśa) between colors, tastes and smells which are intangible things and tangible touchable things is not possible. Just as [connection, etc.] between the pot and space (ākāśa)⁸⁶ [is not possible]. Because that is so therefore the connection of color, etc. [with the pot] is not possible in all respects. When that [viz. the connection of color, etc. with the pot] is not possible, then what was said [by you Vaibhāṣikas] namely, that the pot has as its foundation the union (samudāya) because of a particularity (viśeṣa) of color, etc. created through mutual contact is not logically possible.

But if [as an alternative you Vaibhāṣikas suppose that] even without mutual contact, the union of them [viz. color, taste, smell, etc.] is itself the pot, then that [alternative] also is not so because [we reply]:

9. The color is a part (avayava) of the pot and therefore it is not the pot. Since the whole (avayavin) does not exist, therefore the part also does not exist.⁸⁷

Individually the color, etc. of the pot which has the nature of being the union of the color, etc. does not receive the

appellation (vyapadeśa) 'pot' because of the fact that it is a part [of the pot]. The pot is a whole and its parts are color, etc.; and hence first of all the color is not considered to be the pot because of the fact that it is a part [of the pot]. Smell, etc. should be considered in the same way as the color.

But [if you Vaibhāṣikas suppose that] because of the fact that the color is a part then there is something that is called a whole, for [you argue that] it is not logically possible that the parts exist independently of the whole; [then] in this connection we reply that if potness is non-existent respectively in [each of its parts] color, etc., then how can any thing be a whole [pot]? Indeed whatever is called a whole [pot] cannot be determined without [its parts] color, etc.⁸⁸ Because it is impossible to establish the existence of its own-nature which is indeterminable (apariccidyamāna) the whole does not exist. Since the whole does not exist, therefore because of the fact that it is a part [of that non-existent whole] the color also does not exist. Therefore the union of color, etc. is not the pot because [we reply]:

10. The property of being form (rūpatva) is without difference in characteristic (avilaks-ana) for all forms. What indeed is the reason for the existence of the pot in regard to one [form] and not in regard to the others.⁸⁹

"For all forms" [is explained as follows]: colors, smells, etc. are called 'forms' because of the fact that they are grouped under the aggregate of form (rūpaskandha).⁹⁰ These

forms also exist in the cloth, etc. in the same manner as they exist in the pot. Although these [forms] are different with respect to [their locus] the pot, etc., they do not alter their own characteristic (svalaksana)⁹¹ because of the fact that their characteristic is the same in all cases. In this connection just as one form has a state (avasthāna) [consisting in] potness, similarly, why is it not accepted [by you Vaibhāsikas] that another form also which is connected with the cloth, etc. has a state [consisting in] potness? Also it is proper [we argue] that it [viz., the other form connected with the cloth, etc.] has the state [consisting in] potness in the same manner as the color, etc. which exists in the pot because there is no difference [between forms]. But no reason why this is not accepted [by you Vaibhāsikas] is possible; and hence potness occurs in all [forms]. Or else potness does not occur in the pot. Just as there is the [undesired] consequence that there is no difference for [any form and] the pot, etc., similarly, there occurs the [undesired] consequence that there is no difference between color and smell, etc. because of the fact that they are not different from [any given] pot.

But if [as an alternative] you [Vaibhāsikas] think that although there is no⁹² difference between these things [viz., color, smell, etc.] and the pot, but nevertheless that there is a difference between color and taste, etc.; and therefore the [undesired] consequence that there is no difference [between color and smell, etc.] does not occur, then explaining that this [alternative] also is not logically possible

∟we reply∟:

11. ∟Your∟ opinion is that color is different from taste, etc., ∟but∟ is not different from the pot, etc. How then is that ∟viz., the pot∟ which itself does not exist without those ∟taste, etc.∟ not different from color?⁹³

If color is established as different from taste, etc. because of the fact that it is apprehended by a different sense faculty,⁹⁴ then why is it not established that the color is different from the pot also? Because of the fact that it ∟viz., the pot∟ is different from taste, etc. which ∟you Vaibhāṣikas maintain∟ are different from color, it comes about that it ∟viz., the pot∟ in the same manner as the essential nature (svātman) of taste, etc. is different from the color. But no difference is maintained ∟by you Vaibhāṣikas between the pot and the color∟; and hence that ∟alternative∟ is not logically possible.

When the cause of the pot does not exist in the color, etc. then certainly ∟we say∟:

12a. The pot does not have a cause.⁹⁵

It is not possible that that ∟viz., the pot∟ which is without a cause is an uncaused effect (kārya)⁹⁶ which exists by virtue of itself;⁹⁷ and hence ∟we say∟:

12b. An effect does not arise by itself.⁹⁸

Thus since it is not possible that that ∟viz., the pot∟ is an uncaused effect ∟we say∟:

12cd. Therefore no pot exists apart from the color, etc.⁹⁹

Because of the fact that the pot is not perceived as an effect apart from color, etc., it is established that the pot does not exist separately from color, etc.

But if you [Vaibhāsikas] think that the pot is not a thing which has color, etc. as a material cause (upādāna)¹⁰⁰ but [as an alternative you suppose that] with regard to its own parts, the potsherds, the pot is the effect and the potsherds are [its] cause, [then] in setting forth that that [alternative] also is not logically possible we say:

13. The pot is established by virtue of a cause. A cause is established by virtue of another [cause]. How could that thing which has not been established by virtue of itself produce something else?¹⁰¹

If the pot is established in dependence upon the potsherds, which [you Vaibhāsikas suppose] are the material cause of the pot, then what are the potsherds established in dependence upon? First of all they are not established by virtue of their own-nature because of the [undesired] consequence that they would have no cause.

But if another cause also is maintained for those [potsherds] then the potsherds are not established by virtue of their own-nature because of the fact that they also are dependent upon another thing [viz.,] stone fragments as their cause. How will these potsherds which are not established by virtue of themselves establish another thing by virtue of their own-nature? Therefore the pot does not exist [by virtue of own-nature].¹⁰² This very method for the refutation of the pot should

be employed also in regard to the non-establishment of all effects.

Here it is maintained [by you Vaibhāsikas] that because the expression 'pot' [is used] for the color, etc. when they are united as a conglomerate (samudita) and that even when the color, etc. are multiple the [undesired] consequence that the pot would be multiple does not follow. [We reply that] that [objection] also is not logically possible because of the fact that a conglomerate (samūha) is non-existent [apart from its constituent characteristics]. Thus [we say]:

14. The property of being odor is not attested in the color even in union (samavāya).¹⁰³

Therefore the oneness of the conglomerate is not logically possible as [in the case of] the pot. ¹⁰⁴

Although the color, etc. are united as a conglomerate, they do not each abandon their own-characteristic when in the state of conglomeration; and therefore the property of being odor is not possible [for the color] because the color does not abandon its own-characteristic when it is in the state of conglomeration. Thus oneness is impossible in a conglomerate which has a multiple substratum. Indeed a conglomerate is inseparable from the color, etc. and the color, etc. are mutually differentiated. How could a conglomerate which is inseparable from the color, etc. be one [in nature]? The example is given in saying "as in the case of the pot." As [we have said above]:

Oneness does not exist for the pot [and its characteristics] because of the fact that it

is not separate [from them].¹⁰⁵

Similarly, it is also said:

Oneness does not exist for the conglomerate [and its characteristics] because of the fact that it is not separate from [its] characteristics.

Thus [we say]:

Therefore the oneness of the conglomerate is not logically possible as [in the case of] the pot.¹⁰⁶

Therefore because of the impossibility of a conglomerate / as a unity distinct from its characteristics [the supposition of the pot is not logically possible also in regard to / equating the pot with] the conglomeration of color, etc. As it has been described and considered above [we say]:

15. Just as the pot does not exist apart from the color, etc., similarly, the color does not exist apart from air (vāyu), etc.¹⁰⁷

As the pot is not established separately from the color, etc., so also the color, etc. which is the material cause (upā-dāna) of the designation 'pot' is not logically possible apart from the four great elements (mahābhūta)¹⁰⁸ [which are the material cause of the color, etc.] because of the [undesired] consequence that the color would have no cause. As it is impossible for the color and odor to exist apart from [the elements] air, etc., and similarly, because there is no establishment of the great elements apart from one another¹⁰⁹ there is no establishment [of the great elements] by virtue of their own-nature. Insetting forth [this view we say]:

16. A thing that is hot (usna) is fire. How can what is not [something that is] hot (anus-na) be burned? Therefore what is called fuel (indhana) does not exist, and without that [viz., fuel] fire does not exist.¹¹⁰

In this world fire burns the three elements (bhūta) that are capable of being burned (dāhya). Hence just fire, not anything else, burns those three elements which are known as fuel, and just fuel, not anything else, is burned. In this connection if fire, the thing that is hot, burns fuel, then just fire is hot, not the fuel. Also, because it is impossible to burn that which is not hot, the thing that is not hot, [namely] fuel, is not [burned]. Therefore in this way because what is capable of being burned is altogether impossible, that thing which would have the nature of the three elements, [namely,] fuel, does not exist. When fuel is not a separate thing apart from fire, then when fuel is non-existent, fire, being without a cause, is not possible; and hence without that [viz., fuel] fire does not exist.¹¹¹

Here it is objected [by you Vaibhāṣikas] that the fuel, because of the fact that it has the nature of being hard (kāth-inya)¹¹² etc. has the nature of not being hot. Because it is overpowered by fire which has the own-nature of being hot, it becomes hot. Being hot, it is burnt. Although in this way it is supposed [by you Vaibhāṣikas] that what is known as fuel is a real thing (artha), [nevertheless, to your objection we reply]:

17ab. If what is overpowered (abhibhūta)
 [by fire] also is hot, why then does that
 not become fire?¹¹³

If [as an alternative] it is supposed [by you Vaibhāsikas] that a real thing known as fuel which is overpowered by fire becomes hot eventhough it has the own nature of not being hot, then [we reply that let it be supposed that] that thing also is fire because of the fact that it has the nature of being hot. Therefore this [is what is meant by] the non-existence of fuel.

17cd. But if there is a separate thing in fire which is not hot--that is logically impossible.¹¹⁴

But if [as an alternative you Vaibhāsikas suppose that] a real thing even when it is overpowered by fire is not hot, then [we reply that] because of the fact that there is a contradiction between that [not hot] thing which is a separate thing from fire and which is known as fuel [consisting in] the three elements, and that hot thing [viz., fire], it is not logically possible that that thing which has the own nature of not being hot exists in fire. [Otherwise] there would be nothing but fire existing without the three elements, and there is no existence of the great elements without one another. If that were the case, then there would be a contradiction with [our] established doctrine.¹¹⁵ Because no separate thing known as fuel exists in fire and because of the fact that fire would have no cause [if fuel did not exist] that [alternative] also is not logically possible.

But if [as an alternative] you [Vaibhāsikas] think that fire does exist without fuel in the atoms (paramānu) of fiery substances because it does not exist in the three [other] elements, then to that [alternative] we reply:

18ab. If fuel does not exist in the atom (anu), then fire exists without fuel.¹¹⁶

Therefore that [alternative] is precisely the fault that it [viz., fire] has no cause; and hence because of the [undesired] consequence that it has no cause it is not logically possible for those of our own school (svayūthya) to accept that atoms exist in substances just as it is [impossible] for the Vaiśeṣikas.¹¹⁷ The atomic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas is not refuted again because it was refuted in the ninth chapter.¹¹⁸

But if [as an alternative] fearing the [undesired] consequence that fire has no cause [you Vaibhāsikas suppose that] fuel does exist in the atoms, then [to this alternative we reply]:

18cd. If fuel were in that [viz., the atom], then an atom would not be one in nature.¹¹⁹

If you [Vaibhāsikas] suppose that fuel is in the atom, then you must admit that the atom which is in the fiery substance is not one in nature also.¹²⁰ It is not only that the atom is not one in nature because of [your] established principle (niyama) that the eight substances arise simultaneously (sahot-pāda),¹²¹ but also that other things [are not one in nature].

19ab. For each thing that is examined no oneness exists.¹²²

Just as the [four great] elements are not one in nature because they exist in a manner that is different from that, sim-

ilarly, matter derived from the elements (bhautika)¹²³ also does not exist without the elements because of the [undesired] consequence that the matter derived from the elements would be without a cause. In the same way the mental factors (caitta) do not exist without mind (citta).¹²⁴ Also without the characterized thing the characteristic being without a substratum would not exist. Since in this way there is no establishment of something which is one in nature then when a conglomerate which is one in nature does not exist, then also the establishment of something which is multiple in nature is rejected. Hence [we say]:

19cd. Since a thing which is one [in nature] does not exist, the [thing which is] multiple [in nature] also does not exist.¹²⁵

If a thing which is one [in nature] does not exist, then also there is no establishment of the conglomerates.

But if [you Sāṃkhyas say that] this refutation applies [only] to your school because of the fixed principle of simultaneous production is accepted, but with regard to another school this refutation does not apply because it is accepted [by us] that earth atoms, etc. are permanent (nitya)¹²⁶ and are not connected with the existence of things that are different than they are, then in this case in setting forth that that [view] also is not logically possible [we reply]:

20ab. If [your] opinion is that the three things are not different and in this regard a thing that is one in nature exists,¹²⁷

[Then we reply]: that [view] also is not logically possible.

Why?

20cd. Since threeness exists in each case,
therefore oneness does not exist.¹²⁸

Even for [you our] opponent there is not anything which exists that is called 'one'. Since even in this case [the three, viz.,] substanceness (dravyatva), oneness and goodness (sattva) exist in earth atoms a triadic thing (tritaya) exists. Similarly in a quality qualityness (gunatva), oneness and goodness exist. Thus for the Sāṃkhya everything has the form of three qualities; and hence no thing that is one [in nature] exists.¹²⁹ There is nothing that overcomes the refutation mentioned above.

Moreover, an intelligent person should use this method of refutation for the purpose of refuting all the philosophers' theories. In teaching this method [we say]:

21. Existing (sat), non-existing (asat), [both] existing and non-existing (sadasat) and neither existing nor non-existing (sadasan na)--this is the method that intelligent people should utilize constantly in regard to [the theories of] identity, etc.¹³⁰

"Identity, etc." [means the theories of] identity, difference, both or neither. When the philosophers establish these theories, identity, etc., an intelligent person should utilize successively the progressive method (krama) of refutation which is characterized by "existing and non-existing, etc."¹³¹ In this connection the theory of the Satkāryavādins¹³² is that the cause and the effect are one [in nature]. In that [theory] the effect which is present by virtue of its having the essent-

ial nature of an effect (kārvātman). Indeed, it is impossible for a non-existent thing to be [effective]. For if the non-existent thing were not produced, then there would be the possibility of everything [being produced] from everything. The possibility of everything [as produced] from everything is not experienced anywhere at all because the experience of curds [as produced only] from milk is fixed (pratiniyata). Therefore because of the philosophers' acceptance of identity between the cause and the effect, an [already] existent effect arises. Thus there is the theory of identity. In regard to this theory of identity a refutation should be stated constantly through the consideration (parāmarśa) of the theory of the [already] existent effect. Therefore [we say]:

The decoration of pillars, etc. is useless for the house.¹³³

Similarly, [we say]:

It is not logically possible to say that of anything whose coming into existence (sambhava) is effected that it has existed previously. If there were the production of an [already] existent thing, then there would be the coming into existence (bhava) of what has been produced [already].¹³⁴

If a thing exists even though it has not been produced, then the fixed relationship (niyama) [of the cause and the effect] is useless. But if some effect were to be produced [then]

an [already] existent effect is not possible.¹³⁵

Thus an intelligent person should utilize the refutation indicated [above] in regard to the theory of an [already] existent effect to the theory of identity.

The Asatkāryavādins¹³⁶ suppose that there is a difference between the cause and the effect. Thinking that the production of an [already] existent effect is senseless, they maintain that just a [previously] non-existent effect is produced. Also the refutation that was indicated [above] in regard to the theory that the effect is [previously] non-existent should be utilized for the theory of difference. Moreover [we say]:

To one who maintains the theory that the effect is non-existent [one should reply]: the decoration of pillars, etc. is useless for the house.¹³⁷

The Sadasatkāryavādins¹³⁸ suppose that there is both identity and difference between the cause and the effect. They maintain that Devadatta exists just as an individual self (jīvātman) but is not produced as existing just as [the form of] Devadatta. Similarly, they suppose that [golden] arm and wrist bracelets, etc. exist just in the form of gold, but they are not produced as existing just in the form of wrist and arm bracelets, etc. The rebuttal indicated through refuting the doctrine of the existence and non-existence of the effect should be stated in regard to the theory of both identity and difference. Moreover we say:

To those who maintain that the effect is existent [and to those who maintain that the effect is non-existent one should reply: the decoration

of pillars, etc. is useless for the house 7. ¹³⁹

The faults of the theses of the two [preceding] philosophers are applicable to this single [composite] thesis. That is the difference [between this composite thesis and the other two single theses].

To those in whose opinion there is no substantiality of the pot, etc., as a result of rejecting the doctrine that there is existence and non-existence in the case of those things that have as [their] cause [some] thing not determined as a substantially existent (dravya-sat) thing either identical with or different from [its] own cause, a refutation should be stated through the consideration 'neither existing nor non-existing'. Moreover, if [the position that] both exist is possible, then through the refutation of that [position] it is explained by implication that those two [preceding positions, viz., existing and non-existing] will be considered non-existent. Thus according to the progressive method:

Existing, non-existing, [both] existing and non-existing, neither existing nor non-existing--this is the method that intelligent people should utilize constantly in regard to the [theories of] identity, etc. ¹⁴⁰

Should someone ask if things are negated through this method of identity, difference, etc. only or also through another method, then one should reply:

Existing, non-existing, [both] existing and non-existing, neither existing nor non-exist-

ing--this is the method that intelligent people should utilize constantly in regard to the [theories of] identity, etc.¹⁴¹

This progressive method, namely, "existing, non-existing, [both] existing and non-existing, neither existing nor non-existing" should be utilized constantly for the four theories, identity, etc.

In this connection "existing" has the sense of "possessing"¹⁴², "non-existing" has the sense of "not possessing", [both] existing and non-existing" has the sense of "both possessing and not possessing" and "neither existing nor non-existing" has the sense of "neither possessing nor non-possessing." "Identity, etc." has the sense of "identity, difference, both or neither." In this connection in regard to the case of two things or many things [the question arises] is there identity, difference, both or neither [existing between them].

In this connection this progressive method called "existing, etc." must be applied from the point of view of the locus (viṣaya), time (kāla) and the characteristic to those who maintain that there is identity between the cloth and the white color. In this connection first of all [this is examined] from the point of view of the locus. If there is identity between the cloth and the white color, then wherever the white color exists, the cloth also must exist. Wherever the cloth exists, the white color also must exist.

But if [as an alternative you Satkāryavādin suppose that] wherever the white color exists, the cloth does not exist, then

in this connection [we reply that] if it is maintained [by you Satkāryavādins] that there is identity between the cloth and the white color, then that [alternative] is not logically possible because of the difference in locus.

Also [this is examined] from the point of view of time. In this connection time is of three kinds: past, present, and future. In this connection in regard to past time the white color which has been produced previously is experienced only in the past temporal state. If there is identity between the cloth and the white color, then if the white color has been produced previously, the cloth also must have been produced previously.

But if [as an alternative you Satkāryavādins suppose that] the cloth has been produced afterwards, then [we reply that] the white color also must have been produced afterwards. If the white color has been produced previously now then as the cloth has been produced afterwards, those two things, the one that has been produced previously and the one that has been produced afterwards, cannot be identical because of the fact that there is a difference in the sequence of their production.

Moreover, if there is identity between the cloth and the white color, then when the white color is destroyed, the cloth also will be destroyed; and if the cloth is destroyed, then the white color also will be destroyed. [If as an alternative you Satkāryavādins suppose that] when the white color is destroyed just the white color will be destroyed whereas the cloth will not be destroyed and if the cloth is destroyed just the cloth will be destroyed whereas the white color will not be destroyed,

then in this connection [we reply that] what was maintained [by you Satkāryavādins] namely, that there is identity between the cloth and the white color, is not so because of the difference that when one is destroyed, [the other] is not destroyed.

Moreover, if someone says "white", only what is white is mentioned; the cloth is not [mentioned]. If someone says "cloth", just the cloth is mentioned; the white color is not mentioned. Since when someone says "white", just what is white is mentioned whereas the cloth is not mentioned, and when someone says "cloth", just the cloth is mentioned whereas the white color is not mentioned, therefore these two things are not identical because of the difference that when one is mentioned, [the other] is not mentioned.

Also [this is examined] from the point of view of the difference between the characteristic and the characterized thing. In this connection the characteristic is the white nature and the characterized thing is the cloth. If there is identity between these two things, then if the white color is the characteristic, the cloth also is that characteristic. If the cloth is not that characteristic, then the white color also is not that characteristic. But if [as an alternative you Satkāryavādins suppose that] only the white color is the characteristic, but the cloth is not the characteristic, and that only the cloth is the characterized thing, but that the white color is not [the characterized thing], then in this connection [we reply that] the doctrine that [the two] the cloth and the white color are one will not be so because of the fact that

there is a difference between the characteristic and the characterized thing. Just as the identity of the cloth and the white color is refuted, similarly, one should speak at greater length (vistarāśas) about the refutation of identity in regard to all things.

In this connection it is objected that if one mentions the refutation of identity, then one must maintain difference. It is said that if there is a difference between the cloth and the white color, and if the white color is not the cloth because of the fact that a quality is dependent upon a substance, then just as if [for example,] Yajñadatta is not the brother of Devadatta, then Devadatta also is not the brother of Yajñadatta, similarly, [if the white color is not the cloth, then] the cloth is not white. If [as an alternative] it were maintained [by you Asatkāryavādins] that the cloth is white because of its connection with the white color, then [the question arises] does the cloth possess or not possess the white characteristic because of [its] connection with that white color. First of all [we reply that] if the cloth is white because it possesses the white characteristic, then this [viz., the white color] is considered to be the cloth [and hence they are identical, not different].

But if [as an alternative you Asatkāryavādins suppose that] the white characteristic is not possessed [by the cloth], then [we reply that] although there is a connection [between the cloth and the white color], that [viz., the cloth] is not white because it does not possess the white characteristic. In this connection what was maintained [by you Asatkāryavādins]

namely, that the cloth is white because it is connected with the color white is not so. Just as the cloth is not white, similarly, because the cloth is different from its distinctive features, namely, [the qualities] blue, yellow, red, orange, pale yellow, gray, black, long, short, smooth, coarse, etc., it does not exist in each one. Also, because it does not exist in each one, the cloth itself does not exist. As the cloth itself does not exist, similarly, also all [other] things because of the fact that there is a difference between them and their distinctive features, the qualities, do not exist [in reality].

In this connection it is objected that if one mentions the refutation of identity and difference which is [equivalent to the position of] existing and non-existing, then that [refutation] must be stated correctly for both [identity and difference]. It is replied that in regard to the thesis which says that there is both identity and difference between the cloth and the white color the refutation is established through the very same refutation that was stated earlier for [the single theses] identity and difference.

One must mention briefly the negation of that thesis which maintains that both [identity and difference] exist. If there is no identity between the cloth and the white color, and also [that] both [identity and difference between the cloth and the white color] are not existent, then because they do not obtain both characteristics, the white color is not white and is not non-white and the cloth also is not cloth and not non-cloth. Therefore why is the white color which does not

have both characteristics called "white" and not called "black"? Since the white color is called "white" and is not called "black", therefore just the white color exists. Also, why is the cloth which does not obtain both characteristics called "a cloth", but not called "a pot"? Since the cloth is called "a cloth", but is not called "a pot", therefore just the cloth exists. In this way just the white color and the cloth are established. Surely, those two [viz., the white color and the cloth] must be identical or different. If they are identical, one must mention again the very same progressive method for the refutation of identity. If [on the other hand] they are different, then the progressive method [for the refutation] of difference [must be mentioned]. Thus it is established that one should mention at greater length the progressive method for the refutation of all things.

Here it is objected [by the non-Buddhist philosophers] that if the own-nature of things does not exist because it is not so established, then, through what logical reasoning do [Buddhist] philosophers suppose that things exist? [We reply that] in this connection logical reasoning is not [applicable], but nevertheless:

22. Just as one might say that a permanent thing exists if the continuum (saṃtāna) is wrongly perceived, similarly, one might say that a thing exists if an aggregation (sāma-grī) is wrongly perceived.¹⁴³

Just as, while the flame of a lamp is destroyed each moment

ksana),¹⁴⁴ an existent continuum comes into being when there is an aggregation of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī), and is present in an uninterrupted fashion as the connection (saṁbandha) between the cause and the effect in the former and latter moments,¹⁴⁵ similarly, while all the conditioning factors (saṁskāra)¹⁴⁶ are produced and immediately destroyed, without any beginning an existent continuum arises whenever there is an aggregation of causes and conditions such as the self (ātman) and is present in an uninterrupted fashion as the connection between the cause and the effect. Therefore just as it is suitable for the non-Buddhist sages whose ascertainments, surely, are confused and erroneous in regard to perceiving the notion of this continuum as it really is and who remembering their former existences perceive the continuum which consists of an unbroken series of aggregates (skandha) as being either themselves or another [individual] to think that a thing is permanent because they do not perceive the momentary destruction [of things], similarly, dependent upon this or that aggregation and having the [interdependent] nature of the elements and matter derived from the elements, and the mind and mental factors, a house, etc. which is the aggregation of substances, [viz.,] straw, beams, etc. which are [its] material causes (upādāna), and a pot, etc. which is the aggregation of qualities, [viz.,] color, odor, etc. [which are its material causes] and other things, the self, space, etc. exist.

Taking as valid knowledge (pramāṇa) worldly [i.e. not merely hallucinatory] error, [viz.,] things such as the ele-

ments and matter derived from the elements not established in [its] characteristic as distinct from an aggregate, the mind and mental factors, and a pot, etc., aside from what is [merely] a reflection, an echo, etc.¹⁴⁷ [i.e. what is not even a valid 'worldly' thing] own and universal characteristics (svasāmānyalaksana) are simply applied involving dependence and support in order to introduce ordinary people (loka) [to the truth].¹⁴⁸ When these [things] arise, just the aggregation arises, and just the aggregation will cease. Therefore since the aggregation is not understood as it really is and is wrongly perceived, the [non-Buddhist] philosophers, imagining the establishment [of these things] separately by virtue of their own-nature, perceive things that are not logically possible on account of their error.

[It is objected here by the non-Buddhist philosophers that] if in this way a thing does not exist, then our opinion that a thing exists is erroneous, but if you [Mādhyamikas] also do not admit that a thing exists, then there will be a perception without a thing [as its objective content] and that is not logically possible because of the contradiction between perception and non-perception¹⁴⁹. We reply that we do not maintain the doctrine that a thing does not exist because of the fact that our doctrine is interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)¹⁵⁰. [If you non-Buddhist philosophers should ask]: Do you [Mādhyamikas] maintain the doctrine that a thing exists? [Then we reply]: no, because of the fact that our doctrine is interdependent origination. Also [if you non-

Buddhist philosophers should ask⁷: What is your doctrine?

Then we reply⁷: our doctrine is interdependent origination.

Also, if you non-Buddhist philosophers should ask⁷: what is the meaning of interdependent origination? Then we reply⁷: the meaning is without a nature of its own (niḥsvabhāva), the meaning is not produced by own-nature, the meaning is that an effect has a nature of its own which is like magic illusions (māyā), mirages (marīci), reflections, the cities of celestial musicians, phantoms, and dreams, the meaning is emptiness (śūnyatā)¹⁵¹ and the meaning is without self (anātman). Thus we say⁷:

23. That thing⁷ for which there is interdependent origination is not independent (svatantra). All this is without independent reality; therefore, self [i.e. nature]⁷ does not exist.¹⁵²

In this connection since that thing⁷ which has an essence of its own, a nature of its own, which is independent and which is not dependent upon anything else is established by virtue of itself, it would not have originated in interdependence. If that is the case, then that thing which has originated in interdependence is not independent because it is produced in dependence upon causes and conditions.

All this is without independent reality.

Therefore in any thing there is no self, [i.e. there is no]⁷ nature of its own. Therefore since in this connection interdependent origination is [equivalent to]⁷ without a nature of its own, the meaning of being without an independent own-nature

[is equivalent to] the meaning of emptiness, but it [viz., interdependent origination] does not have the sense that all things are non-existent . Therefore in this connection because of the denial of what has originated in interdependence, which is produced and is like a magic illusion, and the cause of defilement (saṃkleśa) and purification (vyavadāna),¹⁵³ the view of non-existence is an error (viparyāsa), [but] because there is no own-nature the view that things are existent is also an error. Therefore if that is the case then the faults of the non-existence of interdependent origination, [viz.,] the doctrine of eternalism (śāśvatavāda) and the doctrine of nihilism (ucchedavāda)¹⁵⁴ come about for those who maintain that things have a nature of their own.

But if [you other Buddhist philosophers suppose that just] the meaning of being without independent reality (asvatantra) is the meaning of interdependent origination [and ask us] : how then will you [Mādhyamikas] refute us? [and] what do you think is the difference between us? , [then we reply that]: what you conceive and speak about as the meaning of interdependent origination is misunderstood and that is the difference. Just as a young child, who has not purified himself [of misunderstanding] in regard to conventional practices (vyavahāra), by imputing (adhyāropa)¹⁵⁵ truth upon a reflection and having denied the emptiness of own-nature as it really is, conceiving it [viz., the reflection] as being possessed of a nature of its own, does not understand that the reflection is a conceptual construction (kalpanā), similarly, you [Buddhist philosophers] also, even though you accept interdependent originat-

tion, do not thoroughly understand own-nature as it really is and that interdependent origination like a reflection is also empty of a nature of its own because of the fact that you do not apprehend the non-existence of own-nature and because of the fact that after having imputed an existent own-nature upon a non-existent own-nature you [then] apprehend [things]. Therefore in this way when what is conceived and spoken about is not understood, then one deceives both oneself and others. Therefore because in this connection we are much more numerous this [view viz., everything is without independent reality and lacking a nature of its own] which was written by the author of the [Catuhṣataka] treatise [in the verse] is not ineffective. Also because there is not any production of own-nature therefore [we say]:

24. No union (samavāya)¹⁵⁷ exists anywhere at all for a thing which has no effect. That union which exists for the sake of an effect is not union according to the Noble Ones.¹⁵⁸

If the source of things were own-nature, then that would be permanent and not dependent upon an effect, for own-nature is not dependent upon an effect. Also, because a single thing when it has ceased is not able to establish any effect, the aggregate effect will involve mutual union for what is to be realized, but the union which exists on account of an effect is not union according to the Noble Ones who perceive its own-nature. It [viz., the union] clearly is not maintained as true.

For the purpose of setting forth [the truth] therefore this is stated to show the establishment of the stopping of the phenomenal world (saṃsāra) through the total stoppage of what is the seed of the phenomenal world's activity together with an attachment to thing through the force of defiled ignorance (kliṣṭājnāna), [viz.,] a cognition which imputes the own nature of a thing: [We say]:

25. The seed of existence (bhava) is cognition; sense objects (viśaya) are the sphere (gocara) of its activity. When non-substantiality (nairātmya) is perceived for the sense objects, the seed of existence will cease. 160

Because the sense objects are perceived as being without a nature of their own through the progressive method explained above, cognition, the cause of attachment, which becomes the seed of existence, by stopping totally established the stopping of the phenomenal world for the disciples (śravaka), Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattva¹⁶¹ who obtain intellectual receptivity (ksānti)¹⁶² in regard to the truth that things (dharma) have no origination. The thought of awakening (bodhicitta), the seed which becomes the Tathāgata's knowledge¹⁶³ does not stop in them because all will obtain undoubtedly the Tathāgata's knowledge. Even those who do not [now] produce such a thought of awakening, later after producing [the thought of awakening] through the actions of a Bodhisattva undoubtedly will obtain the highest knowledge. This should be sought after in such sūtras as the Saddharmapundarika.¹⁶⁴

[Here ends] the commentary to the fourteenth chapter which is entitled "showing the realization of the refutation of the extreme [views]" in the Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśataka which was previously composed by the teacher Āryadeva.

IV NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

¹ On bhava as one of the twelve members of interdependent origination see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, Gand, 1913, pp. 30-31. See also Prasannapadānāmamadhya-makavṛtti (hereafter abbreviated MKV) edited by Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica no. IV, St. Petersburg, 1903-1913, pp. 556.3-557.4, and Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, translated by Jacques May, Paris, 1959, pp. 263-264.

² The Tibetan text adds sprul pa (= Skrt. nirmāṇa). Cf. CS 13: 25 (ed. Vaidya, p. 108; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 197):

alātacakranirmāṇasvapnamāyāmbucandraiḥ /
dhūmikāntaḥ pratiśrutkāmarīcyabhraiḥ samo bhavaḥ //

This verse is translated by Vaidya, p. 155. It is quoted twice in MKV pp. 173 and 552 (trans. by May, pp. 136, 259). This verse is also cited by Murti, p. 177, and by Lamotte in the Traité I p. 359 note 4 and in La Somme du Grand Véhicule, Lou-1938, p. 22*. Lamotte in both works (Traité I, pp. 358-360 notes 1-6; La Somme du Grand Véhicule, pp. 21*-22* section 27 notes 1-9) cites a number of passages in which these similies are used. On the simile alātacakra see Traité I, p. 372 note 1; La Vallée Poussin's note to MKV 219.8, p. 602. See also Ratnāva-li 1:36, p. 314:

trivartmaitad anādyantamadhyam saṁsāramandalam /
alātamaṇḍalapraḥkhyam bhramaty anyonyahetukam //

This verse is translated by Tucci on p. 316.

³ The term svabhāva is subject to varied interpretations. Stanislaw Schayer, Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā, Kra-

kowie, 1931, pp. 55-57 identifies four distinct ways in which the term svabhāva is utilized: 1. svabhāvah = svo bhāvah = nirajam ātmīyam svarūpam; 2. svabhāva im Sinne der hīnayānistischen dharma-Theorie als das absolut individuelle Eigenmerkmal = sva-lakṣana; 3. svabhāva als Äquivalent der prakṛti, des upādāna und des āśraya; and 4. svabhāvah = svato bhāvah; das absolute, nicht relative Sein (= nirapekṣaḥ svabhāvah). Jan Willem de Jong in an article, "Le problème de l'absolu dans l'école Mādhyamaka," *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 140 (1950), pp. 323-324 (translated into English as "The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School," *JIP* 2 (1972), pp. 2-3) says: "According to Nāgārjuna the real svabhāva is non-contingent and has no relation to anything whatsoever. Heat is thus not svabhāva and fire, not possessing svabhāva, has no 'own-being' or, as the Mādhyamikas say, is empty of 'own-being' (śūnyah svabhāvena). All things, like fire, are born of causes (pratītyasamutpanna) and are empty of 'own-being' (śūnya). The Mādhyamikas in this way conclude that the concepts of śūnya and pratītyasamutpanna are equivalent."

"Candrakīrti rejects the svalakṣana, equating it with the svo bhāva which has already been eliminated. As a matter of fact, in his opinion, the layman attributes to things an individual character (svalakṣana), because they believe in a plurality of real elements. Consequently, the svo bhāva and the svalakṣana, the 'own-being' and the individual character have one and the same meaning."

"On the other hand, for Candrakīrti, the unchanging basis (āśraya) is identical to the absolute being (svato bhāva). By

no means does he distinguish, as Schayer leads us to believe, an āśraya or a prakṛti peculiar to each thing, but he gives a more extensive meaning to this concept: āśraya to him is the unchanging support of all things (bhāva) taken together. This support can only be non-contingent, because there is nothing outside of it. It becomes thus the svato bhāva. We may therefore conclude that for the Mādhyamikas the concept of svabhāva has only two meanings: (1) that of the 'own-being of each thing' (svalakṣana or svo bhāva), which, incidently, they consider unreal, and (2) that of the 'own-being of all things taken together' (prakṛti or svato bhāva)."

Ryotai Fukuhara in an article, "On Svabhāvavāda" in Buddhist Studies in India, ed. R.C. Pandeya, Delhi, 1975, p. 83 also distinguishes two distinct meanings of svabhāva as used by Candrakīrti in MKV: "(1) Svabhāva discussed in Chapter XV means 'a special quality of a thing unshared by any other things', such as ausnya of agni.... Svabhāva used in this meaning is synonymous with svalakṣana, svarūpa and prakṛti, and its antonyms are sāmānya-lakṣana and parabhāva. (2) In some other cases, svabhāva means 'a self-established entity', and when it is used in its adverbial forms (svabhāvena or svabhāvatas), it is to be translated with such phrases as 'by itself' and 'as a self-established entity'....Svabhāvatas of this meaning is synonymous with svātmanā....Antonym of this svabhāva is not sāmānya-lakṣana or parabhāva, but parasparāpekṣa."

See also May, op. cit. p. 124, note 328, and Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, Ann Arbor, 1967, pp. 239-240.

In the fourteenth chapter of the CŚT Candrakīrti uses sva-

bhāva, for the most part, in the sense of a hypostatized essence which, if possessed by a thing, is the unchanging ground of its existence, its *raison d'être* (svabhāvato 'stitvam). He rejects this notion of svabhāva on empirical grounds, noting that there is no experience of things coming into existence by themselves. All things are observed to have come into existence as a result of certain causes and conditions (hetupratyayajanman). However, when discussing the topic of fire and fuel, Candrakīrti in CŚT also uses svabhāva in the sense of a thing's own-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa).

⁴ Padārtha is utilized here as a synonym for bhāva and is rendered in the Tibetan translation by the same Tibetan word, dnegos po, which is employed to translate bhāva.

⁵ rang bzhin dang bcas pa'i dnegos po. This gloss is provided by Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i grel, Sarnath, 1974.

⁶ The Tibetan translation of this verse differs. In place of astitā the Tibetan has bdag nyid (= Skrt. ātmata).

⁷ Trans. Vaidya, p. 155. Cf. CŚ 9:2 (ed. Vaidya, p. 76; ed. Bhattacharya, p. 33):

apratītyāstitā nāsti kadācit kasyacit kvacit /
na kadācit kvacit kaścid vidyate tena śāśvataḥ //

Trans. Vaidya, p. 134. This verse is quoted twice by Candrakīrti in MKV, pp. 397 and 505 and is translated by Jan Willem deJong, Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapadā, Paris, 1949, p. 48 and by May, op. cit. p. 239.

⁸ On the difference between the 'cause' (hetu) and the 'condi-

tion' (pratyaya) see David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Honolulu, 1975, pp. 56-66.

⁹ Nāgārjuna dismisses this alternative in MK 4:2cd:

āhetukaṃ na cāsty arthah kaścid āhetukah kvacit /
Candrakīrti comments: na cāsty arthah kaścid āhetukah kvacit /
tasmād ahetukatvadosaprasaṅgān na rūpakaraṇanirmuktaṃ rūpābhy-
upetavyam iti / MKV 124.2-3; trans. May, op. cit. p. 89.

On the doctrine of noncausation (ahetuvāda) see Kalupahana, op. cit. p. 53.

¹⁰ Candrakīrti uses svarūpa as a synonym for svabhāva.

¹¹ rgyu rkyen las ma skyes pa'i dngos po gzhan la rag ma las
pas sam / dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i grell, p. 174.

¹² rgyu med du 'byung ba'i dngos po de ni yul dus gang na'ang
yod pa ma vin no // Ibid.

¹³ The translation follows the Tibetan. The Sanskrit fragments, viz., visaṃbādakāḥ visaṃbādatvād seem corrupt. Cf. utpannarūpatvena caite bhāva avidyātimiropahatamatinayanānām
bālaprthagjanām khyānti / tasmān niḥsvabhāvā eva santo bālānām
visaṃvādakā māyākarituragādivad anabhiññānām na tu vijñānām /
MKV 237.4-6; trans. Schayer, op. cit. pp. 25-26. Also, cf. tatra visaṃvādakaṃ mosadharmakaṃ vitathakhyātyālātacakravat //
MKV 238.4-5; trans. Schayer, op. cit. p. 28.

¹⁴ As May remarks, op. cit. p. 117, note 298, "Le Mādhyamika souscrirait, à sa manière, au principe hégélien "tout ce qui est rationnel est réel; et tout ce qui est réel est rationnel"."

¹⁵ Through the application of extreme heat to a lump of unrefined gold all the impurities that are due to its solidified condition are dissipated and just the pure molten gold remains. In the following passage from Asaṅga's Mahāvāsanasaṃgraha the example of gold purified by fire is given: de la sa'i kham la ni med pa'i sa dmigs la / yod pa'i gser ni mi dmigs te / 'di ltar mes sreg na sa ni mi snang la gser ni snang ngo // sa'i kham ni sar snang ba na log par snang ngo // gser du snang ba de bzhin / nyid / du snang ngo // ed. Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule, p. 39; trans. p. 126.

¹⁶ Error (viparyāsa) involves accepting as true the reverse of what is actually the case. Error is held by the Buddhists to be fourfold: taking something as permanent (nitya) which is in fact impermanent (anitya); taking something as pleasant (sukha) which is in fact painful (duḥkha); taking something as a self (ātman) which is in fact not-self (anātman); and taking something as pure (śuci) which is in fact impure (aśuci). Āryadeva examines each of these four errors in the first four chapters of the CŚ. Nāgārjuna devotes the twenty third chapter of the MK to a consideration of error. See MKV p. 45lff. (trans. May, p. 179ff.).

Besides these four errors there is implicit in the Mādhyamika system a fifth error of which Conze, op. cit. pp. 204-205 says, "The belief which holds that dharmas have objective reality, although in fact they are unreal, non-existent, devoid of own-being and merely imagined, has arisen (samutthita) from a new kind of 'perverted view', which is often called the asad-vi-

paryāsa, and which consists in confusing reality with a mirage or a dream, mistaking things for what they are not, 'form-with respect to something unreal the notion that it is real'." For textual references to asaṁ-viparyāsa see May, p. 166, note 519.

¹⁷ Translated after the Tibetan.

¹⁸ Here the Tibetan text presents a problem. HPS has sarvathā tasya visambādakatvāt, but the Tib. has de rnam pa thams cad du mi slu ba nyid yin pa'i phyir ro (= Skrt. tasya sarvathā avisambādakatvāt) which is inconsistent with the tenor of the passage. The negative mi in the Tib. has to be taken as an error that has crept into all four editions of the CŚT.

¹⁹ The term rūpa has a wide range of meanings (see May, p. 79, note 132), but is often left untranslated. "Rūpa," Vasubandhu writes, " is twofold: color and shape." (rūpam dvidhā varṇaḥ saṁsthānāṁ ca.) Abhidharmakośa (hereafter abbreviated AK) ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi, p. 32) In this verse of the CŚ in which Āryadeva recounts the various relations that might exist between a pot and one of its qualities the term rūpa is translated in the sense of 'color'. The commentaries of Candrakīrti, Red mda' ba, and rGyal tshab confirm this narrow interpretation when they refer to this quality as one that is produced by baking (pākaja), that is to say, the pot takes on a red color after it has been baked.

²⁰ Trans. Vaidya, pp. 155-156.

²¹ Cf. Aksarasataka, trans. from the Chinese by Gokhale, op. cit. p. 10, "When you say, "Because the rūpa is there, there-

fore the pot is there," the rūpa and the pot are either one or different. If the pot and the rūpa are one, when the other rūpas are seen, the pot also ought to be seen. If the rūpa be different from the pot, the pot cannot be visible: then there is no pot. If because of its being seen, it is (considered) to be a pot (then,) when the pot stays in a place obstructed (from vision) and the eye does not see it, the pot would be no pot. If the rūpa and the pot are one, when the pot is destroyed, (all) the remaining rūpas too would get destroyed."

²² See AK, p. 572: ghāsādyagnisambandhād gunāḥ pākajā utpannāḥ
tat eva tādrśād vā punah pakṣatamotpattau tesāṃ vināśa iti
(Trans. from the Chinese by La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmako-
śa de Vasubandhu (hereafter abbreviated as Kośa), Brussels,
1971 reprint, tome III p. 7) and Yaśomitra's Sphutārthā com-
mentary, p. 572: agnisaṃyogah śyāmatāṃ ghatasya nivartya rak-
tatāṃ janayati sa eva raktatāṃ janayatīti kalpyeta /

Cf. Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, ed. with the
Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdharabhaṭṭa by Durgadhara Jha Sarma, Vanar-
asi, 1963, p. 257: pārthivaparamānūrūpādīnāṃ pākajotpattividhā-
nam / ghatāder āmadravasyāgninā sambaddhasyāgny abhighātānno-
danād vā tadāraṃbhakesv anusu karanāny utpadyante tebhyo vibhā-
gebhyah saṃyogavināśāḥ saṃyogavināśebhyaś ca kāryadravyaṃ vi-
nāsyati / tasmin vinaste svatantresu paramānusu agnisaṃyogād
ausnyāpeksād khyāmādīnāṃ vināśāḥ punar anyasmād agnisaṃyogād
ausnyāpeksāt pākajā jayante / Trans. by Gaṅgānātha Jha, The
Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda, Allahabad, 1916, p. 233.
See Umesha Mishra, Conception of Matter, Allahabad, 1936, p. 77ff.

23 Cf. Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i grel, p. 174: de la re zhiq gzugs nyid bum pa'o zhes bum pa gzugs dang gcig ma vin te / gang na gzugs yod pa de na bum pa yod pa thal ba'i phyir dang / so btang pa las skyes pa'i yon tan dmar po la sogs pa 'byung bas snqon po'i gzugs 'jig pa na bum pa'ang 'jig par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // (In this connection first of all, that just the color is the pot and hence that the pot and the color are one is not so because it would follow that wherever the color exists, the pot would exist, and because when previous color [of the pot] is destroyed by the arising of the red [color], a quality produced by baking, then the pot also will be destroyed.)

24 Trans. after the Tibetan. HPS yadi rūpāṇyo ghataḥ syāt svarūpanirapekṣo grhyate / Tib. gal te bum pa gzugs las gzhan du 'gyur na ni de gzugs las mi ltos par gzung du yod par 'gyur ro // Tib. de gzugs (= Skrt. so rūpa) instead of svarūpa.

25 Cf. Madhyamakāvatāra (hereafter abbreviated MA) 6:143:

bdag ni gzugs ldan mi 'dod gang phyir bdag /
yod med de phyir ldan don sbyor ba med /
gzhan na gzhan ldan gzhan min gzugs ldan na /
bdag ni gzugs las de nyid gzhan nyid med /

Trans. La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, Le Muséon, n.s. 12 (1911), pp. 310-311. This verse is quoted in MKV, pp. 434-435, and trans. de Jong, pp. 74-75.

The Mādhyamika denies the existence of both things such as the pot or the self, which common people believe to exist, and things such as the son of a barren woman, the existence of which clearly would be a logical contradiction.

²⁶ On the term kalpanā see May, p. 65 note 64.

²⁷ Cf. MKV 341.1-2 (trans. de Jong, p. 2) and MKV 212.6-7 (trans. Schayer, "Feur und Brennstoff", RO 7 (1930), p. 46.

²⁸ rGyal tshab, bZhi brqya pa'i rnam bshad legs shad snying po. Sarnath, 1971, pp.2-3 says: bum pa zhes bya ba tshogs pa rang gi ngo bos grub pa yod na / gzugs dang bum pa rang bzhin gcig gam rang bzhin tha dad / dang por ltar na / gzugs nyid bum pa'o zhes gzugs dang bum pa rang bzhin gyis grub pa'i gcig ma yin par thal / de ltar na gang na gzugs yod pa de na bum pa yod par thal ba'i phyir / lha sbyin don gzhan pa'i ba lang ldan pa ltar gzugs las don gzhan pa'i bum pa gzugs dang ldan par rtog na gzugs dang ldan pa'i bum pa gzugs las rang bzhin gzhan du yod pa min la ste yod pa min par thal / gzugs la ltos med du 'dzin par thal ba'i phyir ro // bum pa la gzugs don gzhan brten pa'i tshul du yod pa min zhing gzugs la bum pa 'khar gzhong la rgyu shug ltar brten pa'i tshul du yod pa ma yin te / rang bzhin gzhan du med pa'i phyir ro // (If there is an aggregate 'pot' established by virtue of its own-nature, the color and the pot [would be] one by virtue of their own-nature or different by virtue of their own-nature. It follows that the first view [viz.,] that just the color is the pot; and hence the color and the pot are one; established [as such] by virtue of their own-nature, is not so because it would follow that wherever the color exists, the pot would exist. [But on the other hand] if it is supposed that the pot which is a different thing than the color possesses the color like Devadatta possesses cows which are different things [than him] it fol-

lows that the pot, which possesses the color, is not different from the color by virtue of their own-nature, because it would follow that it would be perceived independently of the color. The pot does not exist in the color in the manner [of something] contained by something else, and the color does not exist in the pot in the manner of [something] contained like curds in a jar, because of the fact that they are not different by virtue of their own nature.)

²⁹ Cf. MA 6:137ab, p. 259.

len po rang nyer len gcig rigs dngos min /
de lta na las byed po gcig nyid 'gyur /

Trans. La Vallee Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 303.

³⁰ Cf. MK 18:1ab, p. 341.

ātma skandhā yadi bhaved udayavyayabhāg bhavet / Trans.

de Jong, p. 2. See also MK 27:6ab, p. 576.

na copādānam evātmā vyeti tat samudeti ca/ Trans. May, p. 283.

³¹ This phrase is missing in the Tibetan translation. Cf. MA 6:127ab, p. 245.

gal te phung po bdag na de phyir de /

mang bas bdag de dag kyang mang por 'gyur / Trans. La Val-

lée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 292. See also de Jong, p. 3 note 11.

³² Cf. MK 27:7, p. 577.

anyah punar upādānād ātmā naivopapadyate /

grhyeta hy anupādano vady anyo na ca grhyate // Trans.

May, p. 283. Cf. also MA 6:124ab, p. 243.

de'i phyir phung po las gzhan bdag med de /
phung po ma gtogs de 'dzin ma grub phyir / (Trans. La Val-
 lée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 289.

³³ Cf. MK 27:12 p. 580:

nāpy abhūtvā samudbhūto doṣa hy atra prasajyate /
kṛtako vā bhaved ātmā saṃbhūto vāpy ahetukah // (Trans.
 May, p. 287). Schayer, AKP, p. 90 note 60: "Zweites Argument:
 Ist der pudgala mit den skandhas identisch, so muss er teil-
 nehmen an dem Entstehen und an dem Vergehen der skandhas (udaya-
vyāya-bhāg bhavet). Die Annahme, dass das Ich vergeht führt
 zum uccheda-vāda; nimmt man aber an, dass es entstehen kann,
 'ohne früher existiert zu haben' (pūrvam abhūtvā paścād utpan-
nah syāt), so ist das nur in zwei Fällen möglich; entweder ist
 das Ich ein kṛtaka-dharma und wird von einem besonderen Faktor
 (kartar) hervorgebracht oder es entsteht ohne Ursache (ahetuka).
 Beides ist unhaltbar. Der Begriff eines kṛtaka ātman wurde zu
 der falschen Lehre führen, dass der saṃsāra einen Anfang hat
 (ādimān saṃsārah syāt), und die These des ahetukatva ist für
 den Buddhismus a priori ausgeschlossen."

³⁴ The Mādhyamikas often employ a fivefold examination when
 considering the possible relations that may exist between one
 thing and another, e.g. MK 22:1abc: skandhā na nānyah skandhe-
bhyo nāsmīn skandhā na tesu sah / tathāgataḥ skandhavān na
 (Trans. de Jong, p. 73). In this manner the self is examined
 in relation to the aggregates. The self is neither identical
 with the aggregates nor is it different from the aggregates,
 nor does it possess the aggregates, nor are the aggregates con-
 tained in the self, nor is the self contained in the aggre-

gates. This fivefold examination can be reduced effectively to two possibilities: identity or difference. If it can not be established that some thing is either identical with another thing or different from that other thing, then it goes without saying that it cannot be established that some thing possesses the other or that the relationship of locus-located (ādhāra-ādheya) obtains between them.

35 Nopapadyate: May p. 56 note 19c says, "Ce terme n'est pas un synonyme de na yujyate:nopapadyate exprime l'irrationalité; na yujyate l'incohérence, la contradiction interne, l'absurdité." Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, Madison, 1967, p.53 translates nopapadyate as "is not true to fact, is not proved," and B.K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht, 1971, p. 148 interprets this term as "counter to our experience".

36 See May p. 183 note 597 for textual references.

37 The perceptible form (rūpa) viz., color, shape, etc. of a thing is the cause of its being designated as 'a pot' or as a 'a cloth'. These designations (prajñapti) 'pot' or 'cloth' are mere names (nāmamātra) which are attached to specific collections (sāmāgrī) of phenomena. When these collections which constitute the parts of the whole 'pot' or 'cloth' are disbanded, the 'pot' or 'cloth' ceases to exist. As Paramārtha explains, "Quand la cruche est réduite en terre cuite, l'idée de cruche ne naît plus à l'endroit de cette cuite. Donc les choses telles que la cruche existent comme désignation métaphorique

(prajñāpti) de la figure (hing siang, ākṛti, saṁsthāna)."

Quoted in Kośa IV, p. 140 note 1.

See also May, p. 159 note 489. He notes, "Kalpanā et prajñāpti désignent deux aspects d'un même phénomène: kalpanā étant l'aspect subjectif, la "conception" en tant qu'activité de l'esprit; et prajñāpti l'aspect objectif, la "conceptualisation" de l'objet."

³⁸ Trans. after the Tib.

³⁹ Both Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p. 175 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, p. 14 identify the opponent here as a Bye brag pa (= Skrt. Vaiśeṣika).

⁴⁰ Trans. after the Tib; Skrt. lacks darśane.

⁴¹ Bhattacharya, p. 201 note 8 cites a parallel passage from Haribhadra's commentary to Śaṅkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa: tatra param sattā bhāvo mahāsattāti cocyate. The Vaiśeṣika works refer to sattā as parasāmānya. "Existence (sattā) according to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika," Raja Ram Dravid says in The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy, Varanasi, 1972, p. 34, "is the highest universal (parasāmānya), it extends over the greatest number of objects, and is the cause of their conception as 'existents'."

⁴² rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, p. 14: spyi dang khyad par gyi mtshan nyid mi mthun pa. (a difference in characteristic between universal and particular).

⁴³ Trans. Vaidya, p. 156; Bhattacharya, p. 202: "In the second half of the kārika there are two negatives, but the commentary

in both the Skrt. and Tib. takes only one of them. The kārika may be explained as follows: if you say having seen the diverseness of them two that the ghaṭa itself is different from bhāva, then we reply no; for in that case why is it that bhāva too, will not be different from ghaṭa."

⁴⁴ Cf. Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.2.4 p. 41: bhāvo 'nuvrtter eva hetuvāt sāmānya eva. (trans idem.) Also see Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p. 29: tatra param sattā mahāviśayatvāt sā cānuvrttihetutvāt viśeṣaḥ te khalu vyāvrttihetutvā d viśeṣā eva. (trans. Jha, p.25)

⁴⁵ Cf. Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p. 13: nityadravyāvṛttayo 'nytā viśeṣaḥ te khalu vyāvrttihetutvād viśeṣā eva. (trans. Jha, p. 31).

⁴⁶ Cf. Akṣaraśataka (trans. Gokhale, pp. 9-10):

"(XI) Insider says: You teach diversity: then there is non-existence. Because the pot is without existence, there is no pot." and Śataśāstra (trans. Tucci, pp. 45-46):

"The unbeliever says, "Because, (the one) is the general characteristic and (the other) is guṇa, (therefore) existence and unity are not the pot."

"Existence is the general characteristic and therefore it is not the "pot". Unity is guṇa (therefore) it is not the pot. The pot is dravya."

"The follower says: "If it is so, the pot is not existent."

"If existence is not the pot, because it is a general characteristic, if unity, is not the pot, because it is guṇa; and if the pot is neither existence nor unity, because it is dravya, then the pot is not existent...."

"The unbeliever says, "(The pot is existent), because the pot is united with existence."

"Because the pot is united with existence, the pot is said to be existent. It is not absolutely existent. In the same way, because the pot is united with unity, it is called one; but it is not the absolute unity."

"The follower says: "Existence alone is a (mere) word. This thing has been refuted before. If existence is not the pot, then the pot is not existent."

47 On the term pravṛttinimitta see Matilal, p. 113ff.

48 The more usual term for the fault of infinite regress is anavasthā. On anavasthā as a logical mistake see Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Westport, Conn., 1972, pp. 82-83.

49 This seems somewhat similar to Dharmakīrti's view. Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, p. 80 note 1.14 says, "Dharmakīrti sets up the following criteria to distinguish sva-lakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa: svalakṣaṇa a. has the power to produce effects (artha-kriyā)...sāmānyalakṣaṇa a. has no power to produce effects..."

50 The universal existence (sattā) according to VS 1.2.7. (sad iti yato dravyagunakarmāsu sā sattā) resides only in the first three categories. Dharmendra Nath Sastri, Critique of Indian Realism, Agra, 1964, pp. 149-151 says, "Śrīdhara explains that the categories sāmānya, etc., do not possess the universal existence (sattā-jāti), and 'existence' in their case consists only in 'the form of their own-nature' (svarūpa-sattva). Here a ques-

tion arises: Do the first three categories, substance, etc. not possess the 'existence by their-own-nature' (svarūpa-sattva)? We shall revert to this point later on. Now the problem is: if the categories sāmānya, etc., do not possess the universal 'existence' (sattā-jāti), why do they appear as existent? Śrīdhara gives a queer explanation: "Why there is the common notion of being existent in the case of sāmānya, etc.? It is because existence (sattā) is imposed upon them on account of similarity between the universal existence (sattā-jāti) and existence in the form of their own-nature. Then is that notion false? Who says it is not? It is indeed false. A notion of commonness of existence in the case of objects which are of different natures cannot but be false. Of course, the comprehension of their nature is not false, because their nature is real."

"...The categories (sāmānya, etc.) are existent because their nature is real; but they are not existent because commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is not apprehended in those objects...."

"Now let us return to the question whether the first three categories, substance, etc. (possessing the universal existence) have also 'existence by nature' (svarūpa-sattā). Praśastapāda who declares that this is the characteristic of only the last three categories, sāmānya, etc., clearly implies that 'existence by nature' does not belong to the first three categories, substance, etc. Obviously, he thought that their existence was constituted by the universal 'existence' (sattā-jāti). But is this possible? 'Existence' as a universal, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is in essence different from the individuals in

which it resides. If individual objects, substance, etc. have their existence by virtue of the universal 'existence' (sattā-jāti) which is different from them, it will mean that they exist through the agency of something which, in essence, is extraneous to them."

⁵¹ cf. MK 14:7 pp. 254-255:

nānyasmin vidyate 'nyatvam ananyasmin na vidyate /
avidyamāne cānyatve nāsty anyad vā tad eva vā //

(trans. Schayer, pp. 50-51)

⁵² On the function of pramāna in the Madhyamaka system see May p. 116 note 294 for references.

⁵³ In the compound tattavid the term 'tattva' may be interpreted as synonymous with paramārtha satya. Cf, MA 6:23 p. 102:

ngos kun yang dag rdzun pa mthong ba yis /
ngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur /
yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de /
mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs /

(All things have a double nature: a nature which is obtained through correct and erroneous perception. The content (visaya) of a correct perception is / ultimate / truth (tattva). / The content / of an erroneous perception is called conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya).) Cf. MA pp. 299-300.

The nature which is revealed through a correct perception is that all things, internal conditioning factors (saṃskāra), as well as external things, are not established independently and are empty of any nature of their own. Buddhapālita in his commentary to the MK explains the two truths as follows:

sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi chos bstan ni / bden pa
gnvis 'di dag brten nas 'byung ste / 'jig rten pa'i kun rdzob
kyi bden pa zhes bya ba ni chos rnams la ngo bo nyid stong pa
dag la / 'jig rten gyis phyin ci log na rtogs pas / chos thams
cad skye bar mthong ba gang yin pa ste / de ni de dag nyid la
kun rdzob tu bden pa nyid yin pas / kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o //
don dam pa'i bden pa ni 'phags pa rnams kyis phyin ci log par
thugs su chud pas / chos thams cad skye ba med par gzigs pa
gang yin pa ste / de ni de dag nyid la don dam par bden pa
nyid yin pas don dam pa'i bden pa'o // Buddhapālita mūlamadhyama-
śāstra, PTT vol. 95 f. 305b. (The Dharma teaching of the
 Lord Buddhas comes forth dependent upon these two truths. The
 worldly conventional truth (lokasaṃvṛtisatya) is called conven-
 tional truth because it is true just in a conventional sense
 (saṃvṛtyā) for those ordinary people (loka) who view all things
 (dharma) as produced because they do not understand [their] er-
 ror (viparyāsa) in regard to things which are empty of a nature
 of their own. The ultimate truth is called the ultimate truth
 because it is true precisely in an ultimate sense for the Āryas
 who view all things as unproduced because they have completely
 understood the error [of the ordinary people].) For a more
 detailed examination of the role of the two truths in Madhyama-
 ka see the articles by Murti, Streng, Sprung, Matilal and Iida
 in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. Mer-
 vyn Sprung, Dordrecht, 1973.

54 Cf. VS 1.1.16 p. 16 dravyāśrayī agunavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣu
akāraṇam apeksaḥ iti guṇalakṣaṇam.

55 Trans. Vaidya, p. 156.

56 The number one comes under the category guna and the pot comes under the category dravya. Cf. Śataśāstra's discussion on this point (trans. Tucci, pp. 44-46).

57 As the Śataśāstra points out, "The pot and existence are two; how are the two not the pot?" (trans. Tucci, p. 39).

58 Otherwise, if some other thing should be placed in proximity to the pot, then two things will be perceived and dvitva occurs. See Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, pp. 144-146 for a discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of dvitva.

59 Trans. Vaidya, p. 156.

60 The Tibetan translation of the CŚT adds an example: dper na ldan pa gnyis la gnas pasuspun'gnyi ga la yangspun zla nyid dang 'brel pa yin gyi gang yang rung ba ni ma yin pa bzhin no // gcig dang bum pa gnyis ni mtshungs pa ma yin te / bum pa dang ni ldan pa'i phyir te / yon tan rnams ni rdzas la brten pa'o zhes khas blangs pa'i phyir ro // (For example, because a connection resides in two things, the relationship of brotherhood exists between both brothers, but it [viz., the relationship of brotherhood] does not exist for [one brother and] anyone at all. The [number] one and the pot are not similar things because only the pot possesses oneness and oneness does not possess the pot; and because qualities are located in the substance.)

61 On samuccaya see Louis Renou, Terminologie Grammaticale, Paris, 1942, p. 323.

⁶² VS 1.1.16 see above note 54.

⁶³ Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p. 230: rūparasagandhasparśasnehasāṃ-
siddhikadravatvabuddhisukhaduhkhecchādvesaprayatnadharmādharmā-
bhāvanāśabda vaiśeṣikaguṇāḥ / Trans. Jha, p. 212.

⁶⁴ Size is one of the qualities that is held to pervade its substrata (āśrayavyāpītvam, Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p. 243; trans. Jha, p. 226). Cf. Daśapadārtha, trans. Hakuju Ui, The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 111. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, p. 295, says: " ... 'measure' (parimāna) has been held to be co-existent with its substance (yāvad-dravya-bhāvin). Of the four kinds of measure, viz., (i) minuteness (anutva), (ii) largeness (mahattva), (iii) shortness (hrasvatva) and (iv) length (dīrghatva), the first and the third (minuteness and shortness), and the second and the fourth (largeness and length) are co-existent; they all reside in the same substratum. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no difference between anutva and hrasvatva, or between mahattva and dīrghatva.... For all practical purposes, therefore, there are only two kinds of measure, viz., (i) minuteness (anutva) and (ii) largeness (mahattva). "

⁶⁵ Trans. Vaidya, p. 156.

⁶⁶ Here kāraṇa is synonymous with samavāyikāraṇa. Substance is defined (VS 1.1. 15, p. 25) as a samavāyikāraṇa. Just as the potsherds are the samavāyikāraṇa of the pot, similarly, the pot is the samavāyikāraṇa of its color.

⁶⁷ According to the Vaiśeṣikas the quality, parimāna is perceptible by virtue of its inherence in substances that are possessed of color (rūpidravysamavāyāt, VS 4.1.11, p. 141), but to say

that the color itself is possessed of any given size would violate VS 1.1.16 (see above note 54).

⁶⁸ Trans. Vaidya, p. 156.

⁶⁹ Trans. after the Tib; HPS jyāvas.

⁷⁰ On the divergent interpretations of sāmānya and viśeṣa see Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, p. 311 ff. See also Ui, op, cit. pp. 35-38. Ui, p. 67 says, "The explanation of universality and particularity in the Śata-śāstra agrees with V.S. Universality includes existence (sattā) on the one hand and pot-ness (ghatatva) on the other hand....universality and particularity are relative, like father and son....Universality is possible by dependence on particularity; without particularity universality cannot be established."

⁷¹ Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p. 231 (trans. Jha, p. 213): saṃkhyā-parimānaprthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvanaimittika-dravatvavegāḥ sāmānyaguṇāḥ /

⁷² Trans. Vaidya, p. 157.

⁷³ Cf. Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p. 177: de'i phyir ldog pa zhes bya ba'i mtshan nyid 'dis kyang mtshan gzhi bum pa gang du'ang grub par yod pa ma yin pa des na dngos po bum pa zhes bya ba grangs sogs tha dad par grub pa'i rang gi ngo bo yod pa ma yin no // (Therefore, even by means of this characteristic known as 'differentiation' the characterized thing, the pot, is not established anywhere at all; therefore this thing called 'pot' does not have a nature of its own which is established separately from number, etc.) and rGyal tshab,

bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po p. 5: ldog pa
zhes bya ba mtshan nyid kyis kyang mtshan gzhi bum pa ni/ gang
du yang ngo bo nyid grub pa yod pa min der ni gcig gnyis la
sogs pa'i grangs sogs las tha dad par rang gi ngo bos grub
pa'i bum pa'i dngos po yod pa min no // mdor na mtshan nyid las
ngo bo tha dad pa'i mtshan gzhi dang / mtshan gzhi las ngo bo
tha dad pa'i mtshan nyid rnyed pa min no // (Even by means of
the characteristic 'differentiation' an own-nature is not es-
tablished anywhere at all for the characterized thing, the pot;
in this connection there is no thing 'pot' which is establish-
ed by virtue of its own-nature separately from number, one,
two, etc. In brief one does not find a characterized thing
which is different in nature from / its / characteristics nor a
characteristic which is different in nature from the character-
ized thing.) See also MK 5:3 p.130 (Trans. Schayer, p. 5):

lakṣaṇāsaṃpravṛttaḥ ca na lakṣyaṃ upapadyate /
lakṣyasyānupapattaḥ ca lakṣaṇasyāpi asaṃbhavaḥ //

⁷⁴ cf. MK 5:2 pp. 129-130 (Trans. Schayer, p. 4):

alakṣaṇo na kaścic ca bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit /
asaty alakṣaṇe bhāve kuha lakṣaṇam //

⁷⁵ According to rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs
bshad snying po, p. 5 the Buddhist opponent is a mDo sde pa
(= Skrt. Sautrāntika). However the opponent here is someone who
maintains that the cause and the effect are the same in nature.
Kalupahana points out on p. 149: "The Sarvāstivāda theory of
own-nature left its impressions on the Sarvāstivāda theory of
causation too. As pointed out above, the Sarvāstivādins dis-

tinguished between cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya) because they accepted the substantialist standpoint that cause and effect are connected by their 'own-nature' (svabhāva). The Sarvāstivādins themselves admit that they are 'substantialists' (sadvādi). This is almost identical with the theory of 'everything exists (sabbam atthi) rejected by the Buddha because he thought it would lead to a belief in eternalism (sassataditthi). Thus not only was the theory of 'own-nature' identical with the theory of 'substance' or 'self' (ātman), as pointed out by Yaśomitra, but it also tended toward eternalism (śāśvatadrsti); hence the view of the Sarvāstivādins that things (i.e. 'own-nature') exist during past, present, and future."

"If so, it is very difficult to agree with Murti that the Sarvāstivāda (or more exactly, Vaibhāṣika) theory of causation is a nonidentity theory (asatkāryavāda). The evidence adduced above goes against the view that the Sarvāstivādins perceived a complete difference between a cause and its effect. For them to have considered cause and effect as completely different entities would have made their theory of 'own-nature' meaningless. In fact, as will be pointed out later, the Sautrāntikas affirmed a difference between cause and effect "because there was no 'own-nature' (svabhāva) connecting them."

⁷⁶ Trans. Vaidya, p. 157

⁷⁷ After the Tib. so so ma yin pa (= Skrt. aprthatvam); HPS has prthatvam.

⁷⁸ Trans. after the Tibetan bum pa mtshan nyid gzugs la sogs pa

rnams dang so so ma yin pa'i phyir (= Skrt. ghatasya rūpādi-
bhir lakṣanair aprthaktvād); HPS rūpādibhir lakṣanair aprthak-
tvañ ghatasya...

⁷⁹ Cf. ŚŚ (trans. Tucci, p. 41): "...So the rūpa and so on are the pot. From many causes, such as the rūpa and the other parts, one single effect is manifested viz., the pot; in this case not only the rūpa is the pot, but also the pot is not separate from rūpa." The reply (idem, p. 41): "If one says, 'one pot', the rūpa and the other parts also must be one, because the rūpa and so on are not different from the pot...."

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 42: "The unbeliever says: (The pot must exist), because you admit many pots."

"You say, that as the rūpa and the other parts are many, the pot also must be many. Therefore wishing to refute one pot, you admit many pots."

⁸¹ Ibid. The reply: "We say that you are wrong, but this does not mean that we admit many pots. You yourself said that the rūpa and the other parts are many and that therefore the pot does not exist as a separate dharma to be considered as the effect of the rūpa and so on....As the pot is not different from the many parts such as the rūpa and so on, the pot must not be one. Now, since the many parts such as the rūpa, etc., are not different from the pot, therefore the rūpa and so on must not be many. And again, if you say that there is no cause without effect, then the effect being refuted, the cause also is by itself refuted, because, according to your system cause and effect are one."

⁸² Trans. Vaidya, p. 157.

⁸³ On the term sparsa see Herbert V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, pp. 48-55 and May, p. 261 note 941 for additional references.

⁸⁴ Cf. AK vol. I Vasubandhu's commentary on 2:24 p. 187:
sparsa indriyavisayaviijnānasannipātājā sprstih / (trans. Kośa
I p. 154) ; and Yaśomitra's commentary to AK 2:24 idem.:
indriyavisayaviijnānānām sannipātāj jātā sprstih / sprstir
iva sprstih / yadyogād indriyavisayaviijnānāny anyonyaṁ spars-
antīva sa sparsaḥ / (trans. Herbert V. Guenther, p. 50 notes
 1 and 3) and see Mk 26:5 p. 554:

sannipātas trayānām yo rūpaviijnānacaksusām /

sparsaḥ saḥ tasmāt sparsāc ca vedanā saṁpravartate //

(trans. May, pp. 261-262) and MKV p. 457: sparsyate iti spars-
aḥ / (trans. May, p. 186).

⁸⁵ See Ak 1:10 and Vasubandhu's commentary p. 35 (trans. Kośa
 I p. 18) and Ak 1:35 and Vasubandhu's commentary pp. 92-94
 (trans. Kośa I pp. 64-66).

⁸⁶ Space (ākāśa) is defined by the Vaibhāsikas as a thing (vas-
tu) whose own-nature consists in offering no impediment to any
 material form (anāvaranaśvabhāvam ākāśam yatra rūpasya gatiḥ).
 See Vasubandhu's commentary to AK 1.5d p. 18 (trans. Kośa I
 p. 8). For the Sautrāntikas space is the mere absence of any
 touchable thing (sprastavyābhāvamātram ākāśam) See Vasubandhu's
 commentary to AK 2:55d p. 321 (trans. Kośa I p. 279). Neither
 the Vaibhāsikas nor the Sautrāntikas would admit to a connect-
 ion between the tangible pot and space.

Āryadeva in CŚ 9:15 (ed. Vaidya, p. 76; Bhattacharya, p. 36; trans. Vaidya, p. 134) criticises the Vaibhāṣika notion of ākāśa:

ākāśādīni kalpyante nityānīti prthagjanaiḥ /
laukikenāpi tesv arthān na paśyanti vicakṣaṇāḥ //

This verse is quoted by Candrakīrti in MKV p. 505 (trans. May p. 239). In commenting upon this verse in the CŚT Candrakīrti refers to a definition of ākāśa that is striking similar to those given above by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas (both La Vallée Poussin in the Kośa I p. 8 note 3 and Conze in Buddhist Thought in India p. 164 erroneously attribute the following passage of the CŚT to Āryadeva): rūpāntarābhāve tu rūpinām utpattipratibandhābhāvāt sa eva rūpāntarābhāvo bhr̥śam asyāntaḥ kāsante bhāvā ity ākāśam ity ākhyātaḥ / ed. HPS p. 483; cf. PTT vol 98f. 167a: gzugs gzhan med pas gzugs can rnam
'byung ba la gegs med pa'i phyir gzugs gzhan med nyid de la /
dngos po rnam la 'di'i nang du chos snang bas nam mkha'o //
 (Because there is no obstacle to the arising of things which have form (rūpin) because there are no other forms / to impede them / this absence of other forms is called ākāśa because things (bhāva) shine (kāsante) greatly within it.) For other criticism leveled by Āryadeva on the Vaibhāṣika notion of ākāśa see CŚ 9:6 (ed. Vaidya, p. 78; Bhattacharya, p. 37; trans. Vaidya, p. 135). Compare also ŚŚ (trans. Tucci pp. 74-75) and AŚ (trans. Gokhale p. 13).

87 Trans. Vaidya, p. 157.

⁸⁸ cf. ŚŚ (trans. Tucci pp. 47-48).

⁸⁹ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

⁹⁰ cf. AK 1.9ab: rūpaṃ pañcendriyāny arthāḥ pañcāvijñaptir eva
ca and commentary p. 30: pañcendriyāni caksuḥśrotaghrāṇajihvā-
kāyendriyāni pañcārthāḥ teṣāṃ eva cakṣurādīnāṃ indriyānāṃ ya-
thāsvaṃ ye pañca viśayāḥ rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyākhyāḥ
avijñaptiś ca iti etāvān rūpaskandhaḥ (trans. Kośa I pp. 14-
 15; and commentary to AK 1.13 p. 44: kasmāt punar ayam avi-
jñaptiparyantaḥ rūpaskandhaḥ ity ucyate rūpanāt / uktam bhag-
avatā rūpyate rūpasya iti bhikṣavaḥ tasmād rūpopādānaskandha
ity ucyate / kena rūpyate pāṇisparśenāpi sprṣṭo rūpyate iti
vistarāḥ / (trans. Kośa I p. 24). See also Th. Stcherbatsky,
The Central Conception of Buddhism, Delhi, 1970 reprint, p. 11
 note 2.

⁹¹ svalakṣaṇa = svabhāva. See above note 3.

⁹² Trans. after the Tib, gzhan ma yin pa nyid (= Skrt. ananya-
tva); HPS anyatvam.

⁹³ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

⁹⁴ As MK 3:1 points out each of the six sense faculties (in-
driya) has its own sphere of activity (gocara) p. 113:

darśanaṃ śravaṇaṃ ghrāṇaṃ rasanaṃ sparsanaṃ manah /
indriyāni sad eteṣāṃ draṣṭavyādīni gocaraḥ //

(trans. May p. 78). Nāgārjuna criticizes the sense faculties
 in chapter three of the MK pp. 113-122 (trans. May pp. 78-87)

Āryadeva criticizes them in chapter thirteen of the CŚ (ed. Vaidya, pp. 102-108; Bhattacharya, pp. 167-196; trans. Vaidya, pp. 151-155).

⁹⁵ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

⁹⁶ Cf. MK 8:4ab, p. 182: hetāy asati kāryaṃ ca na vidyate / (Trans. May, p. 146). See May, p. 146 note 422.

⁹⁷ MKV commenting on MK 1:1 says p. 13: naivaṃ svata utpannā jātu vidyate bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana / (Trans. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa p. 93). On the notion of self-causation see Kalupahana, p. 6ff.

⁹⁸ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

⁹⁹ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

¹⁰⁰ Louis de La Vallée Poussin, La Théorie des Douze Causes, Gand, 1913 p. 27 says, "Upādāna signifie non seulement 'attachement à ...mais encore 'ce à quoi on s'attache'. D'où la notion de cause matérielle de support."

¹⁰¹ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

¹⁰² Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel ba, p. 180: gal te bum pa ni gzugs la sogs pa'i nye bar len pa can ma yin gyi / rang gyi yan lag gyo mo sogs la ltos 'bras bu yin la / rgyu mo rnams ni rgyu yin no snyam na / bum pa gyo mo la sogs pa'i rgyu las grub par gyur cing gyo mo la sogs pa'i rgyu ni gseg ma la sogs pa'i rgyu gzhan las grub par 'gyur na / gyo mo gang la rang las grub pa med pa de yis 'bras bu gzhan bum pa rang gi ngo bos ji ltar skyed par byed / de'i phyir bum pa rang bzhin gyid med do // (If you think the pot is not that which has color, etc. as

[its] material cause, but that it is an effect in regard to its own parts, the potsherds, and that the potsherds are [its] cause, [then we reply that if] the pot is established by [its] cause [viz.,] the potsherds, etc., and [its] cause, the potsherds, etc. are established by another cause, [viz.,] the stone fragments, [then] how do the potsherds which are not established by virtue of themselves produce another thing [viz.,] the pot which is [their] effect by virtue of their own nature? Therefore the pot does not exist by virtue of own-nature.)

103 Samavāya is used in the Vaiśeṣika system with the technical meaning of 'inherence'. See VS 2.2.26-28, pp. 243-246; Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, pp. 773-785 (trans. Jha, pp. 675-683); Daśapadārtha (trans. Ui, p. 117); B. Faddegon, The Vaiśeṣika System, pp. 116- and 126; and Potter, pp. 118-129. However here Āryadeva uses it in a non-technical sense as 'union'. Cf. MKV 561.4-6: katham ādhyātmikasya pratītyasamutpādasya pratyayopanibandho draṣṭavya iti / sannām dhātūnām samavāyāt / katham esām sannām dhātūnām samavāyāt / yad idam prthivyaptejovāy-ākāśavijñānadhātūnām samavāyād ādhyātmikasya pratītyasamutpādasya pratyayopanibandho draṣṭavyah / (trans. May p. 268).

See also CŚ 14:24.

104 Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

105 CŚ 14:7ab.

106 Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

107 Trans. Vaidya, p. 158. This verse of the CŚ is quoted in MKV p. 71 (trans. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nir-

vāna, p. 158).

¹⁰⁸ cf. AK 1:12 and commentary pp. 42-43:

bhūtāni prthividhātur aptejovāyudhātavaḥ /
ity ete catvāraḥ svalaksanopādāyarūpadhāraṇād dhātavas' ca cat-
vāri mahābhūtāny ucyate / mahattvam eṣāṁ sarvānyarūpāśrayatve-
naudārikatvāt atha vā tadudbhutavrttiṣu prthivyaptejovāyuskan-
dhesv eṣāṁ mahāsanniveśatvāt / te punar ete dhātavaḥ karmani
saṁsiddhāḥ kim svabhāvas' ca ity āha

dhṛtyādikarmasaṁsiddhāḥ
dhṛtisaṁgrahapaktivyūhanakaramsv ete yathākramaṁ saṁsiddhāḥ
prthivyaptejovāyudhātavaḥ / vyūhanaṁ punaḥ vṛddhiḥ prasarpa-
naṁ ca veditavyam / idam eṣāṁ karma / svabhāvas tu yathākra-
maṁ /

kharasnehoṣṇateranāḥ //
kharāḥ prthividhātuh / sneho 'bdhātuh / uṣṇatā tejodhātuh /
irāṇa vāyudhātuh / (trans. Kośa I pp. 21-22).

See also Th. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhi-
sm, pp. 11-15, and Herbert V. Guenther, p. 223ff.

¹⁰⁹ The four great elements (mahābhūta) mutually condition one another and are each considered as the co-existent (sahabhūhetu) cause of the others. See AK 2:50cd p. 283 (trans. Kośa I p. 248) and the commentary.

¹¹⁰ Trans. Vaidya, p. 158

¹¹¹ Attached to the last chapter of the AK is an appendix, the Aṣṭamakośasthānasambaddhaḥ pudgalaviniścaya, AK pp. 1163-1165 (trans. Kośa VI pp. 234-236; Th. Stcherbatsky, The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, Varanasi, 1970 reprint, pp. 15-19) which ex-

amines the Vātsīputrīya's notion of the individual (pudgala) and its relation to the five aggregates. The Vātsīputrīyas utilize the analogy of fire (agni) and fuel (indhana) to clarify the type of relationship which they asserted to exist between the individual and the five aggregates: fire and fuel are said to be neither the same nor different from one another. Nāgārjuna in the tenth chapter of the MK pp. 202-217 (trans. Schayer, "Feur und Brennstoff" pp. 26-52) in a similar fashion analyzes fire and fuel in terms of identity and difference and concludes with MK 10:14 p. 211:

indhanaṃ punar agnir na nāgnir anyatra cendhanāt /
nāgnir indhanavān nāgāv indhanāni na tesu sah //

(trans. Schayer, "Feur und Brennstoff" p. 45).

Fire and fuel exist in a relationship of mutual dependence (parasparāpekṣā) which Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 80, paraphrasing the view of Y. Ueda, explains: "The unique logical principle in brief is that of any two concepts, e.g. fire and wood, there are inherent conditions in each such that their ultimate relationship into a whole or unity entails a mutual denial of each other."

112 on kathinya see May p. 91 note 197.

113 Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

114 Trans. Vaidya, p. 158.

115 See above note 109 and Stcherbatsky, The Soul Theory of the Buddhists pp. 93-99. See also Ratnāvalī 1:83-90 (trans. Jeffrey Hopkins, The Precious Garland and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, New York, 1975, pp. 29-30.

- 116 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.
- 117 On the atomic theory of the Vaibhāsikas see Yamakami, pp. 121-127, Geunther, pp. 276-279, and AK pp. 121-122 (trans. Kośa I pp. 89-92).
- 118 CS chapter nine ed. Vaidya, pp. 76-82; Bhattacharya, pp. 31-67; trans. Vaidya, pp. 133-138; verses 12-19 cf. Erich Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1969, pp. 219-220.
- 119 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.
- 120 Cf. sGam po pa (trans. Geunther, pp. 278-279): "The Vaibhāsikas say: the nature of atoms is such that an atom is spherical, has no parts, is single, and exists materially....Although the adherents of an atomic doctrine say so, nothing of what they say is proved. Atoms must be single or plural. If they are single, it must be questioned whether they have several sides or not. If they possess various sides, they extend into an Eastern, Western, Southern, Northern, upper and lower directions. Since in such a case they have six sides (and are divisible) the claim of their singleness collapses. If they don't possess different sides, all material things ought to be of the nature of a single atom. But this is not the case, as is plainly evident." See also Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā, ed. and trans. S. Bagchi, Nava Malanda Mahavihara Research Publication I pp. 367-389; appendix pp. 1-12; ed. and trans. Sylvain Lévi, Matériaux pour l'Étude du Système Vijñaptimātratā, Paris, 1932.
- 121 Cf. AK pp. 65-67 (trans. Kośa I pp. 144-149)
- 122 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

123 or upādāyarūpa. See AK pp. 92-93 (trans. Kośa I pp. 64-66) and Guenther, pp. 231-232.

124 cf. AK 2:23a and commentary p. 185: cittacaittāḥ sahāvaś-
yaṁ na hy ete vinā anyonyam bhavitum utsahante / (trans. Ko-
śa I p. 149)

125 Trans. Vaidya p. 159.

126 This view is attributed to Mādhava a contemporary of Dignāga whom Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya (ed. and trans. Ma-saaki Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, Cambridge, Mass., 1968) refers to as the destroyer of the Sāṁkhya (sāṁkhyavaināśika, text pp. 218-219, trans. p. 57) because of his rejection of some of the views of earlier Sāṁkhya teachers. Mādhava adopted some of the Vaiśeṣika views on the atoms and maintained the atoms to be the primordial things (pradhāna, text pp. 218-219, trans. p. 58) Hsüan tsang in the Ta t'ang hsi yü chi (trans. Beal pp. 104-110) tells of Guṇamati's defeat of the elderly Mādhava. See also Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. II. Delhi, 1973, pp. 320-321.

127 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

128 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

129 See Hattori, pp. 155-156 note 5.40 in which a passage from Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccaya is quoted. This passage quotes from a work of Madhava. Frauwallner says of Madhava, p.320: According to him, the atoms were no doubt formed out of the three qualities of the Ur-matter, but they are different according to the elements and this difference

goes already back to the Ur-matter. The threefoldness of the qualities which form the earth atom is different from the threefoldness which forms the water atom and both already are in existence in the Ur-matter. With this, however, the unity of the Ur-matter is given up. This doctrine is no more Sāṃkhya, but Vaiśeṣika clothed in a Sāṃkhya form."

130 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

131 This method refers to the catuskoṭi. The catuskoṭi, sometimes called "the four logical alternatives" or "the tetralemma" or when each of its four members are negated successively "the principle of four cornered negation", contains a set of four alternative positions that were debated in the philosophical discussions of ancient India. The catuskoṭi encompasses these four propositions: (1) x exists, (2) x does not exist, (3) x both exists and does not exist, and (4) x neither exists nor does not exist. Some attempts have been made to express the catuskoṭi in terms of western logic, viz., Richard Robinson, "Some logical aspects of Nāgārjuna's system" PEW 6 (1957), pp. 302-303, Hajime Nakamura, "Buddhist logic expounded by means of symbolic logic," JIBS 7.1 (1958) pp. 3-4, and K.N. Jayatilleke, "The logic of four alternatives" PEW 17 (1967), p. 71ff.

The catuskoṭi in embryonic form seems to have developed during the sixth century B.C. amongst the proliferation of new philosophical teachings which were antithetical to Brahmanic orthodoxy. Similar in some respects to the catuskoṭi are the five membered propositional formula of the sceptic Saṃjaya (see Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London

1963, pp. 136-137, 337-339, B. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, Delhi, 1970, pp. 328-330, and P.T. Raju, "The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953-1954), pp. 694-697.) and the seven membered formula of the Jain Samantabhadra (see Jayatilleke, pp. 338-339; Archie Bahm, "Does Seven-fold Predication Equal Four-cornered Negation?" PEW 7 (1957-1958), p. 128, and George Burch, "Seven-valued Logic in Jain Philosophy" International Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1964) p. 83), both of whom were sixth century contemporaries of the Buddha.

The catuskoṭi is attested in the Pali canon in connection with the indeterminate points (avyākṛtavastūni) in Majjhima Nikāya 63 and 73 (ed. R. Chalmers, vol. II, PTS, 1898; trans. I.B. Horner, The Middle Length Sayings, vol. II, PTS, 1957). In the Majjhima Nikāya 73 the Buddha responds to Vacchagotta by saying, "Vaccha, I am not of the view that the Tathāgata exists after death, that this alone is true and every other [view] is false." (na kho ahaṃ vaccha evaṃditṭhi hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā idam eva saccaṃ moghaṃ annam ti) He repeats this denial for each of the three remaining alternatives. From this it is clear that each of four positions was considered to be in a relation of exclusive disjunction. In MK 25:17 p.534 Nāgārjuna rejects the applicability of the catuskoṭi in a similar way for the Tathāgatha's existence after death:

paraṃ nirodhād bhagavān bhavatīty eva nohyate /

na bhavaty ubhayaṃ ceti nobhayaṃ ceti nohyate //

(Trans. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 203)

In the twenty seventh chapter of the MK Nāgārjuna examines

the false views of rival schools. He argues in 27:3 (p. 573; trans. May p. 280) that the assertion "I did exist in the past" is not possible because the present individual is not identical with the one who existed in the past. Nor is the assertion that "I did not exist in the past" possible because the present individual is not different from the one who existed in the past (MK 27:10 p. 579; trans. May p. 285). Thus the first two propositions of the catuskoṭi are applied to the theories of identity and difference and both are rejected. Nāgārjuna in 27:13 p. 581 (trans. May p. 287) concludes:

evaṃ dr̥ṣṭir atīte yā nābhūm aham abhūm aham /
ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti naisā samupapadyate //

Candrakīrti in MKV p. 581 comments: etaddvayasyābhāvāc cobhayaṃ
api nopapadyate / kiṃ kāraṇaṃ / yasmād dvayaṃ hy etatsamāhr-
tam ubhayaṃ iti kalpyate / ekaikasya ca prthak prthagabhāvāt
kutas tatsamāhāra ity ubhayaṃ api na sambhavati / ubhayaśyābhā-
vāt kutas tatpratishedhena nobhayaṃ bhaviṣyatīti / tasmān nai-
vābhūvaṃ na nābhūvaṃ ity etad api nopapadyate // (trans. May
pp. 287-288). In the above context it is clear that the third
member of the catuskoṭi is considered to be a combination of
the first two members and that the fourth is considered to be
the negation of the third.

In verses fifteen through twenty of chapter twenty seven Nāgārjuna examines the notion of an eternal thing, here exemplified by a god and that of a non-eternal thing, here exemplified by a man. In 27:15 he argues that if the god and the man were identical the god would be unborn. This engenders the view of eternalism (śāśvatavāda) and rejects the belief that good

karma produces birth among the gods. On the other hand if the two were different, a continuous life-history (saṃtāna) would be impossible because the past individual would have been destroyed and another produced in his place (MKV pp. 583-584; trans. May p. 289). This would give rise to the nihilist doctrine (ucchedavāda). Nāgārjuna in MK 27:17 p. 584; trans. May p. 290)

says: divyo yady ekadeśaḥ syād ekadeśaś ca mānuṣaḥ /
aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca bhavet tac ca nā yujyate //

Candrakīrti in MKV p. 585 says: yadā tu śāśvatāśāśvataṃ evāpra-
tisiddham tadā kutas tatpratishedhena naiva śāśvataṃ syād iti /
(trans. May p. 290).

The third alternative appears to have been understood in two ways: (1) x is both y and non-y, i.e. a combination of the first two alternatives, where y and non-y are seen as contradictory terms, and (2) x is partly y and partly non-y where y and non-y are seen as contraries, e.g. God and man, but are re-interpreted as contradictory terms, e.g. eternal and non-eternal for the purpose of the dialectical method of argumentation which as used by Nāgārjuna and his followers successively denies each alternative of the catuskoti. Throughout the MK Nāgārjuna, when he is not using the catuskoti as a traditional means of classifying possible points of view, rejects the third alternative as impossible (cf. MK 7:30, 8:7, 25:14, 27:17) and considers the fourth alternative as contingent upon the third and thus equally impossible.

Candrakīrti in his commentary to MK 18:8 (MKV pp. 370-371; trans. de Jong pp. 27-28) speaks of the catuskoti as the means (upāya) by which the Buddha teaches his doctrine according to

the aptitudes of his listeners; the truth is revealed progressively. The doctrine is adapted to the needs and capacities of the listener just as medicine is prescribed for a specific illness. Cf. CŚ 8:20 ed. Vaidya p.74; Bhattacharya p. 24):

sad asat sadasac ceti nobhayaṃ ceti kathyate /

nanu vyādhivaśāt pathyaṃ ausadhaṃ nāma jāyate // (trans.

Vaidya p. 132; quoted in MKV p. 372 and trans. de Jong p. 29).

132 The Satkāryavādinś referred to are both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas. On the Vabhāṣikas as Satkāryavādinś see Kalupahana, pp. 149-151. On the Sāṃkhyas as Satkāryavādinś see Mahesh Chandra Bhartiya, Causation in Indian Philosophy, Ghaziabad, 1973, p. 36ff and Potter, pp. 106-109, 150-153. See also Gerald J. Larson, "The notion of satkārya in Sāṃkhya" PEW 25 (1975) pp. 31-40

133 CŚ 11:15ab ed. Vaidya, p.93; Bhattacharya, p. 119; trans. Vaidya p. 145. The point is that for the Satkāryavādinś the decoration of pillars and so forth must already exist.

134 CŚ 11:10 ed. Vaidya p. 92; Bhattacharya p. 115; trans. Vaidya p. 144.

135 CŚ 11:12 ed. Vaidya p. 92; Bhattacharya p. 115; trans. Vaidya p. 144. Cf. AŚ (trans. Gokhale p. 11): "If it exists previously no agency is necessary; thus if the clod of earth is (already) the pot, no potter is necessary; or if the thread is already cloth, no weaver is necessary. Inasmuch as a pot and cloth wait for their being accomplished through able workmen it is known that in the cause there is no effect." Cf. ŚŚ (trans. Tucci pp. 61-65).

136 The Asatkāryavādin referred to are the Sautrāntikas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. On the Sautrāntikas as Asatkāryavādin see Kalupahana, op. cit. pp. 151-154. On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as Asatkāryavādin see Bhartiya, op. cit. p. 119ff. and Potter op. cit. pp. 111-114.

137 CŚ 11: 15abd. See above note 133. The point here is that for the Asatkāryavādin inasmuch as the effect, the decoration of pillars and so forth, is non-existent it will never be produced. Cf. ŚŚ (trans. Tucci), pp. 65-72.

138 The Sadasatkāryavādin referred to are the Jainas. On the Jainas as Sadasatkāryavādin see Bhartiya, op. cit. pp. 106-111, and Potter, op. cit. pp. 114-115.

139 CŚ 11:15. See above notes 133 and 137. Candrakīrti quotes this verse in MA p. 99 (Trans. La Vallée Poussin, p. 297) and again in MKV p. 393 (Trans. de Jong, p. 46).

140 CŚ 14:21. See below note 130.

141 CŚ 14:21.

142 Bhattacharya wrongly emends the Tib. to read bdag (= Skrt. ātman).

143 Trans., Vaidya, p. 159.

144 Cf. AK pp. 1219: pradīpa ity arcisāṃ saṃtāna upacaryate sa deśāntareṣūtpadyamānas tam deśaṃ gacchatīty ucyate / (trans. Kośa, VI p. 281 and Stcherbatsky, The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, pp. 64-65. Cf. Buddhaghosa, Sāratthappakāsinī, -trans. Kalupahana, op. cit. p. 83: "Just as the flame of a burning lamp, without leaving the area of the wick, breaks up then and

there and when it burns or flickers in succession throughout the night it is called a lamp, even so, taking the succession [of states] this body is presented as enduring for a long time."

¹⁴⁵ or saṁtati. See both entries in Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol. II, Delhi, 1970, p. 555. Cf. MK 27:22, p. 587:

skandhānām esa saṁtāno yasmād dīpārcisām iva /
pravartate tasmān nāntānantavattvaṁ ca yujyate //

(Trans. May, p. 292).

¹⁴⁶ Cf. AK pp. 1218-1219: kathaṁ ca devadatto gacchati / kṣaṇi-
kā hi saṁskārā abhinnaśantānā devadatta iti bālair ekasattvapi-
ndagrāhenādhiṁ uktāḥ svasya śantānasya deśāntare kāraṇaṁ bhava-
nta ucyante gacchati devadatta iti / (trans. Kośa V, pp. 279-280, Stcherbatsky, The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, pp. 62-63). On saṁskāra see May, p. 74, note 108 for other references.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. CŚ 13:25. See note 2 below and May, pp. 75 and 136, notes 110 and 381 for other references.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. CŚ 8:19 ed. Vaidya, p. 74, Bhattacharya, p. 24:

nānyayā bhāṣayā mlecchah 'śakyo grāhayituṁ yathā /
na laukikam rte lokah 'śakyo grāhayituṁ tathā //

(Trans. Vaidya, p. 132). This verse is quoted by Candrakīrti in the MA p. 120 (trans. La Vallée Poussin, p. 314) and again in MKV p. 370 (trans. de Jong, p. 27).

¹⁴⁹ See MA chapter 3 in which Nāgārjuna refutes both the process of perception (darśana) and the agent of perception (drastr). pp. 113-122 (trans. May, pp. 78-87).

150 Nāgārjuna discusses the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda in MK chapter twenty six, pp. 542-570 (trans. May, pp. 251-276, summarized by Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 134, note 1). Cf. AK 3:20-24, pp. 435-439 (trans. Kośa, pp. 60-65). See also La Vallée Poussin, La Théorie des Douzes Causes, A. Berriedale Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Banaras, 1963 reprint, pp. 96-114, Edward Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, London, 1967 reprint, pp. 58-70, Lillian Silburn, Instant et Cause, Paris, 1955, pp. 197-211, Jayatilleke, op. cit. pp. 445-457, Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 156-158, Kalupahana, op. cit. pp. 54-58, and Nathmal Tatia, "Paṭiccasamuppāda" in Nava Nalanda Mahavira Research Publication, vol. I, pp. 179-239.

On the role of pratītyasamutpāda in the Mādhyamika school see Kalupahana, op. cit. pp. 161-162, Streng, Emptiness, pp. 58-66, Alex Wayman, "Contributions to the Mādhyamika school" JAOS 89 (1969), pp. 141-152, and Streng, "The significance of pratītyasamutpāda for understanding the relationship between saṃvṛti and paramārthasatya in Nāgārjuna" in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, pp. 27-39.

151 Cf. MK 24:18, p. 503:

yah pratītyasamutpādah 'sūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe /
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipatsaiva madhye ā //

(Trans. May, p. 237, cf. Robinson, op. cit. p. 40, Streng, Emptiness, p. 213, Matilal, op. cit. p. 148, Inada, op. cit. p. 148, and Wayman, "Contributions to the Mādhyamika school," p. 145)

Cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī, ed. Johnston and Kunst MCB 9 (1948-

1951) verse 22, p. 121, ed. Satkari Mookerjee, The Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication, vol. I, appendix, p. 23:

yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhāvanām 'sūnyateti sā proktā /
yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam //

(Trans. Mookerjee, op. cit. p. 17, Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 224, and Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna," JIP 1 (1971), p. 232) and verse 66, ed. Johnson and Kunst, pp. 147-148, Mookerjee, appendix, p. 38:

sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād grāho na syāt pratītya saṁbhūtaḥ /
yaś ca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu 'sūnyatā saiva //

(Trans. Mookerjee, op. cit. p. 37, Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 227, and Bhattacharya, "The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna," p. 256)

Cf. *Lokātītastava* verse 20 ed. Prabhubhai Patel, "Catustava," IHQ 8 (1932) p. 325:

yah pratītyasamutpādaḥ 'sūnyatā saiva te matā /
bhāva svatanthro nāstīti śiṁhanādas tavātula //

(Tib. text ed. and trans. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Les quatre odes de Nāgārjuna", Le Muséon 1913, p. 9 and p. 13) and *Acintyastava* verse 38 ed. Prabhubhai Patel, "Catustava", IHQ 8 (1932), p. 692:

yah pratītyasamutpādaḥ 'sūnyatā saiva te matā /
tathāvidhaś ca saddharmas tat samaś ca tathāgataḥ //

On *pratītyasamutpāda* as *'sūnyatā* see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Reflections sur le Madhyamaka," MCB 2 (193), pp. 12-16, Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, pp. 42-43; Murti, op. cit. pp. 7-8, Streng, *Emptiness*, pp. 63-66, Matilal, op. cit. pp. 148-151. See also Streng's articles, "The Buddhist

doctrine of two truths as religious philosophy," JIP 1 (1971), pp. 264-267, and "The significance of the pratītyasamutpāda for understanding the relationship between saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya in Nāgārjuna," in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, pp. 28-30, and Bimal K. Matilal, "A critique of the Mādhyamika position," also in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, pp. 56-57, Alex Wayman, "Contributions to the Mādhyamika school," pp. 144-145, and Ives Waldo, "Nāgārjuna and analytic philosophy," pp. 287-288.

¹⁵² Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

¹⁵³ Kalupahana, op. cit. p. 137 points out, "Acceptance of a theory of causal dependence, not only in individual and social life but also in the physical world, enables one to put an end to suffering by removing the causes that produce it. Therefore, the Buddha maintained that there are causes for defilement, and hence, the purity of man."

¹⁵⁴ CF. MK 18;10, p. 375:

pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad tad eva tat /
na cānyad api tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ //

(Trans. de Jong, p. 32) See the introduction above pp. 26-41 for other references to the doctrine of eternalism and nihilism.

¹⁵⁵ See May p. 187, note 609. May says, " Adhyāropa, samāropa désignent, comme prapañca, l'opération de la kalpanā. La traduction ordinaire est "surimposition": la kalpanā surimpose" littéralement "fait monter sur" la réalité absolue homogène et vraie (vacuité) toutes sortes d'entités hétérogènes et fausses qui constituent les objets de la connaissance empirique et de

la pensee discursive; elle assigne a ces entites des predicats, des "aspects" (ākāra) egalement illusoires."

156 Cf. MK 15:1-2 pp. 259-262:

na saṁbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktah pratyayaḥetubhiḥ /
hetupratyayasāṁbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet //
svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham /
akṛtimah svabhāva hi nirapeksaḥ paratra ca //

(Trans. Schayer pp. 59-62).

157 See above note 103.

158 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

159 On the various meanings of the term viññāna see Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, pp. 485-486, Stcherbat-sky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 241-242, Silburn, pp. 206-209, Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 110-113, Kalupahana, pp. 115-121, and May, p. 252 note 904 for additional references.

160 Trans. Vaidya, p. 159.

161 On the different paths of the Śravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattva see E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of the Pra-ñāpāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra of Maitreya," AO 11 (1933), p. 18ff. See also Fujita Kōtatsu, "One Vehicle or Three," JIP 3 (1975), pp. 79-166.

162 On ksānti see Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 199: "a preliminary stage leading to jñāna but still distinguished from jñāna by the fact that it is still characteriz-

ed by doubt." For additional references see de Jong, p. 14 note 37 and May, p. 212 note 717.

¹⁶³ The five jñāna of a Tathāgata are listed in the Mahāvyutpatti nos. 110-114.

¹⁶⁴ Translated from the Sanskrit by Eugene Burnouf, Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi, Paris, 1852, and H. Kern, The Saddharmapundarika or the Lotus of the True Law, New York, 1963 reprint.

V THE TEXT

C f.206a
D f.209a
N f.230b
P f.236b

'dir smras /¹ gal te rten cing 'brel par²
'byung ba'i phyir srid pa mgal me'i 'khor lo dang
sprul pa dang rmi lam la sogs pa ltar rang bzhin
med na 'o na de gang zhig rang bzhin du 'gyur zhe
na / dngos po 'ga' la yang rang bzhin brtag par
mi nus te / rnam pa de lta bu'i dngos po rnam pa
thams cad du mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar /

1. dngos po gang zhig gzhan 'ga' la 'ang //
rag las³ pa zhig mi 'gyur na //
de yi bdag nyid 'grub 'gyur na //
de ni gang la⁴ 'ang yod ma yin //

N f.231a

gal te dngos po 'ga' zhig 'grub pa* la 'ga'
la⁵ yang cung zad cig rag las par gnas pa nyid du
mi 'gyur na ni⁶ de'i tshe rang dbang ba gzhan la

P f.237a

rag ma⁷ las pa de* rang nyid kyis rnam par gnas pa'i
phyir rang bzhin gyis yod pa nyid du brtags par rigs
na gang zhig rgyu dang rkyen la rag las te skye ba'i
dngos po gzhan la rag las pa nyid du mi 'gyur ba 'am /
rgyu med pa'i dngos po 'ga' zhig 'byung ba 'di ni
srid pa yang ma yin no //

¹ CD, NP omit the /.

² CDP, N bar.

³ Vaidya's edition of the CS has lus.

⁴ Vaidya's edition of the CS has na.

⁵ CD, NP omit la.

⁶ CD, NP omit ni.

⁷ CD, NP omit ma.

atrāha yadi pratītyasamutpannatvād alātacakrādi¹
 van niḥsvabhāvo bhavaḥ kasya tarhīdānīm² svabhāvo 'stu /
 na kasyacit padārthasya svabhāvaḥ śakyah kalpayitum /
 tathāvidhasya padārthasya sarvathānupalabhyamānatvāt /
 tathā hi 〔 / 〕³

1. āyattaṃ yasya bhāvasya bhaven nānyasya kasyacit /
 sidhyet tasyāstitā⁴ nāma kvacit sa ca na vidyate //

yadi hi kasyacit padārthasya niṣpattau kvacit kiñ-
 cid āyattaṃ na syāt tadāsyāparāyattasya svatantrasya
 svatveva vyavasthitatvāt svabhāvato 'stitvam kalpayi-
 tuṃ yuktam / ⁵na tv eṣa sambhavo 'sti⁵ yaddhetuprat-
 yayāyattajanmanāṃ parāyattatā na syāt / ahetuko vā
 padārthah kaścit sambhaved iti /

¹ Tib. mgal me'i 'khor lo dang sprul pa dang rmi lam
 la sogs pa (= Skrt. alātacakranirmanasvapnādi).

² Tib. omits anything that would correspond to idānīm.

³ HPS //.

⁴ Tib. bdag nyid (= Skrt. ātmatā).

⁵ Tib. has nothing to correspond to this phrase.

gang gi phyir de ltar rgyu med pa thal bar 'gyur
bas 'ga' zhig tu dngos po 'ga'i rang bzhin¹ rang
gi ngo bo med pa de'i phyir 'ga' la yang rang bzhin
med la / rang bzhin med pas kyang mgal me'i 'khor
lo la sogs pa ltar rang bzhin gyis grub pa med do
zhes bya bar gnas so //

gal te dngos po 'di dag mgal me'i 'khor lo
dang sprul pa la sogs pa ltar bslu bas² dngos po
med par mi 'gyur na ni de'i tshe nges par³ 'thad
pas rnam par dpyad pa nasale sbram la sogs pa ltar
rang gi ngo bo ches gsal bar dmigs par 'gyur na /
de dag ni⁴ phyin ci log tsam gyi rgyu can yin pas
rnam par dpyod pa'i mes bsregs pas⁵ na rang gi ngo
bos med par ni mi 'gyur ba ma yin no // dngos po
ni 'thad pa dang bral ba ma yin te / de rnam pa
thams* cad du mi bslu ba⁶ nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //
de nyid kyi phyir slob dpon gyis* dngos po la mngon
par zhen pa lhod par bya ba'i phyir 'di man cad⁷ du
ji ltar⁸ bum pa la sogs pa rnams la rang gi ngo bo
mi srid pa de ltar 'thad pa bshad pa /

D f.209b
C f.206b

¹ CD, NP have the abbreviation rin for rang bzhin.

² NP, CD slu bas.

³ CDP, N ngas par.

⁴ CDP, N na.

⁵ CNP, D bas.

⁶ NP, CD slu bas.

⁷ CDP, N ched.

⁸ CD, NP ji lta.

yataś caivaṃ nirhetuka < tva >¹prasaṅgāt kaścit padār-
thasya kvacit svarūpaṃ nāsti / tasmān nāsti kasyacit
svabhāvaḥ svabhāvābhāvāc cālātacakra< ādi >²van nāsti
svabhāvasiddhir iti sthitam /

yadi cāmī padārthā alātacakrā³divad⁴visaṃvādakatvād
avastukā⁴ na syus tadā niyatam upapattyā vicaryamānā jā-
tarūpādivat spaṣṭaram upalabhyamānasvarūpāḥ syuh / na
caite vicārāgnisantāpitā viparyāsa⁵nibandhanatvāt svarū-
pābhāvaṃ nāsādyanti / ⁶na hi vastūpapattyāpi yujyate⁶
sarvathā tasya visaṃvādakatvāt / ata evācāryo vastvabhi-
niveśaśithilīkaraṇāyātaḥparam yathā ca ghaṭādīnāṃ svarū-
paṃ na sambhavati tathopattim āha /

¹ HPS adds tva, but Tib. has no corresponding nyid.

² Tib. la sogs pa (= Skrt. ādi); HPS lacks ādi.

³ Tib. me'i 'khor lo dang sprul pa la sogs pa (= Skrt. alātacakranirmanādi).

⁴ Tib. bslu bas dngos po med (= Skrt. visaṃvādakād avas-
tukāḥ). HPS visambādakāḥ visambādakatvād avastukā

⁵ Tib. adds tsam (= Skrt. mātra).

⁶ Cf. Tib. dngos po ni 'thad pa dang bral ba ma yin te /

2. gzugs nyid bum zhes gcig ma yin //
 gzugs ldan bum gzhan yod min la¹ //
 bum pa la gzugs yod min zhing //
 gzugs la bum pa yod ma yin //

N f.231b

P f.237b

'di na bum pa zhes bya ba'i dngos po 'ga' zhig
 yod par 'gyur na ni / de lta ba'i dbang po'i

gzung² bar bya ba yin pas tha dad pa 'am mi* dad

pa zhig tu rtog grang na / de la re* zhig /

gzugs nyid bum zhes gcig ma yin //

gzugs gang yin pa de nyid bum pa'o zhes gzugs dang

bum pa gcig pa ni mi srid do // gal te gzugs dang

bum pa gnyis gcig³ nyid du³ 'gyur na ni /⁴ de'i

tshe gang dang gang na yod pa de dang de na bum

pa'o zhes gzugs thams cad la bum pa yod pa nyid du

'gyur zhing / so btang ba las skyes pa'i yon tan

'byung bas gzugs 'jig⁵ par 'gyur na / 'di ni srid

pa yang ma yin pas gzugs nyid bum pa'o zhes gcig pa

yod pa ma yin no //

¹ Bhattacharya's edition has pa; Vaidya's edition has na.

² CD, NP bzung.

³ CD, NP omit nyid and have gcig tu 'gyur.

⁴ CD, NP omit the /.

⁵ CDN, P has 'jigs.

2. rūpam eva ghaṭo naikyam ghaṭo nānyo 'sti rūpavān //

na vidyate ghaṭe rūpam na rūpe vidyate ghaṭaḥ //

iha yadi ghaṭo nāma kaścit padārthaḥ syāt sa darśanendri-
yagrāhyatvād rūpād bhedenā vā parikalpito 'bhedenā vā tatra
tāvat

rūpam eva ghaṭo naikyam

na yad eva rūpam sa eva ghaṭa iti rūpaghaṭayor aikyam na
bhavati / yadi hi rūpaghaṭayor aikyaḥ syāt tadā yatra
yatra rūpam tatra tatra <ghaṭa i>¹ ti sarvatraiva rūpe
ghaṭaḥ syāt / pākajaguṇotpattau rūpavināśe ghaṭavināśaḥ
syāt / na caitat sambhavatīti rūpam eva ghaṭa iti nāsty
ekatvam /

¹ HPS adds ghaṭa i. Tib. has bum pa'o zhes which corre-
sponds.

ci ste nyes pa 'di spang bar 'dod nas dper na
 lhas sbyin don gzhan du gyur pa'i ba lang dag dang
 ldan pa ltar gzugs las gzhan pa'i bum pa zhig
 gzugs dang ldan par yong su rtog na / 'di yang mi
 rigs te /¹ 'di ltar /

gzugs ldan bum gzhan yod min la //
 gal te bum pa² gzugs las gzhan du 'gyur na ni de
³gzugs la mi ltos par³ gzung du yod par 'gyur ro //
 ba lang dag las tha dad pa'i lhas sbyin ni ba lang
 las tha dad par mi 'dzin pa ma yin te / de bzhin du
 bum pa yang gzugs la mi⁴ ltos par gzung⁵ du yod par
 'gyur na⁶ 'dzin pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir
 gzugs las tha dad pa'i bum pa med do // gang gi
 tshe med pa de'i tshe yod pa ma yin pa ji ltar de
 dang ldan pa nyid du 'dzin / mo gsham gyi bu yod
 pa ma yin pa ni ba lang dang ldan no zhes bya bar
 mi bsnyad do // de bzhin du bum pa gzugs dang ldan
 no zhes bya bar mi bsnyad do // de bzhin du bum pa
 gzugs dang ldan no zhes bya bar yang⁷ mi rung* ngo //

D f.210a

¹ NP, CD omit the /.

² CNP, D ba.

³ CD, NP have gzugs las mi rtog par.

⁴ CDP, N ma.

⁵ NP, CD bzung.

⁶ CD, NP nas.

⁷ NP, CD omit yang.

athaitaddoṣaparijīhīrṣayā rūpād anyo ghaṭo rūpavān
parikalpyeta / tad yathārthāntarabhūtair gobhir gomān
devadatta ity etad apy ayuktam / yasmād¹

ghaṭo nānyo 'sti rūpavān
yadi rūpād anyo ghaṭaḥ syāt ~~(so)~~rūpa²nirapekṣo gr̥hyeta na
nī gobhyo vyatirikto devadatto govyatirekeṇa na gr̥hyate
tadvad ghaṭo 'pi rūpanirapekṣo gr̥hyeta / na ca gr̥hyata
ity ato rūpavyatirikto ghaṭo nāsti / yadā ca nāsti tadā
katham asaṃvidyamānas tadvat tayā gr̥hyeta / na hy avidya-
māno vandhyātanayo gomān iti vyapadiśyate / ³ evaṃ rūpa-
vān ghaṭa ity api na yujyate /

¹ Tib. 'di ltar (= Skrt. tathā hi).

² Tib. de gzugs (= Skrt. so rūpa°). HPS svarūpa°.

³ Tib. addṣ de bzhin du bum pa gzugs dang ldan no zhes bya
bar mi bsnyad do // (= Skrt. evaṃ ghaṭo rūpavān iti na vy-
apadiśyate /).

C f.207a

gzhan nyid mi srid pa nyid kyī phyir gzugs
dang bum pa gnyis* rten dang brten pa'i rtog pa
nyid kyis grub pa yang med pas /

bum pa la gzugs yod min zhing //

gzugs la bum pa yod ma yin //

P f.238a

gzugs dang* bum pa gnyis gzhan nyid yin na ni
¹'khar gzhong¹ dang zho ltar bum pa la gzugs zhes

N f.232a

bya bar 'gyur zhing / re lde*² la lhas sbyin ltar
gzugs la bum pa zhes bya bar yang 'gyur na / 'di
ni srid pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir bum pa
rang bzhin gyis med do // gang zhig rang bzhin gyis
med la dmigs pa yang yin pa de ni mgal me'i 'khor
lo ltar rang bzhin gyis stong pa yin no //

gzhan yang ji ltar bdag byed pa po dang nye bar
len pa las gcig tu nyid³ thal ba'i phyir dang /
phung po bzhin skye ba dang 'jig pa la brten pa nyid
du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir phung po bdag ma yin pa
de bzhin du⁴ gzugs kyang bum pa ma yin te / nye bar
len pa dang nye bar len pa po dag gcig nyid du thal
bar 'gyur ba'i phyir dang / nye bar len pa mang⁵
bas bum pa mang⁶ po nyid du thal ba'i phyir ro // ⁷

¹ CDN, P mkar gzhong.

² CDP, N lda.

³ NP, CD omit nyid and have gcig du.

⁴ CDN, P omits du.

⁵ CDP, N meng.

⁶ CDP, N meng.

⁷ CD, NP phyir dang /.

anyatvāsambhavād eva ca rūpaghaṭayor ādhārādheyakal-
panāyāpi nāsti siddhir iti

na vidyate ghaṭe rūpaṁ na rūpe vidyate ghaṭaḥ
rūpaghaṭayor anyatve sati ghaṭe rūpaṁ iti syāt kuṇḍa iva
dadhi rūpe 'pi ghaṭa iti syāt kaṭa iva devadatto na caitat
sambhavatīti nāsti ghaṭaḥ svabhāvataḥ / yasya ca nāsti
svabhāva upalabhyate ca tadalātacakrādi¹vat svabhāvaśūnyam /

api ca yathātmā skandhā .a bhavati kartur ātmanah
karmaṇaś copādānasyaikatvaprasaṅgāt skandhavac codayavyava-
bhāktvaprasaṅgād ²ātmabahutvaprasaṅgāc ca² / evaṁ ghato
'pi rūpaṁ na bhavati upādānopādator ekaprasaṅgāt / <upādā-
nabahutvād>³ ghaṭabahutvaprasaṅgāt /

¹ Tib. lacks la sogs pa (= Skrt. ādi).

² Tib. has nothing to correspond to this phrase.

³ lacuna in HPS, Tib. nye bar len pa mang bas (= Skrt. u-
pādānabahutvād).

ji ltar so sor 'dzin par thal ba'i phyir dang /
 rgyu med pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir bdag
 phung po dag las¹ gzhan du mi 'gyur ba de bzhin du
 bum pa yang gzugs las tha dad par mi 'gyur te / so
 sor 'dzin par thal ba'i phyir dang / rgyu med pa
 nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //

yang ji ltar phung po dag las de nyid dang
 gzhan nyid du rtog pa med pas bdag phung po dang
 ldan no² zhes bya bar bsnyad pa ma yin pa de bzhin
 du bum pa gzugs dang ldan no zhes bya bar yang mi
 srid do // gzugs dang bum pa dag de nyid dang
 gzhan nyid du rtog pa med pa'i phyir ro // ji ltar
 phung po dag las de nyid dang gzhan nyid du rtog
 pa med pas bdag la phung po dag dang phung po dag
 la bdag go zhes bya ba rnam pa gnyi ga yang mi
 rigs³ pa de bzhin du bum pa la gzugs dang / gzugs
 pa bum pa zhes bya ba'i* rtog pa gnyis kyang mi
 'thad do //

p f.238b

D f.210b

N f.232b

C f.207b

yang ji ltar gzugs la bltos⁴ nas bum pa la
 rtog* pa gzhi mi srid pa de bzhin du brtags pa'i
 rgyu thams cad la bltos⁵ pa'i gzhi yang mi srid pas*
 bum rang* gi ngo bos grub pa med do //

¹ NP, CD la.

² CDP, N na.

³ CDN, P rig.

⁴ NP, CD ltos.

⁵ NP, CD ltos.

yathā cātmā skandhebhyo anyo na bhavati prthaggrahana
 prasaṅgān nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāc ca / evaṁ ghaṭo
 'pi rūpavyatirikto na bhavati prthaggrahanaprasaṅgān
 nirhetuka < tva > ¹prasaṅgāc ca /

yathā cātmā skandhebhyas tattvānyatvakalpanābhāv-
 āt skandhavān ātmeti na vyapadiśyate / tadvad eva rūpa-
 ghaṭayos tattvānyatvakalpanābhāvād rūpavān ghaṭa iti na
 vyapadiśyate ² / yathā ca skandhebhya < s tattvānyatvaka-
 lpanābhāvād ātmani skandhāh > ³ skandhesv ātmeti dvidhāpi
 na yujyate evaṁ ghaṭe rūpaṁ rūpe ghaṭa ityāpi kalpanādv-
 ayaṁ nopapadyate /

yathā ca rūpāpekṣayā ghaṭe kalpanācatuṣṭayaṁ ⁴ na
 sambhavaty evaṁ sarvaprajñāptikāraṇāpekṣam catuṣṭayaṁ ⁵ na
 sambhavatīti nāsti svarūpato ghaṭaḥ /

¹ Tib. nyid (= Skrt. tva). HPS adds tva.

² Tib. srid (= Skrt. sambhavati).

³ Tib. de nyid dang gzhan nyid du rtog pa med pas bdag la
 phung po dag (= Skrt. tattvānyatvakalpanābhāvād ātmani
 skandhāh). Lacuna in HPS.

⁴ Possibly due to an old copyist's error all four Tibetan
 editions have gzhi instead of the expected bzhi (= Skrt.
 catuṣṭayaṁ)

⁵ Again Tib. gzhi.

ji ltar bum pa rang bzhin gyis yod pa ma yin pa de
 bzhin du dngos po thams cad kyang btsal ba na rang
 bzhin gyis yod pa ma yin pas srid pa mgal me'i
 'khor lo dang sprul pa la sogs pa dang 'dra ba nyid
 du 'gyur ro //

'dir kha cig dag na re gzugs dang bum pa dag
 pa gzhan nyid mi srid mod kyi / de lta na yang
 dngos po dang bum pa gnyis la gzhan nyid yod do //
 gang gi phyir kho bo cag gi ltar na ni bum pa yang
 gzhan nyid yin la yod pa yang gzhan nyid yin no //
 yod pa zhes bya ba ni spyi chen po yin la bum pa ni
 khyad par gyi rdas yin te / de ni yod pa dang
 'brel pa las yod do zhes bya bar bsnyad do zhes
 zer ro // de dag la brjod par bya ste /

3. gnyis mtshan mi mthun mthong nas ni //
 gal te dngos las bum gzhan na //
 ma yin de ltar dngos po 'ang¹ //
 bum pa las gzhan cis mi 'gyur //

¹ NP, CD yang. Bhattacharya's and Vaidya's editions
 also have yang.

yathā ca ghaṭaḥ svabhāvato nāsti tathā sarvabhāvā api
svabhāvato mṛgyamānā na santīti siddhā bhavaty alāta-
cakrādi¹ prakhyatā bhāvasya /

atrāhur eke yadyapy rūpaghaṭayor < anyatvaṁ na sam-
bhavati tathāpi bhāvo gha >² tayor anyatvam asti /
yasmād anya eva ghaṭo 'smakām³ anyathaiva ca sattā / sat-
tā hi nāma mahāsāmānyaṁ ghaṭas ca viśeṣo dravyam sattā-
yogāt sad iti vyapadiśyata iti tām pratyucyate /

3. vailakṣanyam dvayor dr̥ṣtvā bhāvād anyo ghaṭo yadi /
ghaṭād anyo na bhāvo 'pi kim evaṁ na bhaviṣyati //

¹ Tib. me'i 'khor lo dang sprul pa la sogs pa (= Skrt. alātacakranirmanādi).

² Tib. gzhan nyid mi srid mod kyi / de lta na yang dngos po (= Skrt. anyatvaṁ na sambhavati tathāpi bhāvah).

Lacuna in HPS. HPS adds gha. Tib. bum pa.

³ Tib. adds ltar na (= Skrt. darśane).

gal te bum pa la sogs pa'i rdzas rnams la rjes
 su 'jug pa'i mtshan nyid can yin pa'i phyir dngos
 po ni spyi yin la / bum pa ni ldog pa'i mtshan
 nyid can yin pa'i phyir khyad par gyi ¹mtshan nyid
 do zhes¹ dngos po dang bum pa de gnyis kyi mtshan
 nyid mi mthun pa mthong nas dngos po las bum pa
 gzhan du 'gyur na ni de kho na ltar mtshan nyid mi
 mthun pa las dngos po yang bum pa las gzhan du ci'i
 phyir mi 'gyur / de'i phyir mtshan nyid mi mthun pa
 kho na las gzhan gyi blo dang sgra 'jug pa grub pas²
 gzhan gyi blo dang sgra'i rgyu mtshan rjes su 'jug
 pa'i mtshan nyid* can gzhan nyid gzhan brtags³ par
 mi bya ba zhig na / gzhan nyid gzhan rtog pa yang
⁴yin pas⁴ 'o na dngos po dang bum pa dag las mtshan
 nyid mi mthun pa la bltos⁵ pa'i gzhan⁶ nyid yod pa
 ma yin no // de'i phyir /⁷

p f.239a

gnyis mtshan mi mthun mthong na ni //
 dngos las bum gzhan zhes bya ba de ma yin no //

¹ CD, NP mtshan nyid ces.

² CNP, D bas.

³ NP, CD brtag.

⁴ CD, NP yin pa dang /.

⁵ NP, CD ltos.

⁶ NP, CD mtshan.

⁷ CD, NP omit the /.

ghaṭādidravyānām anupravṛttilakṣaṇatvāt sāmānyam
 bhāvaḥ / vyāvṛttilakṣaṇatvāc ca ghaṭo viśeṣalakṣaṇa iti /
 yadi tayoṛ vailakṣanyam bhāvaghaṭayoṛ dr̥stvā bhāvād anyo
 ghaṭo bhavati / evaṃ eva vailakṣanyād ghaṭād api kim artham
 bhāvo 'nyo na bhaviṣyati / tataś cānyabuddhidhvanipravṛt-
 tinimittam anyatvam aparaṃ anupravṛttilakṣaṇam na kalpayi-
 tum / vailakṣanyād eva anyabuddhidhvanipravṛttisiddheḥ
 kalpyate cāparaṃ anyatvam iti nāsti [/]¹ tarhi bhāvaghaṭayoṛ
 vailakṣanyāpekṣam anyatvam < / >² tataś³ ca yad uktam³ /
 vailakṣanyam dvayoṛ dr̥stvā
 bhāvād anyo ghaṭa iti tan na < / >⁴

¹ HPS /.

² HPS lacks /.

³ Tib. lacks this phrase.

⁴ HPS lacks /.

- N f.233a ji ltar* dngos po rjes su 'jug pa'i mtshan nyid can
 yin pa'i phyir bum pa las gzhan yin pa de bzhin
- D f.211a du¹ gzhan nyid* kyang rjes su 'jug pa'i mtshan
 nyid can yin pa'i phyir bum pa las gzhan du 'gyur
- C f.208a la / gzhan nyid de la* gzhan gyi blo dang sgra
 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan gzhan nyid gzhan yod par yang
 mi 'gyur ro // ² gal te 'gyur na ni gzhan nyid rnam
 la mthar thug pa med pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro //

ci ste gzhan nyid med pa kho nar gzhan nyid la
³gzhan³ kyi blur 'gyur na ni de kho na ltar gzhan
 la yang srid par 'gyur bar gyis shig / de'i phyir
 cung zad kyang mi byed pa'i gzhan nyid yongs su
 brtags pas ci zhig bya / gzhan nyid med na yang
 'ga' la yang gang las kyang gzhan nyid med do zhes
 bya bar grub bo //

gzhan yang 'di bsam par bya ba ste / yod pa
 ci 'dra ba zhig gzhan nyid dang ldan par 'gyur / ci
 gzhan du gyur pa zhig gam 'on te gzhan ma yin par
 gyur pa zhig yin grang / ⁴ gal te gzhan du gyur pa
 zhig yin na ni / de'i tshe gzhan nyid dang ldan
 pa'i don med do // 'on te gzhan ma yin par gyur pa
 yin na de lta na yang 'gal ba gzhan ma yin pa nyid
 dang ldan pas gzhan nyid dang ldan par mi 'gyur ro //

¹ NP, CD add /.

² CDP, N omits the //.

³ NP, CD gzhan nyid.

⁴ NP, CD omit the /.

yathā ca bhāvo 'nupravṛttilakṣaṇatvād ghaṭād anya evam
 anyatvam apy anupravṛttilakṣaṇatvād ghaṭād anyat syāt /
 na ca tasyānyatvasyāparam anyatvam anyabuddhidhvanipra-
 vṛttinimittam asti / yadi syād anyatvānām aparyavasāna-
 doṣaḥ syāt /

atha vinaivānyatvena anyabuddhir anyatve bhavati tad-
 vad evānyatvā¹pi sambhāvyatām ity alam anyatvenākiñcit²
 kareṇa parikalpitenā / asati cānyatve nāsti kutaścit³ ka-
 syacid anyatvam iti siddham /

api cedam cintyate kim bhūtāyāḥ sattāyā anyatvena
 yogo 'stu / kim anyabhūtāyā ananyabhūtāyā vā / yady an-
 yabhūtāyās tadā vyartho 'nyatvena yogah / athānanyabhūtāyā
 evam api viruddhena anyatvena yogād anyatvena yogo na prāp-
 noti /

¹ Tib. lacks nyid (= Skrt. tva).

² Tib. adds kyang (= Skrt. api).

³ Tib. adds kyang (= Skrt. api).

P f.239b

gzhan nyid med pas na bum pa las dngos po gzhan
 yin no zhes bya ba mi rung ngo // 'jig rten na¹
 phyin ci log tshad mar byas te yod pa'i blo dang
 sgra 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan* yin pas bum pa'i rang
 gi ngo bo kho na dngos po zhes bya bar² 'jog gi /
 gzugs las rnam pa bzhir dpyad pa na de la rang³
 bzhin yod pa ma yin pas de kho na nyid rig pa la
 bltos⁴ nas bum pa mgal me'i 'khor lo la sogs pa
 bzhin rang bzhin gyis stong ngo zhes bya bar grub
 po //

N f.233b

'dir smras pa / bum pa ni yod pa nyid de yon
 tan gyi rten yin pa'i phyir ro // yod pa ma yin pa
 ni yon tan⁵ gyi rten du ma mthong na /⁶ bum* pa
 gcig bum pa gnyis shes⁷ bum pa yon tan gyi rten du
 'gyur ba yang yin no // gcig nyid la sogs pa rnams
 ni yon tan gyi tshig gi don gyis bsdu la bum pa ni
 rdzas yin zhing / yon tan rnams rdzas pa brten pa
 nyid kyang srid pa yin no // de'i phyir yon tan
 gyi rten yin pa'i phyir bum pa yod pa kho na'o //
 'di la brjod par* bya ste / khyod kyi lugs kyis /

D f.211b

¹ CD, NP ni.

² CD, NP ba.

³ CD, NP have rang gi bzhin.

⁴ NP, CD ltos.

⁵ CNP, D rten

⁶ NP, CD omit the /.

⁷ NP, CD zhes.

anyatvābhāvāc ca ghaṭād anyo bhāva iti na yujyate / ¹ta-
 taś ca¹ loke viparyāsaṁ pramāṇīkṛtya ghaṭatvarūpaṁ² eva
 sadbuddhidhvanipravṛttinimittatvād bhāva iti vyavasthāpya-
 te / tasya ca rūpāc caturdhā vicāryamāṇasya³ nāsti svabhā-
 va iti tattvavidapekṣayālātacakrādivat svabhāvaśūnyo ghaṭa
 iti siddham /

atrāha / vidyate eva ghaṭo guṇāśrayatvāt </>⁴ na
 hy asat guṇāśrayo dr̥ṣṭaḥ / bhavati ca guṇāśrayo ghaṭa eko
 ghaṭo dvau ghaṭāv iti / ekatvādyo guṇapadārthasaṁgrhītā
 ghaṭaś ca dravyam / dravyāśrayitan ca guṇānāṁ sambhavatīti
 </>⁵ ato guṇāśrayatvād asty eva ghaṭa iti / atrocyate /
 tvan matena [/]⁶

¹ Tib. lacks this phrase.

² Tib. bum pa'i rang gi ngo bo (= Skrt. ghaṭasvarūpaṁ).

³ Tib. dpyad pa na (= Skrt. vicāryamāṇe).

⁴ HPS lacks /.

⁵ HPS lacks /.

⁶ HPS //.

C f.208b

4ab. gal te* gcig bum mi 'dod na //

bum pa 'ang gcig tu mi 'gyur ro //

gal te tshig gi don tha dad pas gcig bum par
 mi 'gyur ro snyam du sems na / 'o na ni bum pa
 yang gcig tu mi 'gyur ro // ji ltar gcig nyid de
 gcig gi grangs bum par mi 'gyur ba de bzhin du
 rdzas nyid kyis gcig gi grangs las gzhan du 'gyur
 ba'i phyir bum pa yang gcig tu mi 'gyur te / gnyis
 nyid la sogs pa bzhin no snyam du dgongs so //

gzhan yang bum pa'i rang bzhin gcig la gcig
 gis grangs¹ rtog gam / rang bzhin du ma la yin
 grang² gal te rang bzhin gcig la yin na ni de'i
 tshe gcig rtog pa don med do // 'on te rang bzhin
 du ma la yin na ni de'i tshe yang 'gal ba'i phyir
 mi rigs pa nyid do // de'i phyir 'jig rten na don
 gzhan mi nye ba'i bum pa'i rang gi ngo bo kho na la
 gcig tu rtog³ par shes par bya'o //

P f.240a

ci ste yon* tan rnam rdzas la⁴ brten pas bum
 pa kho na gcig tu 'gyur gyi gcig nyid ni bum par
 mi 'gyur ro⁵ zhe na / 'di la brjod par bya ste /

¹ NP, CD omit grangs.

² CDN, P grangs.

³ CD, NP rtogs.

⁴ CDN, P adds brdzas la.

⁵ CD, NP omit ro.

Ad. eko yadi ghaṭo neṣṭo ghaṭo 'pi eka na jāyate¹ /
 padārthabhedād yadi eko ghaṭo na bhavatīti manyase
 ghaṭo 'pi tarhy eko na bhavati </>² yathaikatvam eka-
 saṁkhyā ghaṭo na bhavati evaṁ dravyatvenaikaśaṁkhyāyāḥ
 prthagbhūtatvād ghaṭo 'py eko na bhavati / dvitvād iti
 bhāvaḥ³ /

api cāsyā⁴ ghaṭasya ekarūpasya ca ekasaṁkhyā pari-
 kalpate vānekarūpasya vā </>⁵ nyid ekarūpasya tadā vyārthaiva-
 ekatva⁶ kalpanā / athānekarūpasya tadāpi viruddhatvād
 ayuktaiva / tasmāl loke ghaṭasvarūpasyaivāsannihitār-
 thāntarasyaikaikalpanā vijneyā /

atha dravyāśrayino guṇā iti kṛtvaikatvayogād ghaṭa
 evaiko bhavati na tv ekatvaṁ <ghaṭo>⁷ bhavanti / atrocya-
 te </>⁸

¹ Tib. 'gyur (= Skrt. bhavati).

² HPS lacks /.

³ Tib. dgongs (= skrt. abhiprāya).

⁴ Tib. has nothing to correspond to asya.

⁵ HPS lacks /.

⁶ Tib. lacks nyid (= Skrt. tva).

⁷ HPS vyārtha; Tib. bum par.

⁸ HPS //.

4cd ldan ni mtshungs pa 'ang ma yin la //

des kyang gcig tu mi 'gyur ro //

ldan pa zhes bya ba ni mtshungs pa dag kho na
 la 'gyur gyi mi mtshungs pa dag la ni ma yin te /
 dper na ldan pa gnyis la gnas pas spun gnyi ga¹ la
 yang spun zla nyid dang 'brel ba² yin gyi gang yang
 rung ba ni ma yin pa bzhin no // gcig dang bum pa
 gnyis ni mtshungs pa ma yin te / bum pa kho na
 gcig nyid dang ldan pa'i phyir la gcig nyid bum pa
 dang mi ldan pa'i phyir te / yon tan rnam ni rdzas
 la brten pa'o zhes khas blangs pa'i phyir ro // de
 N f.234a la gang gi* phyir gcig ni yon tan du mthong la bum
 pa ni rdzas yin zhing rdzas dang yon tan gnyis kyang
 mtshungs par mi 'gyur ba de'i phyir de gnyis ldan
 pa nyid du mi 'gyur ro // ldan pa med pas kyang
 gang gcig nyid³ dang ldan pa las bum pa kho na gcig
 tu 'gyur ro⁴ zhes bya ba de yang ma yin no // gal
 te 'dir ldan pa mthong na ni de'i tshe bum pa yang
 gcig dang ldan par 'gyur la gcig kyang bum pa dang
 D f.212a ldan par 'gyur na / de ni ltar srid pa yang* ma
 C f.209a yin pas de gnyis * kyi ldan pa nyid mi 'thad do //

¹ CD, NP ka.

² CP, DN pa.

³ NP, CD omit nyid.

⁴ CD, NP have //.

4cd.na cāyaṃ samayor yogas tenāpy eko na jāyate¹ //
 yogo nāma samayor eva bhavati na viṣamayos² tatraika-
 guṇo dr̥sto ghaṭas ca dravyaṃ dravyaguṇayoś ca samatā yas-
 mān na bhavati tasmāt taylor yoga eva na bhavati </>³ yo-
 gābhāvat⁴ tatra⁵ yad iṣṭam⁶ ekatvayogād ghaṭa evaiko bha-
 vatīti tan⁷ na / yadi cātra yogo dr̥stas tadā ekenāpi gha-
 tasya yogah syād ghaṭenāpy ekasya /⁸ sa ca naivaṃ bhavati
 iti⁸ yoga evānaylor nopapadyate /

¹ Tib. 'gyur (= Skrt. bhavati).

² Tib. adds dper na ldan pa gnyis la gnas pa spun gnyi ga
 la yang spun zla nyid dang 'brel ba yin gyi gang yang rung
 ba ni ma yin pa bzhin no // gcig dang bum pa gnyis ni
 mtshungs pa ma yin te / bum pa kho na gcig nyid dang ldan
 pa'i phyir la gcig nyid bum pa dang mi ldan pa'i phyir te /
 yon tan rnams ni rdzas la brten pa'o zhes khas blangs pa'i
 phyir ro // (= Skrt. tadyathā yogo dvistha ity ubhaylor
 bhrātror api bhrātr̥tvasambandho 'sti yasya kasya cana tu
 nāsti / ghaṭa eva ekatvayogād eka eva ghaṭāyogāc ca eka-
 ghaṭau na samau stas / guṇā dravyāśrayina ity abhyupaga-
 māt /)

³ HPS lacks /.

⁴ Tib. adds kyang (= Skrt. api).

⁵ Tib. has nothing to correspond to tatra.

⁶ Tib. has nothing to correspond to iṣṭam.

⁷ Tib. adds yang (= Skrt. api).

⁸ Tib. de ni ltar srid pa yang ma yin pas (= Skrt. sa ca
 naivaṃ sambhavo 'stīti).

ldan pa med pas kyang gcig bum par mi 'gyur bas bum
 pa yang gcig ma yin no // de'i phyir 'dir phyed
 snga mas ni ldan pa khas blangs nas sun 'byin pa
 bshad la / phyed phyi mas ni ldan pa mi srid pa'i
 sgo nas sun 'byin par¹ bshad do // kyang gi sgra
 ni sun 'byin pa'i² rgyu bsdu ba'i don du blta bar
 bya'o //

P f.240b

gzhan yang pha rol po'i gzhung lugs la / gang
 yon tan rnam rdzas la brten'par rnam par* 'jog
 cing / khyad par gyi yon tan rnam yon tan la
 brten par³ ni ma yin pa ches mi rigs pa 'di snang
 na / yon tan rnam kyang yon tan la brten pa nyid
 du rigs pa yang yin no // 'di na bum pa bong tshad
 ci tsam yin pa de tsam kho⁴ nar de'i rten can gyi
 gzugs kyang 'gyur dgos so // de'i phyir rdzas ltar
 gzugs kyang chen po nyid du 'gyur ro //

5ab. gang tshe rdzas ci tsam gzugs na //

de'i tshe gzugs chen ci ste min //

¹ NP, CD pa.

² CDN, P pa.

³ CDN, P bar.

⁴ CDN, P 'kho.

yogābhāvāc ca naivaiko ghaṭo bhavatīti na ghaṭo 'py
 eka iti / tad atra purvārdhena kārīkāyā yogam abhy-
 upetya dūṣaṇam uktam uttarārdhena tu yogāsambhave¹
 dūṣaṇam uktam / api śabdaś ca dūṣaṇakāraṇasamucca-
 yārtho draṣṭavyaḥ /

api cedam ayuktataram parāsamaye drśyate yad dra-
 vyāśrayino guṇā vyavasthāpyante na guṇāśrayino viś-
 eṣaguṇāḥ / yujyate ca guṇānām api guṇāśrayitvam /
 iha yatparimāṇo ghaṭas tadāśray < i >² nāpi rūpeṇa -
 tāvataiva bhavitavyam / tataś ca dravyavad rūpasyāpi
 mahattvam prāpnotīti /

5ab. yāvad dravyaṁ yadā rūpaṁ tadā mahan na kim /

¹ Tib. adds sgo nas (= Skrt. dvareṇa).

² HPS āśrayenāpi.

gang gi tshe rdzas ci tsam ste /¹ rdzas kyi
 chu² zheng gi bdag nyid can gyi dbyibs ji tsam yin
 pa de tsam gzugs de gzugs kyi chu zheng gi bdag nyid
 can gyi dbyibs yin no zhes gzhan gyis khas blangs
³pa de'i³ tshe nges par⁴ phra ba dang che ba'i
 rdzas de la gzugs kyang phra ba dang che ba nyid du
 'gyur dgos so // de'i phyir gang rdzas bzhin du
 gzugs la phra ba dang chen po nyid dag mi 'dod pa
 'di la rgyu ci zhig yod /

ci ste gzugs* ni yon tan yin zhing phra ba nyid
 dang chen po nyid kyang yon tan kho na yin la / yon
 tan ni⁵ yon tan gyi dbyibs su yang mi 'gyur ba zhes
 bya ba 'di ni kho bo cag gi gzhung⁶ lugs yin te de'i
 phyir rdzas ci⁷ tsam yin pa de tsam kho nar gzugs
 kyang yin mod kyi de ltar na yang grub pa'i mtha'
 dang 'gal ba'i 'jigs pas gzugs la phra ba nyid dang
 chen po nyid dag yod pa ma yin no snyam na / brjod
 par bya ste /

Sad. gal te phyir rgol⁸ gzhan min na //

gzhung lugs bsnyad par bya bar 'gyur //

¹ CD, NP omit /.

² CDP, N omits chu.

³ CDP, N pa'i.

⁴ CD, NP pa.

⁵ CD, NP omit ni.

⁶ NP, CD omit gzhung.

⁷ NP, CD ji.

⁸ CD, NP add ba.

yadā yāvad dravyaṁ yāvān dravyasyāyāṁavistārātmakah
 sanniveśas tāvad rūpaṁ rūpasyāpi tāvān evāyāṁavistārāt-
 makah sanniveśa iti parenābhyupagamyate / tadā niya-
 tam anumahati dravye rūpeṇāpi tatrānumahatā bhavitavyam /
 tat kiṁ^(nu) khalv atra kāraṇaṁ yat dravya²rūpasyānumaha-
 tve neṣyate /

atha syād rūpaṁ guṇo 'ntvaṁ mahattvam api ca guṇa
 eva na ca guṇe guṇasya sanniveśo bhavatīti samayo eṣo
 'smākam / tataś ca yadyapi yāvad dravyaṁ rūpaṁ api tā-
 vad eva tathāpi siddhāntavirodhabhayād rūpasyānumahatve
 na sta iti / ucyate^[/]³

5cd. samayo jāyate vācyaḥ prativādy aparo yadi /

¹ HPS na.

² Tib. adds bzhin (= Skrt. vat).

³ HPS //.

D f.212b

C f.209b

gal te phyir rgol khyod rang gi sde tshan nyid
 du 'gyur na ni de'i de la gnod par nus pas de bzlog
 par bya ba'i phyir de la grub pa'i mtha' dang 'gal*
 bar brjod par rigs na / gang gi tshe pha* rol po
 phyir rgol ba yin na ni de la grub pa'i mtha' dang
 'gal ba brjod pa ci yang mi byed pa zhig ste / de'i¹
 grub pa'i mtha' de sel bar zhugs pa'i phyir ro //
 de la rigs pa dang 'jig rten dang 'gal ba brjod pa
 ni rigs te / de'i sgo nas de bzlog par nus pa'i
 phyir ro // de'i phyir lung dang 'gal ba brjod pa
 gang yin pa 'di ni lan ma yin pa nyid pas nyes pa
 de nyid ma g.yos pa yin no // de'i phyir dngos po
 dang bum pa gnyis la gzhan nyid med do // de'i
 phyir 'dir yod pa gzhan nyid bkag pas de las gzhan
 bum pa nyid la sogs pa spyi dang bye brag rnam
 dgag pa yang shes par bya ste / spyi'i yon tan
 rnam ni grangs dang 'dra la bye brag gyi yon tan
 rnam ni chen po nyid dang 'dra'o //

'dir smras pa / bum pa la sogs pa dag las
 dngos po gzhan nyid yin pa dgag pa ni bshad na /
 bum pa'i rang bzhin² ni ma bkag pas dngos po bum pa
 zhes bya ba rang gi ngo bos yod pa kho na'o //
 brjod par bya ste /³

¹ CDP, N de.

² CDN, P omits bzhin.

³ CD, NP have te and omit /.

yadi hi tava svayūthya eva prativādī syāt tanni-
 vartayitum yuktam tava siddhānta<virodha>¹ abhidhānam tasya tadbādh-
 itum sāmāthyāt / yadā tu prativādī parastam prati sid-
 dhāntavirodhodbhāvanam akīncitkaram siddhāntanirākarana-
 pravṛttatvāt tasya / yuktilokavirodhodbhāvanam tu tam
 prati <yuktam>² taddvāreṇa tasya nivārayitum śakyatvāt /
 tasmād aparihāra evāyam yad idam āgamavirodhodbhāvanam
 iti sa evāvicalo doṣaḥ / iti nāsti bhāvaghaṭayor anya-
 tvam / tad atra sattānyatvapratishedhenā³ nyesām api gha-
 ṭatvādīnām sāmānyaviśeṣānām pratishedho vijñeyah / saṁ-
 khyāvat sāmānyaguṇānām mahatvavad <viśeṣaguṇānām>⁴ iti /
 atrāha / ukto bhāvasya <ghaṭādibhyo>⁵ 'nyatva-
 pratishedho ghaṭasya tu svabhāvāpratishedhād asty eva sva-
 rūpato ghaṭākhyo bhāva iti / atro⁶ cyate /

¹ Tib. grub pa'i mtha' dang 'gal ba (= Skrt. siddhānta-
 virodha); HPS lacks virodha.

² Tib. rigs (= Skrt. yuktam). HPS jyāyas.

³ Tib. adds de las (= Skrt. tasmāt).

⁴ Tib. bye brag gyi yon tan rnams (= Skrt. viśeṣaguṇāḥ).
 HPS viśeṣānām, lacks guṇānām.

⁵ Tib. bum pa la sogs pa dag las (= Skrt. ghaṭādibhyah)
 HPS paṭādibhyo.

⁶ Tib. lacks 'dir (= Skrt. atra).

6. mtshan nyid kyis kyang mtshan gzhi ni //
 gang du grub pa yod min pa //
 der ni grangs sogs tha dad par //
 dngos po yod pa ma yin no //

N f.235a

'dir bum pa dang yod pa dag la ldog pa yang
 rjes su 'jug pa'i mtshan nyid smra ba na / pha* rol
 pos bum pa la ldog pa'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzha¹
 ste / de'i phyir mtshan nyid 'dis kyang mtshan
 gzhi grub pa med do // gang zhig mtshan gzhi nyid
 du grub par 'gyur ba ldog pa tsam gnyis ni² dngos
 po rnams kyi dngos po'i³ rang gi ngo bo nges par
 mi nus so //

P f.241b

re zhig gcig ni yon tan yin pa'i phyir bum par
 mi 'gyur la /phra ba dang chen po zhes bya ba dang /
 gzugs la sogs pa rnams kyang yon tan yin pa'i phyir
 bum pa zhes bya bar mi 'gyur ro // yod pa yang
 rdzas dang yon tan dang las rnams kyi spyi* yin pa'i
 phyir bum par mi 'gyur ro // de'i phyir 'di grangs
 dang phra ba dang chen po dang gzugs la sogs pa
 rnams las ldog pa ni⁴ rang bzhin 'di 'dra ba zhig
 go zhes bya bar rnam par gzha⁵ par mi nus* so //

D f.213a

¹ CD, NP bzha^g.

² NP, CD omit ni.

³ CD, NP po yi.

⁴ CD, NP na.

⁵ CD, NP bzha^g.

6. lakṣaṇenāpi lakṣyaśya yatra siddhir na vidyate /

saṁkhyādivyatirekeṇa tatra bhāvo na vidyate //

iha ghaṭasattayor vyāvṛtṭyanuvṛttilakṣaṇaṁ bruvatā
ghaṭasya vyāvṛttilakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthāpitaṁ pareṇa / tad
amunā lakṣaṇenāpi lakṣyaśya nāsti siddhiḥ / na hi vyāvṛt-
timātreṇa śakyam ¹vastusvarūpaṁ nirdhārayitum yallakṣya-
tayā setsyati /

ekas tāvad guṇatvād ghaṭo na bhavati / anur mahad
iti rūpādayaś ca guṇatvād eva ghaṭākhyā na bhavanti /
sattāpi dravyaguṇakarmaṣu ²sāmānyād ghaṭo na bhavati /
tad ayaṁ svabhāva iti na śakyam vyavasthāpayitum /

¹ Tib. adds dngos po rnam kyī (= Skrt. bhāvanām).

² Tib. rdzas dang yon tan dang las rnam kyī (= Skrt.
dravyaguṇakarmānām).

C f.210a

de'i phyir de ltar rgol ba 'gzhan gyi phyogs gang
 du mtshan nyid kyis kyang mtshan gzhi'i bum pa'i*
 rang gi ngo bos grub pa ma yin pa'i phyogs der¹
 dngos po bum pa zhes bya ba'i grangs la sogs pa
 las tha dad par rang gi ngo bo yod pa ma yin no //
 de'i phyir bum pa rang bzhin gyis stong ngo zhes
 bya bar grub bo² //

rnam pa gcig tu grangs dang gzugs la sogs pa
 dag ni bum pa'i mtshan nyid yin la bum pa ni de dag
 gis de dag gis mtshon bar bya ba yin pas mtshan gzhi
 yin te / de la ni mtshan nyid kyis³ kyang rang gi
 ngo bo logs⁴ su grub pa yod pa ma yin te / grangs
 la sogs pa las tha dad par de'i rang gi ngo bo ma
 dmigs pa'i phyir ro // gal te mtshan gzhi de rang
 gi ngo bor⁵ rnyed na ni de'i tshe nges par 'di ni
 bum pa'i rang gi ngo bos grangs la sogs pa las tha
 pa de yin la / yang 'di de'i mtshan nyid grangs la
 sogs⁶ tha dad par gzung du yod par 'gyur na / 'di
 ni de ltar yang ma yin no // de'i phyir /

¹ CDN, P de.

² CDN, P po.

³ NP, CD omit kyis.

⁴ Wrongly emended to legs in Bhattacharya's edition.

⁵ NP, CD bos.

⁶ NP, CD add pa'o zhes grangs la sogs pa.

tad evam / yatra paravāḍipakṣe lakṣaṇenāpi lakṣasya
ghaṭasvarūpasya¹ nāsti siddhis tatra pakṣe² saṁkhyādi-
vyatirekeṇa siddhasvarūpeṇa ghaṭākhyo bhāvo na vidyate² /
tataś ca svabhāvaśūnyo ghaṭa iti siddham /

athavā³ saṁkhyārūpādayo ghaṭasya lakṣaṇam / tair
lakṣyamānatvād ghaṭo lakṣyas tasya lakṣaṇenāpi prthak
svarūpasiddhir⁴ aśakyā kartum⁴ / saṁkhyādivyatirekeṇa
tatsvarūpasyānupalabhyamānatvāt </>⁵ yadi hi tallak-
ṣyaṁ svarūpaṁ labhate tadā niyataṁ saṁkhyādivyatirekeṇa
grhyate idaṁ tat saṁkhyā <di>⁶ vyatiriktaṁ ghaṭasvarū-
pam </>⁷ idaṁ⁸ punar asya saṁkhyādikam lakṣaṇam iti
na ca itad evam ity atah /

¹ Tib. rang gi ngo bos (= Skrt. svarūpeṇa).

² Tib. dngos po bum pa zhes bya ba'i grangs la sogs pa
las tha dad par rang gi ngo bo yod pa ma yin no //
(= Skrt. bhāvasya ghaṭākhyasya saṁkhyādivyatirekeṇa
svarūpaṁ na vidyate).

³ Tib. rnam par gcig tu (= Skrt. ekadhā).

⁴ Tib. yod pa ma yin (= Skrt. na vidyate).

⁵ HPS lacks /.

⁶ Tib. grangs la sogs pa (= Skrt. saṁkhyādi). HPS
saṁkhyā, lacks ādi.

⁷ HPS lacks /.

⁸ HPS /.

N f.235b

mtshan nyid kyis kyang mtshan gzhi ni //*
 gang du grub pa yod min pa //
 der ni grangs sogs tha dad par //
 dngos po yod pa ma yin no //

de'i phyir bum pa rang gi ngo bo med do //

re zhig mtshan nyid dang mtshan gzhi dag gzhan
 nyid yin dang dgag pa bshad zin to // ¹gang dag¹ gi
 bum pa gzugs la sogs pa rnams dang gcig pa grub pa'i
 mtha' yin pa de² dgag pa'i phyir 'di brjod par bya
 ste /

7. mtshan nyid rnams dngos so so ni //

min phyir bum pa gcig ma yin //

re re³ bum pa med na ni //

P f.242a

mang nyid* 'thad par mi 'gyur ro //

gang dag gzugs la sogs pa rnams ni mtshan nyid
 sna tshogs pa yin zhing de rnams dang bum pa so so
 ma yin pa nyid du 'dod pa de dag gi ltar na / bum
 pa mtshan nyid gzugs la sogs pa rnams dang so so ma
 yin pa'i phyir gcig tu mi 'thad de mang po rnams
 dang gzhan ma yin pa'i phyir ro //

¹ NP, CD gang zhig.

² CDN, P da.

³ CDN, P re rer; Bhattacharya's and Vaidya's editions
 have re re'i.

lakṣaṇanāpi lakṣyasya yatra siddhir na vidyate /
 saṃkhyādivyatirekeṇa tatra bhāvo na vidyate //
 iti nāsti svabhāvo ghaṭaḥ /

uktas tāval lakṣyalakṣaṇayor anyatvapratishedhaḥ /
 yeṣāṃ tu rūpādibhir ghaṭasyaikyam iti siddhāntas tatpra-
 tiśedhāyedaṃ ucyate /¹

7. ghaṭasya na bhavaty aikyam aprthaktvāddhi lakṣaṇaiḥ/
 ekaikasmin ghaṭābhāve bahutvaṃ nopapadyate //
 rūpādīni khalu nānalakṣaṇāni / yeṣāṃ taiḥ <a>prthaktvaṃ²
 ghaṭasyeṣṭaṃ teṣāṃ³ rūpādibhir lakṣaṇair aprthaktvaṃ⁴ gha-
 ṭasyaikyaṃ nopapadyate bahubhir ananyatvāt /

¹ HPS //.

² Tib. so so ma yin pa nyid (= Skrt. aprthaktvaṃ). HPS prthaktvaṃ.

³ Tib. adds ltar na (= Skrt. darśane).

⁴ Tib so so ma yin pa'i phyir (= Skrt. aprthaktvāt).

de la¹ gal te bum pa gcig tu mi 'gyur na 'o na mang
 po nyid du 'gyur ro snyam du* 'dod na 'di la brjod
 par bya ste / gang gi phyir gzugs la sogs pa rnams
 la² re re la bum pa med pa* mthong ba de'i phyir
 mang po nyid kyang yod pa ma yin no //

'dir smras pa / gal te gzugs la sogs pa mtshan
 nyid rnams dang so so ma yin pa'i phyir bum pa la
 gcig med na / de rnams phan tshun sbyor ba las bum
 pa gcig tu 'gyur ro // 'di la brjod par bya ste /

8. reg ldan dang mi ldan dang //

lhan cig sbyor ba zhes bya med //

de'i phyir gzugs³ sogs rnams sbyor ba³ //

rnam pa kun tu rigs ma yin //

de la reg pas na reg pa ste lus kyi dbang po'i
 gzung bar bya ba nyid do // de 'di la yod pas na
 reg ldan no // lus kyi dbang po'i gzung bar bya
 ba yin pa'i phyir reg bya kho na reg ldan yin te /
 reg bya reg pa dang ldan pa de⁴ gzugs dang dri dang⁵
 ro dang⁶ reg pa dang mi ldan pa rnams dang sbyor ba
 ste / phrad cing reg pa mi srid de dper na nam
 mkha' dang bum pa bzhi no //

¹ CD, NP omit la.

² NP, CD las.

³ CDN, P gzugs rnams sbyor ba. Vaidya's edition
 has rnams spyor ba ni .

⁴ CDP, N re.

⁵ NP, CD add /.

⁶ NP, CD add /.

syāt tatra mataṁ yadi ghaṭasyaikaṁ na bhavati hanta bahu-
tvaṁ prāptam iti / atrocyate / yasmād rūpādiṣv ekaikasmin
ghaṭasyābhāvo dr̥ṣṭas tasmād bahutvam api nāstīti /

atrāha / yadi rūpādibhir laksanair apr̥thaktvād ghaṭa-
syaikyam nāsti tesāṁ parasparasamyogād ghaṭayaikyam bhaviṣ-
yatīti / atrocyate /

§. na hy asparśavato nāma yogaḥ sparśavatā saha /

rūpādīnām ato yogaḥ sarvathā na yujyate //

tatra spr̥ṣṭiḥ¹ sparśaḥ kāyendriyagrāhyatā </>² spar-
śo³ 'syāstīti sparśavat / spraṣṭavyam eva kāyendriyagrāhy-
atvāt sparśavat / tena sparśavatā spraṣṭavyena rūpagandha-
rasānām asparśavatā <m>⁴ yogaḥ samyogaḥ saṁsparśo na sam-
bhavati / yathā ghaṭasyākāśena /

¹ Tib. reg pas na (= Skrt. spr̥ṣṭīti).

² HPS lacks /.

³ Tib. de (= Skrt. sah).

⁴ HPS asparśavatā.

N f.236a

gang gi phyir 'di de ltar yin pa de'i phyir gzugs
 la sogs pa rnams kyi sbyor* ba rnam pa thams cad
 du mi srid do //` gang gi tshe de ltar yin pa de'i
 tshe gzugs la sogs pa rnams kyi khyad par phan
 tshun phrad pas byas las tshogs pa'i rgyu can bum
 pa yin no¹ zhes bya ba gang smras pa de mi rigs
 so //

ci ste phan tshun reg pa med par yang de rnams
 kyi tshogs pa nyid du bum pa zhes bya bar 'gyur ro
 zhe na / de yang yod pa ma yin te / 'di ltar /

q. gzugs ni bum pa'i yan lag ste //

des na re zhig de bum min //

gang phyir yan lag can med pa //

des na yang lag kyang yod min //

gzugs la sogs pa'i tshogs pa'i ngo bo can bum
 pa'i gzugs la sogs pa rnams ni re re zhing yan lag
 tu gyur pa'i phyir bum pa'i brjod pa la brten par
 mi 'gyur ro // bum pa ni yan lag can yin la gzugs
 la sogs pa rnams² ni yan lag yin no // re zhig
 gzugs ni yan lag yin pa'i phyir bum pa ma yin no //
 gzugs ji ltar³ yod pa³ de bzhin du dri la sogs pa
 dag la yang brjod* par bya'o //

D f.214a

¹ CD, NP add //.

² NP, CD omit rnams.

³ CDP, N yin pa.

yata etad evaṃ rūpādīnāṃ ato yogah sarvaprakāraṃ na sambhavati / ¹yadā ca¹ na sambhavati² tadānyonyasaṃsparśakṛtād rūpādīnāṃ viśeṣāt samudāyanibandhano ghaṭa iti yaduktam tan na yuktam /

atha vināpy anyonyasaṃsparśena tatsamudāya eva ghaṭa iti syād etad api nāsti / yasmāt³ [/]⁴

ghaṭasyāvayavo rūpaṃ tena tāvan na tad ghaṭah /
yasmād avayavī nāsti tena nāvayavo 'pi tat //

rūpādisamudāyarūpasya ghaṭasya pratyekaṃ rūpādayo
'vayavabhūtatvād ghaṭavyapadeśabhājo na bhavanti / ghaṭo
'vayavī avayavaś ca rūpādyā iti < / >⁵ rūpaṃ tāvad avayatvād ghaṭo na prapnoti⁶ / yathā ca rūpaṃ evaṃ gandhādayo
vācyāḥ /

¹ Tib. gang gi tshe de ltar (= Skrt. yadaivam).

² Tib. yin pa (= Skrt. bhavati).

³ Tib. 'di ltar (= Skrt. tathā hi).

⁴ HPS //.

⁵ HPS lacks /.

⁶ Tib. yin (= Skrt. bhavati).

C f.211a

gal te 'o na ni gzugs yan lag yin pa'i phyir
 yan lag can zhes bya ba de 'ga'* zhig yod pa ma
 yin nam / yan lag can la mi bltos¹ pa'i yan lag
 dag ni mi rigs so zhe na / bshad par bya ste /²
 'dir gzugs la sogs pa re re la bum pa nyid med³ na
 yan lag can 'ga' zhig lta ga la yod /⁴ yan lag can
 zhes bya ba gzugs la sogs pa las⁵ tha dad par⁶ yongs
 su bcaḍ par nus pa ma yin la / rang gi ngo bo
 yongs su bcaḍ pa ni yod pa nyid du gzhag⁷ par nus
 pa yang ma yin pas yan lag can med do // gang gi
 phyir yan lag can med pa'i phyir gzugs yan lag⁸ nyid
 du⁸ yang mi srid pas yan lag dang yan lag can gnyis
 med pa nyid do // 'di las kyang / gzugs la sogs
 pa tshogs pa bum pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir /

N f.236b

10. gzugs rnams kun* la 'ang gzugs nyid ni //
 mtshan nyid mi mthun ma yin na⁹ //
 gcig la bum pa yod 'gyur zhing //
 gzhan dag la min rgyu ci zhig //

¹ NP, CD ltos.

² NP, CD //.

³ CD, NP de.

⁴ NP, CD //.

⁵ CD, NP omit las.

⁶ CNP, D bar.

⁷ CD, NP bzhag.

⁸ CD, NP omit nyid and have yan lag tu.

⁹ Bhattacharya's edition has no.

nanu ca rūpasyāṁ avayavād asti tarhy asāv avayavī nāma
 kaścīd/ na hy avayavavinirapeksā avayavā yujyanta iti /
 ucyate </>¹ iha rūpādīnām pratyekaṁ ghaṭatvābhāve ku-
 taḥ kaścīd avayavī / na hi rūpādīvyatirekeṇa avayavī nāma
 paricchetuṁ pāryate / na cāparicchidyamānasvarūpasya sat-
 tvaṁ śakyam ity asann avayavī / yasmāc cāvayavī nāsti tas-
 mād² rūpaṁ avayavatvenāpi na sambhāvyata iti na sta evāvyava-
 avayavinau / itaś ca rūpādisamudāyo na ghaṭaḥ / yasmāt
 10. sarveśām api rūpatvam avilakṣaṇam /
 ekasya ghaṭe sadbhāvo nānyeśām kin <nu>³
 kāraṇam //

¹ HPS lacks /.

² Tib. omits de'i phyir (= Skrt. tasmāt).

³ HPS na.

P f.243a

gzugs rnams kun la 'ang* zhes bya ba ni gzugs
 kyi phung bos bsdus pa yin pa'i phyir gzugs dang
 dri la sogs pa rnams la gzugs zhes bya'o // gzugs
 der rnams bum pa ltar snam bu la sogs pa dag la
 yang yod la / de rnams bum pa la sogs pa tha dad
 kyang rang gi mtshan nyid la 'khrul pa yang ma yin
 te / thams cad du ngo bo mtshungs pa'i phyir ro //
 de la ji ltar gzugs gcig bum pa nyid du gnas pa de
 bzhin du snam bu la sogs pa dang 'brel ba'i gzugs
 gzhan yang bum pa nyid du gnas par ci'i phyir mi
 'dod / de yang bum pa nyid du gnas par ni¹ rigs
 te / mtshan nyid tha mi dad pa'i phyir bum pa nyid
 du gnas pa'i gzugs la sogs pa bzhin no // de ltar
 khas mi len pa ni rgyu nyid yod pa ma yin te / de'i
 phyir thams cad bum pa nyid kho nar 'gyur ba 'am /
 yang na bum pa yang bum pa ma yin pa nyid du 'gyur
 ro // ji ltar bum pa la sogs pa rnams tha mi dad
 par thal bar 'gyur ba de bzhin du gzugs* dang dri
 la sogs pa* rnams kyang tha mi dad par thal bar
 'gyur te / bum pa gcig las gzhan ma yin pa'i phyir
 ro //

D f.214b

C f.211b

¹ NP, CD mi.

sarvesām api rūpānām iti rūpaskandhasaṁgrhītatvād
 rūpagandhādayo rūpānīty ucyante / tāni rūpāni ghaṭa iva
 paṭādiṣv api santi / na ca tāni ghaṭādibhede 'pi sva-
 lakṣaṇaṁ vyabhicaranti sarvatraiva tulyalakṣaṇatvāt /
 tatra yathaikasya rūpasya ghaṭatvenāvasthānaṁ tathānyasyāpi
 <pa>ṭā¹disambandhino rūpasya kasmād ghaṭatvenāvasthānaṁ
 neṣyate / yujyate tu tasyāpi ghaṭatvenāvasthānaṁ lakṣa-
 nābhedād ghaṭā²vasthitarūpadivat / evaṁ tv anabhyupagame
 <kāraṇam>³eva na sambhavati⁴ / tataś ca sarvesām eva gha-
 ṭatvaṁ prāpnoti / yadvā ghaṭasyāpi ghaṭatvaṁ na prāpno-
 ti / yathā ca ghaṭādīnām abhedaprasaṅgaḥ / evaṁ rūpaga-
 ndhādīnām apy abheda <prasaṅgaḥ>⁵ prāpnoti ekasmād ghaṭād
 ananyatvāt /

¹ Tib. snam bu (= Skrt. paṭa). HPS ghaṭa^c.

² Tib. bum pa nyid (= Skrt. ghaṭatva) .

³ Tib. rgyu (= Skrt. kāraṇam). HPS karaṇam.

⁴ Tib. yin (= Skrt. bhavati) .

⁵ Tib. tha mi dad par thal bar (= Skrt. abhedaprasaṅgaḥ) .

HPS lacks prasaṅgaḥ.

ci ste de rnams bum pa las gzhan ma yin pa
nyid yin mod kyi / de ltar na yang gzugs¹ dang ro
la sogs pa dag las tha dad pa yod de de'i phyir tha
mi dad par thal ba med do snyam na / 'di yang mi
rigs so zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

||. ro sogs dag las gzugs gzhan zhing //

²bum las min zhes khyod 'dod na² //

de rnams ma rtogs³ rang med gang //

⁴gang de gzugs gzhan ji ltar min⁴ //

gal te dbang po tha dad pa'i gzung⁵ bar bya ba

P f.243b

yin pa'i phyir gzugs ro la sogs pa dag* las gzhan
du rnam par 'jog na ni gzugs de bum pa las kyang
gzhan yin no zhes⁶ bya bar ci ste mi gzhaq / de

N f.237a

gzugs las gzhan* ro la sogs pa dag las tha mi dad
pa'i phyir ro la sogs pa'i rang gi bdag nyid ltar
gzugs las gzhan nyid du 'gyur na / gzhan nyid du
'dod pa yang ma yin pas 'di mi⁷ rigs so // gang gi
tshe de ltar gzugs la sogs pa rnams la bum pa'i
rgyu nyid mi srid pa de'i tshe nges par /

¹ CD, NP add la.

² CD, NP have bum pa las min zhes 'dod na //.

³ All four editions have rtogs; but Vaidya's and Bhattacarya's editions have the usual spelling gtogs.

⁴ Bhattacarya's edition has de gzugs las gzhan ci ltar min; Vaidya's edition has de gzugs las gzhan ji ltar min //.

⁵ CDN, P gzub bar.

⁶ ND, CP omit zhes.

⁷ NP, CD ma.

atha manyase yady api ghaṭād <an> anyatvam¹ es-
ām² rūpasya rasādibhyo bhedo 'sti tasmād abhedaprasaṅga-
abhāva itī etad apy ayuktam itī pratipādyann āha /

((. rūpam anyad rasādibhyo na ghaṭād itī te matam /
svayaṁ yastair vinā nāsti ³<sa nānyo>³ rūpa-
taḥ katham //

yadi bhinnendriyagrāhyatvād rasādibhyo rūpam anyad-
vyavasthāpyate / ghaṭād api tad rūpam anyad itī kiṁ na
vyavasthāpyate / rūpād anyebhyo rasādibhyas tasya
vyatiriktatvād⁴ rasādisvātma⁵ vad rūpād anya eva prāpnoti /
na cānyatvam isyata itī ayuktam etad / yadā caivaṁ rū-
pādīnāṁ ghaṭakāraṇatvaṁ na sambhavati⁶ tadā niyataṁ

¹ Tib. gzhan ma yin pa nyid (= Skrt. ananyatvam). HPS
anyatvam.

² Tib. has nothing to correspond to esām.

³ Tib. de gzugs gzhan ji ltar min (= Skrt. sa nānyo rū-
pataḥ katham). HPS so 'nanyo rūpataḥ katham.

⁴ Tib. tha mi dad pa'i phyir (= Skrt. avyatiriktatvāt).
HPS vyatiriktatvāt.

⁵ Tib. adds nyid (= Skrt. tva).

⁶ Tib. rigs (= Skrt. yujyate).

12a. bum pa la ni rgyu yod min //

rgyu dang bral ba la ni rang nyid la rgyu med pa
can gyi¹ 'bras bu nyid med pas

12b. rang nyid 'bras bur mi 'gyur te //

gang gi phyir de ltar 'di rgyu med pa'i 'bras bu
nyid mi srid pa /

12c. de'i phyir gzugs sogs las gzhan du //

bum pa 'ga' yang yod ma yin //

gzugs la sogs pa las tha dad par bum pa 'bras bu
gyur par ma dmigs pa'i phyir ro // gzugs la sogs
pa las tha dad pa'i bum pa med do zhes bya bar
grub bo //

ci ste bum pa ni gzugs la sogs pa'i nye bar
len pa can ma yin pa kh na'o // 'o na ci zhe na /
rang gi yan lag tu gyur pa'i² rgyu gyo mo rnams la
bltos³ nas bum pa 'bras bu nyid yin la gyo mo rnams
ni rgyu nyid yin no snyam du sems na 'di yang
snying po med do zhes bshad pa /

13. bum pa rgyu las 'grub 'gyur zhing //

rgyu ni gzhan las grub 'gyur na //

gang la rang las grub med pa //

de yis gzhan po ji ltar bskyed //*

¹ CDP, N gyis.

² CD, NP 'gyur ba'i.

³ NP, CD ltos.

12a. ghaṭasya kāraṇaṃ nāsti¹

²na ca kāraṇarahitasya svata eva nirhetukaṃ kāryatvaṃ
sambhavatīti² /

12b. svayaṃ kāryaṃ na jāyate /³

yata evaṃ⁴ cāsyā nirhetukaṃ kāryatvaṃ na sambhavati /

12cd. rūpādibhyaḥ prthak⁵ kaścid ghaṭas tasmān na vidyate /
rūpādivyatirekeṇa kāryabhūtasya ghaṭasyānupalabhyamā-
natvād nāsti rūpādivyatirikto ghaṭa iti siddham /

atha manyase naiva hi rūpādyupādāno ghaṭaḥ kim tarhi
svāvayavāni kapālāni kāraṇāny apeksya ghaṭasya kāryatvaṃ
kapālānāṃ ca kāraṇatvam iti etad apy ayuktam⁶ ity udbhāv-
ayann⁷ āha

13. ghaṭaḥ kāraṇataḥ siddhiḥ siddhaṃ kāraṇam anyataḥ /
siddhir yasya svato nāsti tad anyad janayet katham //

¹ HPS //.

² Tib. rgyu dang bral ba la ni rang nyid la rgyu med pa can
gyi 'bras bu nyid med pas (= Skrt. kāraṇarahitasya svata
eva nirhetukaḥ kāryatvābhāvād).

³ HPS //.

⁴ Tib. de ltar (= Skrt. evam). HPS eva.

⁵ Tib. gzhan (= Skrt. anyat).

⁶ Tib. snying po med (= Skrt. asāram)

⁷ Tib. has nothing to correspond to udbhāvayan.

D f.215a
C f.212a

gal te bum pa'i rgyu gyo*mo la¹brten nas¹ bum
pa² 'grub na de'i tshe gyo mo rnams gang la bltos³
nas 'grub /⁴ re zhig de rnams ngo bo nyid kyis
'grub pa ni ma yin te rgyu med pa can nyid du thal
bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //

P f.244a

ci ste de rnams la yang rgyu gzhan⁵ zhig 'dod
na / 'o na ni gyo mo*rnams la rang gi ngo bo grub
pa med de de rnams kyang rgyu gzhan⁶ gseg ma la
bltos⁷ pa'i phyir ro // gyo mo gang dag la rang
nyid las⁸ grub pa yod pa ma yin pa de rnams kyis

N f.237b

ni ji ltar gzhan rang gi ngo bos grub par* 'gyur /
de'i phyir yang⁹ bum pa med do // bum pa 'gog par
byed pa'i tshul gang yin pa 'di¹⁰ nyid ni 'bras bu¹¹
thams cad mi 'grub pa la yang sbyar¹² bar bya'o //

¹ NP, CD rten nas.

² DNP, C adds another bum pa.

³ NP, CD ltos.

⁴ CDP, N //.

⁵ NP, CD gang.

⁶ NP, CD omit gzhan.

⁷ NP, CD ltos.

⁸ NP, CD la.

⁹ NP, CD omit yang.

¹⁰ CD, NP omit 'di.

¹¹ CDP, N bus.

¹² CDP, N sbyor.

yadi ghaṭakāraṇāni kapālāni pratītya ghaṭaḥ sidhyati
tānīdānīm¹ kapālāni kim apeksya sidhyanti / na hi tāvat
tāni svabhāvasiddhāni nirhetuka < tva >²prasaṅgāt /

atha teṣām apy anyat kāraṇam iṣyate na tarhi kapālā-
nām svarūpasiddhir asti teṣām api kāraṇāntaraśarkarikāp-
eksatvāt / yeṣām ca kapālānām svataḥ siddhir na bhavati
kathaṁ tāny anyat svarūpataḥ sādhayiṣyanti ity ato 'py
asan ghaṭaḥ / < yo >³ ghaṭapratīṣedhako vidhir eṣa eva
sarvakāryānām asiddhau⁴ yojyah /

¹ Tib. de'i tshe (= Skrt. tadā).

² Tib. nyid; HPS adds tva.

³ Tib. gang (= Skrt. yah). HPS yataś cāyam.

⁴ Tib. adds yang (= Skrt. api).

'dir smras pa / gzugs la sogs pa tshogs pa
 rnams la bum par brjod pa'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa
 mang po nyid¹ yin yang bum pa¹ mang po nyid du thal
 bar mi 'gyur ro // 'di yang mi rigs te / tshogs
 pa nyid med pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar /²

14. 'phrod pa 'dus par gyur kyang gzugs //
 dri nyid du ni mi 'thad de //
 des na bum pa bzhin tshogs pa //
 gcig nyid du ni mi rigs so //

gzugs la sogs pa rnams tshogs kyang tshogs pa
 la gnas pa rnams kyis³ rang gi mtshan nyid mi 'dor
 ro // de'i phyir ji ltar tshogs pa'i gnas skabs
 na gzugs la rang gi ngo bos yongs su btang ba las
 dri nyid mi srid pa de bzhin du du ma'i rten⁴ can
 gyi tshogs pa la gcig nyid mi srid do // tshogs pa
 de ni gzugs la sogs pa rnams las tha mi dad la
 gzugs la sogs pa de rnams kyang phan tshun du tha
 dad na gzugs la sogs pa rnams las tha mi dad pa'i
 tshogs pa gcig tu ji ltar 'gyur /⁵ dpe bshad pa ni
 bum pa bzhin zhes bya ba ste / ji ltar /⁶

¹ CDN, P omits.

² NP, CD omit /.

³ CD, NP kyi.

⁴ CD, NP brten.

⁵ CD, NP omit /.

⁶ CD, NP omit /.

atrāha / samuditānām rūpādīnām ghaṭābhidhānān na
rūpādibahutve 'pi ghaṭabahutvaprasaṅga iti / tad apy
ayuktaṁ samūhasyaiva asatvāt </>¹tathā hi//²

¶4.samavāye 'pi rūpasya gandhatvaṁ nopapadyate /
samūhasyaikatā tena ghaṭasyeva na yujyate //

samuditā api rūpādyo na samudāyāvasthāḥ svaṁ svaṁ
lakṣaṇaṁ vijahati </>³ tataś ca / yathā /⁴ samudāyāva-
asthāyaṁ rūpasya svarūpāparityāgād gandhatvaṁ na sambhavati
//⁵ evaṁ anekāśrayasya samūhasyaikatvaṁ na sambhāvyate /
sa hi samudāyo rūpādibhyo na vyatiriktaś te ca rūpādayaḥ
parasparato bhidyante </>⁶rūpādibhyoś cāvyatiriktasamudāyaḥ
katham ekaḥ syāt / dr̥ṣṭāntam āha ghaṭasyeveveti yathā

¹ HPS lacks /. .

² HPS //. .

³ HPS lacks /. .

⁴ Tib. ji ltar; HPS lacks it.

⁵ HPS /. .

⁶ HPS lacks /. .

mtshan nyid rnams dang so so ni //
 min phyir bum pa gcig ma yin //
 zhes bya ba la sogs pa bshad pa de bzhin du 'dir
 yang /

mtshan nyid rnams dang so so ni //
 min phyir tshogs la gcig med do //
 de ltar na /

des na bum pa bzhin tshogs pa //
 gcig nyid du ni mi rigs so //

P f.244b
 C f.212b
 D f.215b

de'i* phyir¹ tshogs pa mi srid pas gzugs la*
 sogs pa*² tshogs pa² la yang bum pa brtags³ par mi
 rigs so // ji s'ad du⁴ bshad pa'i rnam par dpyad
 pas /

15. ji ltar gzugs sogs ma gtogs par //
 bum pa yod pa ma yin pa //
 de bzhin rlung la sogs pa ni //
 ma gtogs gzugs kyang yod ma yin⁵ //

¹ CD, NP omit phyir.

² NP, CD omit tshogs pa.

³ NP, CD brtag.

⁴ CD, NP omit du.

⁵ Cf. MA, p.224: gzugs la sogs pa ma gtogs par /
 ji ltar bum pa yod min ltar / de bzhin rlung sogs
 ma gtogs par / gzugs kyang yod pa ma yin no /.

ghaṭasya na bhavaty aikyam¹ apr̥thaktvād dhi lakṣaṇair¹
ityādy uktam / tatthehāpi²

samūhasyāsti naikatvam³ apr̥thaktvād dhi lakṣaṇaiḥ³ /
ity⁴ evaṁ

samūhasyaikatā tena ghaṭasyeva na yujyate /
tataś ca⁵ samūhasyāsambhavād rūpādisamūhe 'pi ghaṭa-
kalpanā na yuktā < / >⁶ yathopavarnitena ca⁷ vicāreṇa /
(5. rūpādivyatirekeṇa yathā kumbho na vidyate /
vāyvādivyatirekeṇa tathā rūpaṁ na vidyate //

¹ Tib. mtshan nyid rnams dang so so ni min phyir (= Skrt. apr̥thaktvāddhi lakṣaṇaiḥ). HPS apr̥thaktvāt vilakṣaṇair . Cf. CŚ 14:7.

² Tib. de bzhin du 'dir api (= Skrt. tatthehāpi). HPS ta-vehāpi.

³ Tib. mtshan nyid rnams dang so so ni min phyir (= Skrt. apr̥thaktvāddhi lakṣaṇaiḥ). HPS apr̥thaktvādilakṣaṇaiḥ.

⁴ Tib. omits zhes bya ba (= Skrt. iti).

⁵ Tib. omits yang (= Skrt. ca).

⁶ HPS lacks /.

⁷ Tib, omits yang (= Skrt. ca).

N f.238a

ji* ltar gzugs la sogs pa ma gtogs par bum pa
 ma grub pa de bzhin du bum pa btags¹ pa'i nye bar
 len par gyur pa gzugs la sogs pa rnams kyang rlung
 la sogs pa 'byung ba chen po bzhi ni² ma gtogs³ par
 mi 'grub ste / rgyu med pa can nyid du thal bar
 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // yang ji ltar rlung la sogs
 pa ma gtogs par gzugs dang dri la sogs pa mi srid
 de bzhin du 'byung ba chen po rnams kyang phan tshun
 ma gtogs par⁴ 'grub pa med pas rang gi ngo bos ma
⁵grub par⁵ brjod pa'i phyir bshad pa /

(6. tsha ba me nyid du 'gyur te //

tsha ba min pa ji ltar sreg //

des na bud shing zhes bya ba //

yod min de med me yod min //

'di ni me ni sregs pa po yin la 'byung ba gsum
 ni bsreg par bya'o // de'i phyir bud shing zhes bya
 ba 'byung ba chen po⁶ gsum po de me kho nas bsreg
 gi gzhan gyis ni ma yin la bud shing kho na tshig
 par 'gyur gyi gzhan ni ma yin no //

¹ NP, CD btogs.

² CD, NP omit ni.

³ CDP, N gdogs.

⁴ NP, CD bar.

⁵ NP, CD gru bar.

⁶ CDP, N por.

rūpādivyatiṛekeṇa yathā kumbho na siddhir evaṁ kumbhaprajñā¹ upādānā api rūpādayo vāyvādimahābhūtacatuṣṭayavyatiṛekeṇa na yujyante¹ nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt / yathā ca vāyvādivyatiṛekeṇa rūpagandhāder asambhavaḥ / evaṁ mahābhūtānāṁ² anyonyavyatiṛekeṇa siddhyabhāvād³ rūpādisiddhyabhāvam³ udbhāvayann āha⁴ //

16. agnir eva bhavaty uṣṇam anuṣṇam dahyate katham /
nāsti tenendhanam nāna tadṛte 'gnir na vidyate //
ihā⁵gnir dagdhā bhūtatrayaṁ dāhyam </>⁶ tad etad indhanākhyam bhūta⁷trayaṁ agnir eva dahati nānyaḥ /

¹ Tib. 'grub (= Skrt. siddhyante).

² Tib. adds kyang (= Skrt. api).

³ Tib. rang gi ngo bos ma grub par (= Skrt svarūpasiddhyabhāvam).

⁴ HPS //.

⁵ All four editions of the Tibetan read 'di ni which is perhaps an old copyist's error for 'di na (= Skrt. iha).

⁶ HPS lacks /.

⁷ Tib. 'byung ba chen po (= Skrt. mahābhūta).

de la gal te bud shing tsha ba ¹mes bsregs¹ na ni
 de'i tshe tsha ba de me kho nar 'gyur gyi bud shing
 ni ma yin no // tsha ba ma yin pa la yang sreg pa
 mi srid pas tsha ba ma yin pa yang bud shing ma yin
 no // de'i phyir de ltar rnam pa thams cad du
 bsreg par bya ba mi srid pas gang zhig 'byung ba
 gsum gyi bdag nyid can du gyur pa bud shing zhes bya
 ba med do // gang gi tshe de ltar me ma gtogs par
 bud shing zhes bya* ba gzhan mi srid pa de'i tshe
 bud shing ²med dang² rgyu med pa'i me yang mi srid
 pas de med me yod ma yin no //

P f.245a

'dir smras pa /³ bud shing ni sra ba la sogs
 pa'i ngo bo yin pas tsha ba yin pa'i bdag nyid can
 zhig ste / de tsha ba'i rang bzhin gyi mes zil
 gyis mnan pa las tsha bar* 'gyur la / tsha ba yin
 dang bsreg par bya bar 'gyur ro⁴ zhe na / de ltar
 yongs su brtags na yang bud shing zhes bya ba'i don
 de /*

D f.216a

C f.213a

f7ab. gal te zil mnan tsha na yang //

N f.238b

de yang ci ste mer* mi 'gyur //

¹ CD, NP ches sreg.

² CD, NP me dang.

³ CDP, N omits /.

⁴ CD, NP //.

indhanam eva ca dahyate nānyat / tatrendhanam yady ag-
 nir uṣṇam api dahati tadāgnir eva tad uṣṇam bhavati nendha-
 nam / anuṣṇasyāpi dāhāsambhavād anuṣṇam api nendhanam /
 tad evam sarvathāpi dāhyasyāsambhavān nāsti¹ndhanam
 nāma yad bhūtatrāyātmakam syāt / yadā caivam agnivyati-
 rekenendhanam² nāparam sambhavati tadenndhanābhāve nir-
 hetuko 'py agnir na sambhavatīti tad rte 'gnir na vidya-
 te /

atrāha / anuṣṇātmakam evendhanam kāṭhinyādirūpa-
 tvāt / tac coṣṇasvabhāvenāgninābhibhāvād uṣṇam bhavati /
 uṣṇam ca³ dāhyam bhavati³ti / evam api kalpyamāne indha-
 nākhyo arthah⁴ /⁵

[7ab. abhibhūto 'pi yady uṣṇah so 'py agnih kim na jayate/

¹ HPS adds tena, but Tib. has nothing which corresponds.

² Tib. adds zhes bya ba (= Skrt. nāma).

³ Tib. bsreg par bya ba 'gyur (= Skrt. dāhyam bhavati).

HPS sad dahyate.

⁴ Tib. adds de (= Skrt. sah).

⁵ HPS //.

gal te bud shing zhes bya ba'i¹ don tsha ba
²ma yin pa'i rang bzhin yin yang² /³ mes zil
 gyis⁴ nman te tsha bar 'gyur ro snyam rtog na /⁵
 de yang⁶ me kho nar 'gyur te tsha ba'i rang bzhin
 yin pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir bud shing med pa
 nyid du 'gyur ro //

17cd. 'o na te~~me~~⁷ tsha dngos gzhan //

me la yod ces byar mi rung //

ci ste don de zil gyis nman yang tsha ba ma
 yin pa nyid du 'dod na / 'o na ni me las gzhan
 pa'i dngos po bud shing zhes bya ba⁸ 'byung ba gsum
 po tsha ba dang 'gal bas tsha ba ma yin pa'i rang
 bzhin can de /⁹ me la yod do¹⁰ zhes bya bar mi rigs
 so // de'i phyir 'byung ba gsum dang bral ba'i me
 tsam zhig tu 'gyur na / 'byung ba chen po 'di rnams
 la ni phan tshun med par 'byung ba yod pa ma yin pa
 de'i grub pa'i mtha' dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro //

¹ CD, NP add //.

² NP, CD tsha ba'i rang bzhin ma yin pa yang.

³ NP, CD omit /.

⁴ CDN, P gyi.

⁵ CPN, D omits /.

⁶ CD, NP 'ang.

⁷ All four editions have mi as does Vaidya's edition; Bhattacarya's editions has the correct reading me.

⁸ NP, CD add yang.

⁹ CD, NP omit /.

¹⁰ CDP, N da.

yady agninābhibhūta indhanākhyo 'rtho 'nuṣṇasvabhā-
 vo 'py uṣṇo bhavatīti kalpyate / so 'py agnir astu¹
 uṣnarūpatvāt / tataś ca sa² evendhanābhāvaḥ /
 athā³ <nuṣṇaḥ paro>³ 'py agnau bhāvo 'stīti na yujyate//
 athābhibhūto 'py asāv artho 'nuṣṇa evesyate / sa⁴
 tarhy agneḥ paro 'pi bhāva indhanākhyāṁ bhūtatrāyaṁ uṣṇa-
 viruddhatvād anuṣṇasvabhāvaṁ agnāv astīti na yujyate /
 tataś ca bhūtatrāyarahitam agnimatram eva⁵ syāt / ⁶na
 caisāṁ mahābhūtānāṁ anyonyaṁ vinā bhāvaḥ / yadi syāt
 siddhāntavirodhaś ca syāt⁶ /

¹ Tib. 'gyur (= Skrt. bhavati).

² Tib. omits de (= Skrt. saḥ).

³ HPS anuṣṇaparo.

⁴ Tib. omits de (= Skrt. saḥ).

⁵ Tib. omits kho na (= Skrt. eva).

⁶ Tib. 'byung ba chen po 'di rnams la ni phan tshun med
 par 'byung ba yod pa ma yin pa de'i grub pa'i mtha' dang
 'gal ba'i phyir ro // (= Skrt. na caisāṁ mahābhūtānāṁ
 anyonyaṁ vinā bhāvas tasya siddhāntavirodhāt).

me la bud shing zhes bya ba'i dngos po gzhan med
 pas me¹ rgyu med pa can nyid du yang 'gyur bas 'di
 ni mi rigs so //

ci ste me'i rdzas kyi rdul phra rab la² 'byung
 ba gsum med pas bud shing med par yang me yod pa
 nyid do³ snyam sems na bshad par bya ste /

l~~ab~~gal te rdul la shing med na //

des na shing med me yod do //

P f.245b

de'i phyir rgyu med pa can nyid kyi* skyon du
 thal ba de nyid kyi don du 'gyur ro // rgyu med pa
 nyid du thal ba'i skyon de nyid kyi phyir bye brag
 pa dag ltar rang gi sde pa rnams kyi rdzas kyi rdul
 phra rab khas blang bar mi rigs so // bye brag ba'i
 rdul phra rab du smra ba na rab tu byed pa dgu pa
 nyid las bkag pa'i phyir yang mi dgag go //

ci ste me rgyu med pa can nyid du thal bar⁴
 'jigs nas rdul phra rab la bud shing yod par rtog
 na / de'i phyir /

l~~ed~~gal te de la 'ang shing yod na //

gcig gi bdag can rdul yod min //

¹ CD, NP omit me.

² NP, CD las.

³ CD, NP add //.

⁴ CDP, N bas.

agnau cāparasya padārthasyendhanākhyasyābhāvān nirhetu-
katvañ cāgneḥ syād ity ayuktaṁ etat /

atha manyase tejodravycoparamānau bhūtatrasyābhā-
vād vināpīndhanenāsty evāgnir iti / ucyate¹

18ab. indhanaṁ yady anor nāsti tenāsty agnir indhanaḥ²

tataś ca sa eva³ nirhetukadoṣa <prasaṅgaḥ>⁴ / ata
eva cāhetukadoṣaprasaṅgād vaiśeṣikāṇāṁ iva svayūthyānām
ayukto dravyaparamāṇvabhyupag⁵maḥ / vaiśeṣikaparamāṇu-
vādaś ca navama eva prakaraṇe nisiddhatvān na punar ni-
śidhyate <11>⁵

<atha>⁶ agner ahetukatvaprasaṅgabhītyānāv indhana-
svabhāvaḥ⁷ parikalpyeta /⁸

18cd. anur ekātmako nāsti syāt tasyāpīndhanaṁ yadi <11>⁹

¹ HPS //.

² HPS //.

³ Tib. adds don du (= Skrt. arthe).

⁴ Tib. thal ba (= Skrt. prasaṅgaḥ). HPS omits it.

⁵ HPS lacks /.

⁶ Tib ci ste (= Skrt. atha). HPS yathā.

⁷ Tib yod pa (= Skrt. bhāvaḥ).

⁸ Tib. adds de'i phyir (= Skrt. tatas).

⁹ HPS /.

D f.216b

N f.239a

C f.213b

gal te rdul bud shing yod do zhes ¹bya bar¹
 rtog na / 'o na ni me'i rdzas kyi rdul phra rab
 gcig gi ngo bor* yod do zhes khas blang bar mi
 bya'o // rdzas brgyad lhan cig 'byung bar nges pa
 rdul phra rab gcig gi bdag nyid med pa* 'ba'* zhig
 tu ma zad kyi 'on kyang de las gzhan pa'i dngos po
 yang ste /

19ab.dngos po gang yang yongs btags pa //

de yang de la gcig nyid med //

ji ltar de las gzhan² yod pas 'byung ba chen
 po rnams la gcig gi bdag nyid can yod pa ma yin pa
 de bzhin du rgyu med pa can nyid du thal bar 'gyur
 bas 'byung ba las gyur pa yang 'byung ba rnams med
 par rkyang ba med do // de bzhin du sems med par
 sems las byung ba rnams mi srid la / sems las byung
 ba rnams med par yang³ sems ma yin no // de bzhin
 du skye ba la sogs pa mtshan nyid rnams med par
 mtshan gzhi gzugs la sogs pa yod pa ma yin la /
 mtshan gzhi med par yang rten med pa'i mtshan nyid
 mi srid do // gang gi phyir de ltar dngos po gcig
 po 'ga' la yang grub pa yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe
 gcig rnams kyi tshogs med na du ma grub pa rgyun
 ring du spangs pa nyid do⁴ zhes bshad pa /

¹ CD, NP omit bya bar.

² NP, CD add la.

³ CD, NP omit yang.

⁴ CD, NP add //.

yady anor indhanam astīti kalpyate na tarhi tejo-
dravyaparamānur ekarūpo 'stīty abhyupeyam / na ca keva-
laṁ paramānor evaikātmakasyābhāvāḥ / aṣṭānāṁ dravyānāṁ
sahotpādaniyamād api khalu tad anyasyāpi padārthasya [/]¹

|| ab. tasya tasyaikatā nāsti yo yo bhāvāḥ parīkṣyate /
yathā bhūtānām² ekātmakaṁ nāsti³ taditarasadbhāvād³
evaṁ bhautikam api kevalaṁ nāsti bhūtair vinā ahetuka-
tvaprasaṅgāt / evaṁ cittena vinā caittāna sambhavanti /
nāpi caittair vinā cittam / tathā lakṣaṇair jātyādibhir
vinā lakṣyaṁ rūpādikam nāsti [/]⁴ nāpi lakṣyena vinā niraśra-
yaṁ lakṣaṇam sambhavati / yataś caivam ekasya padārtha-
sya kasyacit siddhir nāsti tadaikakānāṁ samudāyābhāve
sati anekasiddhir api dūrotsāritevety āha [/]⁵

¹ HPS //.

² Tib. 'bgyung ba chen po rnams (= Skrt, mahābhūtānām).

³ Tib. de las gzhan yod pas (= Skrt. taditarabhāvāt).

HPS taditarasminn itarasadbhāvāt).

⁴ HPS lacks /.

⁵ HPS //.

p f.246a

19cd. gang gis gcig kyang yod min* pa //

des na du ma dag kyang med //

re re ma grub pa yin dang tshogs pa rnams
kyang grub pa med do //ci ste lhan cig 'byung bar nges par khas blangs
pas sun dbyung ba 'di rang gi sde pa la 'thad kyi
pha rol po la ni ma yin te / sa la sogs pa'i rdul
phra rab de las gzhan pa'i dngos po la yod pa dang
bral ba rtag¹ pa rnams yod pa nyid du khas blangs
pa'i phyir ro snyam na / de la yang mir rigs pa
nyid du brjod pa'i phyir bshad na /

20ab. gal te gang na dngos de rnams //

med der gcig yod ces 'dod na //

de yang dag pa ma yin no // ci'i phyir zhe na /

20cd. gang gis kun la gsum nyid yod //

des na gcig nyid yod ma yin //

pha rol po la yang gcig ces bya ba'i dngos po
'ga' yang yod pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir de la
yang sa'i rdul phra rab rdzas nyid dang gcig nyid
dang yod pa nyid ces* bya ba de gsum yod la / de
bzhin du yon tan la yon tan nyid dang yod pa nyid
dang* gcig pa nyid ces bya ba yod do // gang gi
phyir ²gsum yod pa² de'i phyir gcig ces bya ba
dngos po 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no //

N f.239b

D f.217a

¹ NP, CD brtag.² CD, NP du ma yin pa.

19cd. na santi tenāneke 'pi yenaiko 'pi na vidyate //
ekasyāpy <a> siddhau¹ satyāṃ samuditānām api nāsti siddhiḥ /

atha syāt svayūthyāṃ praty evaitad dūṣaṇam upapadyate
sahotpādniyamābhyupagamāt </>² param prati tu³ nedaṃ dūṣaṇam³
nityānām prthivyādiparamānūṃ taditarabhāvasadbhāvaviyuktānām
astitvenābhyupagamāt </>⁴ iti / 5 tatrāpy ayuktām udbhā-
vyann āha </>⁶

20ab. bhāvās trayo na santy anye tatraiko 'stīti
cen matam /

etad apy asamyak / kiṃ kāraṇam </>⁷

20cd. tritvaṃ ye nāsti sarvatra tenaikatvaṃ na
vidyate //

parasyāpi hi na kaścid eko nāmo padārtho 'sti / yasmāt
tatrāpi prthivīparamāṇu dravyatvam ekatvaṃ sattvaṃ ekatvaṃ⁸
ceti </> yasmāt tritayam asti tasmān na kaścid eko nāma padār-
tho 'sti /

¹ Tib. ma grub pa (= Skrt. asiddhiḥ). HPS siddhau.

² HPS lacks /.

³ Tib. has nothing to correspond to idaṃ dūṣaṇam.

⁴ HPS /.

⁵ HPS lacks /.

⁶ HPS //.

⁷ HPS //.

⁸ HPS lacks /.

C f.214a

de bzhin du* grangs can la yang thams cad yon tan
 gsum gyi bdag nyid can yin pa'i phyir gcig gi
 dngos po 'ga' yang med pas ¹'ga' yang¹ bshad zin
 pa'i sun 'byin pa las mi 'da'o //

gzhan yang sun 'byin pa'i tshul 'di mkhas pas
 rgol ba thams cad kyi phyogs bas la bar bya ba'i
 phyir sbyar bya'o zhes bslab pa'i phyir slob dpon
 gyis bshad pa /

2|. yod dang med dang yod med dang //²

yod med min zhes bya ba'i tshul //

'di ni mkhas pas gcig nyid sogs //³

dag la rtag tu sbyar bar bya //

gcig nyid la sogs pa dag ni⁴ gcig nyid dang⁵

gzhan nyid dang⁶ gnyi ga dang⁷ gnyi ga ma yin pa

P f.246b

zhes* bya ba ste /

¹ CD, NP omit 'ga' yang.

² CDP, N /.

³ CDP, N /.

⁴ CD, NP have nyid and add dang.

⁵ NP, CD /.

⁶ NP, CD /.

⁷ NP, CD /.

tathā sāṅkhasya¹ triguṇātmakam sarvam ity ekaḥ kaścit
padārtho² nāstīti na kaścid uktaṁ dūṣaṇam < a > tivartate³ /

api cāyaṁ dūṣaṇamārgaḥ sarveṣāṁ eva vādināṁ pakṣa-
nirākaraṇāya viduṣā prayoktavya iti śikṣayann ācārya
āha [/]⁴

21. sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah /
esa prayojyo vidvabhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśah //
ekatvam anyatvam ubhayaṁ nobhayaṁ ity ekatvādayah /

¹ Tib. adds yang (= Skrt. api).

² Tib. adds yang (= Skrt. api).

³ Tib. 'da'o. (= Skrt. ativartate). HPS iti varttate.

⁴ HPS // .

blo bzang pos rgol ba rnams gyi gcig nyid la sogs
 pa'i phyogs rnam par gnas pa de dag la ¹go rim¹
²ji ltar² de³ bzhin du yod pa dang med pa nyid la
 sogs pa mtshon pa'i sun 'byin pa'i⁴ tshul gzhug⁵
 par bya'o // de la 'bras bu yod par smra ba'i
 phyogs ni rgyu dang 'bras bu gnyis gcig pa nyid
 ces bya ba ste / de'i ltar na 'bras bu de'i rgyu
 bdag nyid du rnam par gnas pa nyid du gyur pa 'bras
 bu'i bdag nyid yongs su 'gyur ba ste med pa ni bya
 bar mi nus so // gal te 'byung na ni de'i tshe
 thams cad las thams cad 'byung bar 'gyur na / thams
 cad las thams cad 'byung bar mthong ba yod ma yin
 te / 'o ma la sogs pa kho na las zho la sogs pa
 so so nges par mthong ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir
 rgol ba de'i ltar na rgyu dang 'bras bu dag gcig
 nyid du khas blangs bas 'bras bu yod pa nyid du
 skye ste / de ltar na gcig nyid phyogs so // gcig
 nyid kyi phyogs de la 'bras bu yod par smra ba
 dpyad pa'i sgo nas sun 'byin* pa rtag tu brjod par
 bya ste / de yang /⁶

N f.240a

¹ NP, CD rims.

² CD, NP ji lta ba.

³ CDP, N omits de.

⁴ NP, CD adds phyogs.

⁵ CD, NP gzhig.

⁶ CD, NP omit /.

etesv ekatvādisu pakṣeṣu vadinā vyavasthiteṣu sadasat-
 tvādyupalakṣito dūṣaṇakramah <su>dhiyā¹ yathākramam
 avatāryah / tatra satkāryavādinah kāryakāraṇayor eka-
 tvam iti pakṣah / tasya² hi kāraṇātmanā tat kāryam vy-
 avasthitam eva satkāryātmanā vipariṇamate / na hy asat
 śakyaṁ kartum / yadi hy asann³ utpadyeta tadā sarvataḥ
 sarvasambhavaḥ syān na ca sarvataḥ sarvasambhavo dr̥ṣṭah
 ksīrader eva pratiniyatadadhyādidaśanāt / tad asya vā-
 dinah⁴ kāryakāraṇayor ekatvābhyupagamāt sad eva kāryam
 utpadyata iti evam ekatvapakṣah / tasminn ekatvapakṣe
 satkāryavāda⁵ paramarśena⁵ nityaṁ dūṣaṇam abhidheyam /
 taccoktah⁶ /

¹ Tib. blo bzang pos (= Skrt. sudhiyā). HPS svadhiyā.

² Tib. adds ltar na (= Skrt. darśane).

³ Tib. has nothing to correspond to asan.

⁴ Tib. adds ltar na (= Skrt. darśane).

⁵ Tib. dbang ba'i sgo nas (= Skrt. adhikāradvārā).

⁶ Tib. de yang (= Skrt. tac ca).

'bras bu yod nyid gang 'dod la //

khyim gyi don du kha ba la //¹

sogs pa'i rgyan ni don med 'gyur //²

zhes bya ba 'dis bshad la / de bzhin du /

gang zhig* 'byung bar byed pa de //

sngar yod* ces byar mi rigs te //³

gal te yod pa skye 'gyur na //

skye zin pa 'ang 'byung bar 'gyur //

gal te byas pa med kyang chos //

yod na nges sdom med 'gyur //

ci ste cung zad byed na yang //

'bras bu yod pa mi srid do //

zhes bshad do // de ltar mkhas pa rnams kyis 'bras

bu yod par smra bas nye bar mtshon pa'i sun 'byin

pa gcig nyid kyi phyogs la sbyar bar bya'o //

'bras bu med par smra ba ni rgyu dang 'bras bu

dgag⁴ gzhan* nyid du smra ba dag go //

D f.217b

C f.214b

P f.247a

¹ CD, NP /.

² CDP, N /.

³ CDP, N /.

⁴ CDP, N dag.

stambhādīnām alaṅkāro gr̥hasyārthe nirarthakah /
 satkāryam eva yasyestam
 ityanena¹ / tathā /

sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so 'stīti na yujyate /
 sato yadi bhaved janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ //

dharmo yady akṛto 'py asti niyamo jāyate vr̥thā /
 atha ²<svalpo 'pi kartavyaḥ satkāryasya na sambhavati // >²

¹ Tib. adds bshad (= Skrt. uktah).

² cś 11:10 b.

de dag gis ni yod pa¹ skye ba don med par sems shing
 'bras bu med pa kho na skye'o zhes rtogs te / de
 dag gi gzhan nyid kyi phyogs la yang 'bras bu med
 pas nye bar mtshon² pa'i sun 'byin par brjod par
 bya'o // de yang /³

'bras bu med⁴ nyid dang 'dod la //

khyim gyi don du kha ba la //⁵

sogs pa'i rgyan ni don med 'gyur //⁶

zhes bshad do //

gang dag rgyu dang 'bras bu gnyis gcig nyid du
 'gyur la gzhan nyid du yang 'gyur ro snyam du rtogs⁷
 pa de dag ni 'bras bu yod pa dang med par smra'o //
 de dag ni lhas sbyin srog gi bdag nyid du rnam par
 gnas shing lhas sbyin gyi bdag nyid du rnam par mi
 gnas par skye bar 'dod la / de bzhin du gdu⁸ bu
 dang dpung rgyan la sogs pa gser gyi bdag nyid du
 rnam par gnas shing gdu bu dang dpung rgyan la sogs
 pa bdag nyid du rnam par mi gnas pa rnams skye bar
 rtogs so //

¹ NP, CD ba.

² Bhattacharya's edition has mtshan.

³ CD, NP omit /.

⁴ DNP, C has pad with an m written under the p.

⁵ CD, NP omit //.

⁶ CD, NP /.

⁷ CD, NP rtog.

⁸ Bhattacharya's edition has gang.

\leftarrow^1 stambhādīnām alaṅkāro grhasyārthe nirarthakah /
 yasyāsatkāryam eva ca \rightarrow^1

¹ CS 11: 15 abd.

N f.240b

de dag gi gcig nyid dang gzhan nyid gnyi ga'i
 phyogs la 'bras bu yod pa dang med pa smra ba
 dgag pas nye bar mtshon pa'i sun 'byin pa brjod
 par bya 'o // * de yang /¹ 'bras bu yod nyid gang
 'dod dang² zhes pa la sogs pas bshad de / rgol ba
 gnyis kyi³ skyon gyi phyogs³ gcig la sbyar bar bya
 ba 'di ni khyad par ro //

D f.218a

C f.215a

gang dag gi ltar na bum pa la sogs pa'i dngos
 po med par rang gi rgyu dag las gcig nyid dang
 gzhan nyid du brjod du med pa dang dngos po rdzas
 su yod pa'i rgyu can yin pa de dag la yod pa dang
 med par smra ba bzlog pa'i sgo nas yod pa yang ma
 yin pa* med pa yang ma yin pa zhes bya ba⁴ dpyad
 pas⁵ * sun 'byin pa brjod par bya'o // de yang⁶
 gnyi ga srid pa na ni de dag bkag pa'i sgo nas gnyi
 ga ma yin pa zhes bya bar 'gyur na / gang gi tshe
 'di gnyi ga mi srid pa de'i tshe gang bkag⁷ * pas
 gnyis ma yin par rtogs⁸ par 'gyur zhes don gyis
 bshad zin pa nyid do //

P f.247b

¹ CD, NP omit /.

² NP, CD add //.

³ CD, NP phyogs kyi skyon phyogs.

⁴ CDN, P omits ba.

⁵ CD, NP bar.

⁶ NP, CD add smra ba.

⁷ CDN, P 'gag.

⁸ CD, NP rtog.

de ltar na go rim¹ ji lta ba' bzhin du /

yod dang med dang yod med pa //

yod med min zhes bya ba'i tshul //

'di ni mkhas pas gcig nyid sogs //

dag la rtag tu sbyar bar bya //

gzhan dag ni gal te gcig nyid dang gzhan nyid
la sogs pa'i tshul kho nas dngos po rnams bkag gam
'on te tshul gzhan gyis kyang yin zhe na / brjod
par bya ste /

yod dang med dang yod med pa //

yod med min zhes bya ba'i tshul //

'di ni mkhas pas gcig nyid sogs //

dag la rtag tu sbyar bar bya //

yod pa med pa dang / yod kyang yod la med kyang
med pa dang / yod pa yang ma yin med pa yang ma
yin pa zhes bya ba'i tshul 'di ni mkhas pa rnams
kyis² gcig nyid la sogs pa phyogs bzhi la rtag tu³
kho na sbyar bar bya'o //

de la yod pa zhes bya ba ni bdog⁴ pa zhes bya
ba'i don to // med pa zhes bya ba ba ni bdog pa
ma yin pa zhes bya ba'i don to // yod kyang yod la
med kyang med⁵ ces bya ba ni bdog kyang bdog mi
bdog kyang mi bdog ces bya ba'i don to //

¹ NP, CD rims.

² DNP, C illegible.

³ NP, CD add de.

⁴ Bhattacharya's edition has bdag.

⁵ NP, CD add //.

¹ sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah /
 esa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśah //

sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah /
 esa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśah // ¹

¹ CS 14:21.

N f.241a

yod pa yang ma yin pa med pa yang* ma yin zhes bya
 ba ni bdog pa yang ma yin mi bdog pa yang ma yin
 zhes bya ba'i don to // gcig nyid¹ la sogs pa dag¹
 zhes bya ba ni² gcig nyid dang gzhan nyid dang gnyi
 ga dang gnyi ga ma yin pa zhes bya'o //

de la gnyis sam mang po rnams la gcig nyid dang
 gzhan nyid dang / gnyi ga dang gnyi ga ma yin pa
 zhi tu 'gyur grang na / de la gang dag gi³ snam bu
 dang dkar po gcig nyid ces bya ba phyogs yin pa de
 la yod pa zhes bya ba'i tshul 'di yul dang dus dang
 mtshan nyid las⁴ sbyar bar bya'o //

P f.248a

D f.218b

C f.215b

de la re zhig yul las ni gal te snam bu dang
 dkar po dag gcig nyid* yin na / gang dang gang na
 dkar po yod pa de dang de na snam* bu yang yod par
 'gyur bar* bya dgos so // gang dang gang na snam
 bu yod pa de dang de na dkar po yang⁵ yod par 'gyur
 bar bya dgos so //

ci ste gang dang gang na dkar po yod pa de dang
 de na snam bu yod par mi 'gyur zhing / gang dang
 gang na snam bu yod pa de dang de na dkar po yod
 par mi 'gyur na ni / de la⁶ snam bu dang dkar po
 dag gcig nyid yin no zhes gang 'dod pa de mi 'thad de /

¹ CD, NP sogs dag la.

² CDN, P adds /.

³ NP, CD add ltar na.

⁴ NP, CD la.

⁵ CD, NP 'ang.

⁶ CDP, N na.

yul tha dad pa'i phyir ro //

dus las kyang ste / de la dus ni rnam pa
gsum ste / 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa dang da ltar
ro // de la 'das pa la ni 'das pa'i gnas skabs
kho nar sngar skyes pa'i dkar po mthong ngo //
gal te snam bu dang dkar po dang gcig nyid yin na
ni¹ de'i tshe gal te dkar po sngar skyes na ni
snam bu yang sngar skyes par 'gyur dgos so //

ci ste snam bu phyis skyes na / dkar po yang
phyis skyes par 'gyur dgos so² // gal te dkar po
sngar skyes na ni³ de ltar na³ snam bu phyis skyes
yin la / gang zhig sngar skyes pa dang gang zhig
phyis skyes pa de dang ni gcig nyid du mi 'gyur te /
skye pa'i rim pa tha dad pa'i phyir ro //

N f.241b

gzhan yang gal te snam bu dang dkar po dag
gcig nyid du 'gyur na* ni de'i tshe dkar po zhig na
snam bu 'jig par 'gyur dgos la / snam bu zhig na
yang dkar po 'jig par 'gyur na / gang gi tshe dkar
po zhig na dkar po 'jig par 'gyur gyi /⁴ snam bu
'jig par mi 'gyur la / snam bu zhig na yang snam
bu kho na⁵ 'jig par 'gyur gyi / dkar po 'jig pa ni
ma yin te / de la snam bu dang dkar po dag gcig

¹ NP, CD add /.

² Bhattacharya's edition has to.

³ CDP, N de lta na.

⁴ CD, NP omit /.

⁵ CD, NP nar.

nyid do zhes gang 'dod pa de ma yin te / 'jig pa
dang mi 'jig pa tha dad pa'i phyir ro //

p f.248b

gzhan yang dkar po zhes smra* na dkar po zhes
bya ba kho na smras par 'gyur gyi snam bu zhes smra
pa ni ma yin la¹ /² snam bu zhes smra na yang
snam bu kho na smras par 'gyur gyi dkar po zhes
smras pa ni ma yin no // gang gi phyir dkar po zhes
³smra na dkar po zhes³ bya ba kho na smras par 'gyur
gyi snam bu zhes smras par ni mi 'gyur la /⁴ snam
bu zhes smra na yang snam bu kho na smras par 'gyur
gyi dkar po ma yin pa de'i phyir yang de dag gcig
tu mi 'gyur gyi smras pa dang ma smras pa* dang
tha dad pa'i phyir ro //

D f.219a

mtshan nyid las kyang ste / 'di na mtshan
nyid ni dkar po'i ngo bo yin la / mtshan gzhi ni
snam bu yin na gal te de gnyis gcig nyid du 'gyur
na ni / de'i tshe gal te dkar po mtshan nyid yin
na snam bu yang⁵ mtshan nyid kho nar 'gyur ro //
gal te snam bu mtshan nyid du mi 'gyur na ni dkar
po yang mtshan nyid du ⁶mi 'gyur ro⁶ // gal te

¹ CD, NP no.

² CD, NP //.

³ NP, CD omit smra na dkar po zhes.

⁴ NP, CD omit /.

⁵ CNP, D lang.

⁶ CD, NP ma gyur cig.

dkar po kho na mtshan nyid du 'gyur gyi snam bu ma yin
 pa¹ la snam bu kho na mtshan gzhi 'gyur gyi dkar
 po ni ma yin na ni de la snam bu dang dkar po dag
 gcig nyid de shes gang 'dod pa der mi 'gyur te² /
 mtshan nyid dang mtshan gzhi tha dad pa'i phyir
 ro // ji ltar snam bu dang dkar po dag gcig nyid
 bkag pa de bzhin du dngos po thams cad kyi gcig
 nyid dgag pa yang rgyas par brjod par bya'o //

N f.242a

'dir smras*pa / snam bu dang dkar po dag gcig
 nyid dgag pa ni smras na /³ gzhan nyid la brjod par
 bya'o // brjod par ste / gal te snam bu dang dkar
 po dag gzhan nyid yin zhing / gal te yon tan⁴ rdzas
 la brten pa'i phyir dkar po snam bur mi 'gyur na
 ni ji ltar gal te mchod sbyin lhas sbyin zhes bya
 ba'i spun zla ma yin na lhas sbyin yang mchod sbyin
 gyi spun zlar mi 'gyur ba nyid yin pa ltar snam bu
 yang dkar* por mi 'gyur ro //

P f.249a

gal te dkar po dang ldan pa las snam bu dkar
 por 'gyur ro⁵ zhes 'dod na / de la yang brjod par
 bya ste / gal te dkar po dang ldan pas snam bu
 dkar por 'gyur na / snam bu de gcig⁶ dkar po dang

¹ CD, NP omit pa.

² Bhattacharya's edition has to.

³ NP, CD omit /.

⁴ Bhattacharya's edition has ton.

⁵ CDN, P adds //.

⁶ CD, NP ci.

ldan pas dkar po'i mtshan nyid thob pa zhig gam
 'on te ma thob pa zhig yin grang na / gal te re¹
 zhig dkar po'i mtshan nyid thob pas snam bu dkar po
 nyid du 'gyur na 'di'i snam bu nyid nyams par 'gyur
 ro //

ci ste dkar po'i mtshan nyid ma thob pa yin
 na ni dkar po'i mtshan nyid ma thob pa'i phyir ldan
 pa yod kyang snam bu dkar por mi 'gyur te /² de
 la dkar po dang ldan pas snam bu dkar po yin no
 zhes bya ba gang 'dod pa³ ma yin no // ji ltar
 snam bu dkar por mi⁴ 'gyur ba de bzhin du snam bu'i
 khyad* par gang dag sngonpo dang /⁵ ser po dang /⁶
 dmar po dang /⁷ dmar ser dang /⁸ ser skya dang /⁹
 phug ron kha dang /¹⁰ nag po dang / ring po dang /
 thung ngu dang /¹¹ 'jam¹² dang rtsub pa la sogs pa

D f.219b
 C f.216b

-
- 1 NP, CD nge.
 - 2 NP, CD //.
 - 3 Bhattacharya's edition adds de ni.
 - 4 Bhattacharya's edition has ma.
 - 5 CD, NP omit /.
 - 6 CD, NP omit /.
 - 7 CD, NP omit /.
 - 8 CD, Np omit /.
 - 9 CD, NP omit /.
 - 10 CD, NP omit /.
 - 11 CD, NP omit /.
 - 12 CDP, N adds pa.

de dag las snam bu gzhan nyid yin pa'i phyir thams
 cad du srid pa med par 'gyur ro // thams cad du
 srid pa med pas kyang snam bu nyid du mi 'gyur ro //
 ji ltar snam bu nyid du mi 'gyur ba de bzhin du
 dngos po thams cad kyang yon tan¹ gyi khyad par
 de dang de dag la gzhan nyid yin pa'i phyir thams
 cad du srid pa med par 'gyur ro //

N f.242b

'dir smras pa /* yod pa dang med pa dag gis²
 gcig nyid dang gzhan nyid la ni dgag pa³ smra na³
 gnyi ga'i phyogs la yang⁴ dgag par⁴ brjod par
 bya'o // brjod par ste / gang gi snam bu dang
 dkar po dag gcig nyid du yang 'gyur la gzhan nyid
 du yang 'gyur ro zhes bya ba phyogs yin pa de la
 gcig nyid dang gzhan nyid dgag pa sngar bshad pa
 dag kho nas dgag pa rnam par bshad do //

P f.249b

gnyi ga ma yin* pa gang gi phyogs yin pa de
 la⁵ mdor⁶ bsdus nas dgag⁷ pa brjod par bya'o //
 gal te snam bu dang dkar po dag gcig nyid ma yin
 la / gnyi ga nyid kyang ma yin na ni gnyi ga'i
 mtshan nyid na thob pa'i phyir dkar po yang dkar

¹ Bhattacharya's edition has ton.

² Bhattacharya's edition has gyi.

³ CNP, D smran.

⁴ Bhattacharya's edition has dag pa.

⁵ Bhattacharya's edition adds ni.

⁶ Bhattacharya's edition adds pa.

⁷ Bhattacharya's edition has dgog.

po nyid ma yin zhing /¹ dkar po ma yin pa yang ma
 yin la snam bu yang snam bu nyid ma yin zhing snam
 bu ma yin pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir mtshan
 nyid gnyi ga ma thob pa'i dkar po la ci'i phyir
 dkar po zhes brjod kyi nag po zhes ma yin /² gang
 gi phyir dkar po de la dkar po zhes bya ba brjod kyi
 nag po zhes bya ba ma yin pa de'i phyir dkar po nyid
 du yod do // mtshan nyid gnyi ga ma thob pa'i snam
 bu de la yang ci'i phyir snam bu zhes brjod kyi bum
 pa zhes ma yin /³ gang gi phyir ⁴snam bu de la⁴
 snam bu zhes bya ba nyid brjod kyi bum pa zhes bya
 ba ma yin de'i phyir snam bu⁵ nyid yod do // de
 ltar dkar po nyid dang snam bu nyid du grub pa⁶ dang /
 gdon mi za bar de dag gcig nyid dam gzhan nyid du
 'gyur dgos la gcig nyid yin na ni slar⁷ yang gcig
 'gog pa'i rim* pa kho na brjod par bya'o //

D f.220a
 C f.217a

gzhan nyid* ma yang gzhan nyid 'gog pa'i tshul
 lo // de bzhin du dngos po thams cad la yang 'gog
 pa'i tshul rgyas par brjod par bya'o zhes rnam par
 'chad do //

¹ CD, NP omit /.

² CD, NP omit /.

³ CD, NP omit /.

⁴ Bhattacharya's edition repeats snam bu de la.

⁵ NP, CD add yang snam bu.

⁶ CDP, N omits pa.

⁷ CNP, D slir.

'dir smras pa / gal te de ltar ma grub pa¹
 phyir dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin med na rgol ba
 de dag 'thad pa gang gyis¹ dngos po yod par rtog ce
 na / de la 'thad pa 'ga' yang med kyi 'ong kyang /
 22. ji ltar rgyun² la lta nyes na //³

N f.243a

⁴rtag pa yod ces byar 'gyur ba* //⁴

de bzhin tshogs la lta nyes na //⁵

dngos po ces bya bar 'gyur //

P f.250a

ji ltar mar me'i me lce skad cig re re la 'jig
 cing snga ma dang phyi ma skad cig rgyu dang 'bras
 bu 'brel ba rnam par ma chad par gna[†] pa la rgyu
 dang rkyen gyi tshogs pa yod na yod pa'i rgyun
 'byung ba de bzhin du 'du byed skyes ma thag tu 'jig
 pa thams cad la bdag nyid ji lta bu'i rgyu dang
 rkyen gyi tshogs pa⁶ yod na yod pa'i rgyun rgyu
 'bras bu'i 'brel ba rnam par ma chad par gnas pa
 thog ma med par⁷ 'byung ngo // de'i phyir ji ltar
 rgyun de'i rang gi ngo bo ji ltar gnas pa ltar nges

¹ NP, CD add rangs te.

² CD, NP rgyu. Vaidya's edition also has rgyu.

³ CDP, N /.

⁴ Bhattacharya's edition has rtag pa yod ces bya
 bar 'gyur /. Vaidya's edition has rtag pa yod ces
 byar 'gyur na //.

⁵ CDP, N /.

⁶ CD, NP omit pa.

⁷ CD, NP pa.

par ma¹ 'prigs shing phyin ci log tu nges pa'i
 phyi rol ba'i drang srong rnam la sngon gyi gnas
 rjes su dran zhing 'dir skad cig mar 'jig pa mngon
 sum ma yin pas phung po gcig nas gcig tu brgyad
 pa'i rgyun la nges par mthong ba yin dang bdag gam
 gzhan yang rung ste / dngos po rtag pa yod do
 snyam² par 'byung ba / de bzhin du tshogs pa de
 dang de la brten nas 'byung ba dang³ 'byung ba las
 gyur pa dang / sems dang sems las⁴ byung ba dang /
⁵mtshan gzhi⁵ dang mtshan nyid la sogs pa'i bdag
 nyid can dang /⁶ de'i nye bar len can rtsva dang
 phyam⁷ dang rdzas la sogs pa tshogs pa⁸ khyim la
 sogs pa dang gzugs dang dri la sogs pa'i 'yon tan⁹
 tsogs pa bum pa la sogs pa dang /¹⁰ dngos po
 tshogs pa bdag nam mkha' la sogs pa yod do // tshogs
 pa las logs shig tu mtshan nyid ma grub pa'i chos
 'byung ba dang 'byung ba las gyur pa dang / sems

¹ CD, NP omit ma.

² DNP, C rnam.

³ NP, CD add /.

⁴ CD, NP omit las.

⁵ CDP, N mtshan nyid gzhi.

⁶ CDN, P omits /.

⁷ NP, CD phye ma.

⁸ NP, CD la.

⁹ Bhattacharya's edition has stong.

¹⁰ CD, N omits /; P //.

D f.220b
C f.217b

N f.243b
P f.250b

dang sems las byung ba dang /* bum pa* la sogs pa
gzugs brnyan dang brag cha¹ la sogs dang 'dra ba
de dang de las so sor 'jig rten pa'i phyin ci log
tshad mar byas te 'jig rten gzhuḡ par bya ba'i
phyir nye bar blangs nas sam brten nas rang dang
spyi'i mtshan nyid du 'dogs tsam zhig byed la /
de dag kyang skye ba na tshogs pa kho na skye zhing
tshogs pa kho na 'gag par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir
tshogs* pa ji lta ba bzhin ma shes pa dang blta ba
nyes* pas rgol ba dag la sogs pa so so² la rang gi
ngo bos yongs su grub par rtog cing phyin ci log
tsam las rigs³ pa med pa'i dngos po kho na rtogs so //
gal te de ltar dngos po med pas kho bo cag gi
dngos por lta ba phyin ci log yin na /⁴ khyod
kyang dngos po khas mi len na dngos po med par lta⁵
bar 'gyur na de yang shin tu mi rigs te / mthong
ba dang ma thong ba dang 'gal ba'i phyir ro zhe
na / bshad par bya ste / bdag ni⁶ dngos po med
par smra ba ma yin te / rten cing 'brel⁷ bar 'byung
bar smra ba'o // yang rten cing 'brel bar 'byung

¹ NP, CD ca.

² Bhattacharya's edition omits the second so.

³ CD, NP rig.

⁴ CDP, N omits /.

⁵ CD, NP blta.

⁶ NP, CD gi.

⁷ Bhattacharya's edition has 'bral.

ba'i don ¹gang zhig ce¹ na / rang bzhin med pa'i
 don dang rang bzhin gyis ma skyes pa'i don dang /
 sgyu ma dang smig rgyu dang gzugs brnyan dang dri
 za'i grong khyer dang sprul pa dang rmi lam dang
 mtshungs pa'i rang bzhin can gyi 'bras bu 'byung
 ba'i don dang /² stong pa nyid bdag med pa'i don
 to // 'di ltar /

23. gang la brten nas 'byung yod pa //

de ni rang dbang ma 'gyur ro //

'di kun rang dbang med pa ste //

des na bdag ni yod ma yin //

'di na gang la³ rang gi ngo bo dang rang bzhin
 dang⁴ rang dbang dang gzhan la rag ma las pa nyid
 yin pa de la ni rang las ma⁵ grub pas rten cing
 'brel bar 'byung ba yod pa ma yin na 'dus byas
 thams cad rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yang yin
 no // de ltar na dngos po gang la brten nas 'byung
 ba yod pa de ni rang dbang du mi 'gyur te / rgyu
 dang rkyen la rag las skyes pa'i phyir ro //

'di kun rang dbang med pa* ste*//

de'i phyir dngos po gang la yang* bdag ste rang
 bzhin yod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir 'dir rten cing

D f.221a

P f.251a

C f.218a

¹ CD, NP gang zhe na.

² N, CDP omit /.

³ NP, CD omit la.

⁴ Bhattacharya's edition has das.

⁵ CD, NP omit ma.

'brel bar 'byung ba rang ¹dbang gi¹ ngo bo dang
 bral ba'i phyir rang ²dbang gi² ngo bo dang bral*
 ba'i don stong pa nyid kyi don yin gyi thams cad
 dngos po med pa'i don ni³ ma yin no // de'i
 phyir 'di la rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba byas
 shing sgyu ma dang 'dra ba kun nas nyongs mongs
 pa dang rnam par byang ba'i rgyu la skur pa btab
 pas de med par lta ba phyin ci log yin la rang
 bzhin yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir na dngos por lta
 ba yang phyin ci log yin no // de'i phyir de ltar
 na dngos po rang bzhin dang bcas par smra ba rnams
 la rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba med pa dang rtag
 pa dang chad par lta ba'i skyon du 'gyur ro //

ci ste gal te rang dbang med pa'i don rten
 cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i don yin na ni 'on na
 gang khyed kyis nged⁴ cag la gnod par 'gyur ba
 khyod⁵ dang nged cag la khyad par cis yod snyam
 du sems na bshad par bya ste / gang khyed kyis
 rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i don ji lta ba
 bzhin rtogs⁶ pa dang brjod pa mi shes pa 'di ni
 khyad par ro // ji ltar byis pa gzhon nu tha

¹ CD, NP dbang ba'i.

² CD, NP dbang ba'i.

³ CD, NP omit ni.

⁴ CDP, N nges.

⁵ CDP, N khyed.

⁶ CD, NP rtog.

p f.251b

N f.244b
D f.221b
C f.218b

snyad la ma byang bas gzugs brnyan la bden par
gyur pa lhag par sgro btags pas ji lta ba bzhin
gnas pa'i rang bzhin stong pa nyid bsal¹ nas rang
bzhin dang bcas par rtogs pa² na gzugs brnyan rtog
mi shes pa de bzhin du khyod kyis kyang rten cing
'brel bar 'byung ba khas blangs kyang gzugs brnyan
dang mtshungs pa'i rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba
rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid du gyur kyang rang gi
ngo bo³ ji ltar gnas pa bzhin khong du chud par mi
shes te / ⁴ rang bzhin med pa⁴ nyid du mi 'dzin pa'i
phyir dang / yod pa ma* yin pa'i rang gi ngo bo la
yod pa'i rang gi ngo bo nyid du lhag par sgro btags
nas⁵ 'dzin pa'i phyir ro // brjod kyang mi shes
te / rang bzhin med pa nyid du mi brjod pa'i phyir
dang dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo nyid du brjod pa'i
phyir ro // de'i phyir de ltar rtogs pa dang brjod
mi shes pa na bdag nyid dang gzhan nyid slu⁷ bar
byed do // de'i phyir kho bo cag ches * tshogs che
ba 'dir gnas pas bstan* bcas byed pa'i rtson* pa 'di
'bras bu med pa ma yin no // gang gi phyir 'ga' la
yang ngo bo nyid kyi skye ba yod pa ma yin pa de

¹ CNP, D psal.

² CDP, N omits pa.

³ CDP, N bos.

⁴ NP, CD repeats rang bzhin med pa and add la.

⁵ CD, NP pa.

⁶ CD, NP na.

⁷ CD, NP bslu.

nyid kyi phyir /

24. 'bras bu med par dngos po ni //

kun la 'du ba yod ma yin //

'bras bu'i don du 'du ba gang //

de ni 'phag la¹ ma 'dus pa'o //

gal te dngos po rnams kyi 'jug pa rang bzhin
par 'gyur na ni rtag pa dang 'bras bu la ltos² par
mi 'gyur te rang bzhin ni 'bras bu la mi ltos³ so //
gcig gi dngos po⁴ ni⁵ 'gags⁶ kyang 'bras bu cung
zad kyang⁷ sgrub par mi nus pas tshogs pa'i 'bras
bu bsgrub par bya ba la phan tshun 'du bar yang
'gyur la / gang zhig 'bras bu'i ched du 'du ba med
pa zhig ste bden par gyur pa nyid du⁸ mgnon bar mi
bzhed do shes bya ba'i don to //

de nyid kyi phyir rnam par shes pa dngos po'i
rang gi ngo bo lhag par sgro 'dogs par byed pa nyon
mongspa can gyi mi shes pa'i dbang gis dngos po rnams
la chags pa dang ldan zhing 'khor bar 'jug pa'i

¹ Bhattacharya's edition has pa.

² CD, NP bltos.

³ CD, NP bltos.

⁴ CD, NP pos.

⁵ Bhattacharya's edition has mi.

⁶ NP, CD 'gas.

⁷ CD, NP kyi.

⁸ CDP, N de

sa bon du gyur pa rnam pa thams cad du gags¹ pa
 las 'khor ba ldog par rnam par gzha² go zhes bstan
 pa'i phyir bshad pa /

P f.252a

25. srid pa'i sa bon rnams shes te //

yul rnams de yi spyod* yul lo //

yul la bdag med mthong ba ni //

srid pa'i sa bon 'gag par 'gyur //

N f.245a

ji skad bshad pa'i tshul gyis yul rang bzhin
 med par mthong bas chags pa'i rgyu rnam par shes pa
 srid pa'i sa bon du gyur pa rnam pa thams cad du
 log pa las nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang /
 mi skye ba'i chos la bzod³ pa thob⁴ pa'i byang chub
 sems dpa' rnams la 'khor ba ldog pa rnam par gzha⁵
 go // de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes 'byung ba'i sa
 bon byang chub kyi sems de ni rnams la mi ldog ste /
 thams cad la de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye* shes rnyed pa
 gdon mi za bar 'byung ba'i phyir ro // gang dag gis
 kyang phyis gdon mi za bar bskyed nas byang chub
 sems dpa' spyod pas bla na med pa'i ye shes thob⁶
 bar bya kho na ste / 'di ni 'phags pa dam pa'i⁷

¹ NP, CD dgag.

² CD, NP bzhag.

³ Bhattacharya's edition has brjod.

⁴ CDP, N thub.

⁵ CD, NP bzhag.

⁶ Bhattacharya's edition has thos.

⁷ CDP, N pa.

D f.222a
C f.219a

chos* pad na dkar po'i ndo la sogs pa las¹ btsal
bar bya'o //

slob dpon 'phags pa lha'i zhal snga nas kyi
byang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya
pa las mthar 'dzin pa dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa zhes
bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu bzhi pa'i 'grel ba'o//

¹ CDP, 11 la.

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VIII ABBREVIATIONS

ABAW Abhandlungen der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften
du Berlin

AO Acta Orientalia

AŚ Aksaraśataka

BB Bibliotheca Buddhica

BI Bibliotheca Indica

BST Buddhist Sanskrit Texts

C Cone edition of Tibetan Tripitaka

CŚ Catuḥśataka

CSS Chowambha Sanskrit Series

CST Catuḥśatakatīkā

D sDe ge edition of Tibetan Tripitaka

GOS Gaekwad's Oriental Series

HOS Harvard Oriental Series

HPS Haraprasad Shastri's edition of the Catuḥśataka

IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly

IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal

JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society

JIBS Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies

JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

MA Madhyamakāvatāra

MCB Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques

MK Madhyamakakārikā

MKB Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus

MKV Madhyamakakārikāvṛtti

N sNar thang edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka

P Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka

PEW Philosophy East and West

PTS Pali Text Society

RO Rocznik Orientalistyczny

SBB Sacred Books of the Buddhists

SBH Sacred Books of the Hindus

SOR Serie Orientale Roma

ŚŚ Śataśāstra

VS Vaiśeṣika sūtras

WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasien

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